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iii. 
ABSTRACT 
The Canada-US border is commonly referred to as the world’s longest 
undefended border. The Canadian and American economies have become increasingly 
interdependent during the 20th century, making their shared border a means to economic 
prosperity. Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States’ perception of 
the porous border shifted from a symbol of friendship to a security risk. The Bush 
administration was concerned that the border, which was largely unguarded between 
official ports of entry, was a risk to terrorism and the cross-border smuggling of drugs, 
small arms, and humans. Borders reemerged as a means to security when the Bush 
administration took action to increase security along US borders. Canada’s economic 
stability is entirely dependent on the US market and the open Canada-US border, so 
Canadian policymakers immediately proposed a bilateral border security agreement that 
would keep the border open to trade and closed to illegal activity. This proposal led to 
the implementation of the Smart Border Declaration in December 2001. Part of the 
Declaration stipulated that Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) would be 
expanded across Canada. These teams are comprised of law enforcement agencies from 
Canada and the US, who share intelligence and patrol the border between ports of entry 
to more effectively police cross-border criminal activity. The purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate why it has become more effective to secure the Canada-US border through 
bilateral initiatives like IBETs than through unilateral initiatives since 9/11. The extent to 
which Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have fulfilled the objectives of the Smart 
Border Declaration are critically examined, as are the outcomes of shared intelligence 
through IBETs and their presence between ports of entry along the Canada-US border. 
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  1
The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and Open 
Canada-United States Border 
Introduction 
The Canada-United States border extends for 6,416 kilometers between the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and an additional 2,475 kilometers along the Pacific and 
Arctic Oceans.1 The world’s longest continuous boundary2 is more commonly referred to 
as the world’s longest undefended border.3 Geographic proximity has always made it in 
the best interests of Canada and the United States to establish long-term security and 
economic alliances. Over the past 200 years, the two countries have developed a history 
of friendship and mutual trust as their economies have become more intertwined. The 
implementation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988 and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 only deepened this 
interdependence. The effects of these agreements are astounding: between 1989 and 
1999, two-way trade between Canada and the US increased by 167%.4 Every minute of 
the day, over $1 million of goods cross the Canada-United States border,5 totaling $500 
billion in annual two-way trade.6  
                                                            
1 See Figure 1. 
2 International Boundary Commission, “Good Neighbours: A Short History of the Canada-US Boundary,” 
http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/centennielhist.html (accessed February 25, 2009).  
3 Canada, “Border Cooperation,” last updated November 25, 2008, 
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/washington/bilat_can/border_frontiere.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=34
&menu=L (accessed January 31, 2009).  
4 Blayne Haggart, Canada and the United States: Trade, Investment, Integration, and the Future, 
Depository Services Program, Government of Canada, April 2001, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-
R/LoPBdP/BP/prb013-e.htm (accessed February 3, 2009).  
5 “Border Cooperation.” 
6 Frank McKenna, Address to the Association of Canadian Studies in the United States, St. Louis, Missouri, 
November 17, 2005, 
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/washington/offices_bureaux/amb/051117.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 
February 3, 2009).  
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 Regional economic integration has brought about many positive outcomes for 
North America, but the ways in which globalization has undermined security cannot be 
overlooked. During the 1990s, the growth of legitimate global corporations was 
paralleled by a surge in global criminal organizations. These illicit industries have not 
only increased levels of violence, crime, and drug abuse in Canada and the United States; 
they also present a major security risk to the Canada-US border. The surge in cross-
border commerce between Canada and the United States since the implementation of 
CUFTA and NAFTA has made it increasingly difficult to weed out the illicit from the 
licit along the 9000-kilometer border.  
 Immediately following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on 
September 11, 2001, the Bush administration abandoned its focus on the economy in its 
efforts to secure all points of entry into the United States. The administration’s post-9/11 
security strategy was based on the premise that increasing border security would help 
prevent another attack. However, increased security along the Canada-US border and the 
subsequent traffic delays at ports of entry into the US had devastating economic effects. 
The paradox of creating a border open to trade and closed to dangerous goods and people 
became evident in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. A porous border that would permit 
the efficient movement of goods and people would be vulnerable to terrorism and cross-
border crime. Conversely, conducting a thorough search of each person and vehicle 
crossing the border at ports of entry would cripple the bilateral trade relationship. Even 
with a secure border, the laws of supply and demand dictate that if there is an increased 
demand, high profits increase the incentive to transport illicit goods and people across the 
border. Trying to stop these illicit flows by increasing security at official ports of entry is 
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reactive in nature and acts on the presumption that people with unlawful intentions will 
only cross the border at designated entry points.  Because official ports entry have 
become more secure since the 9/11 attacks, many individuals who are involved in cross-
border illicit activity will cross the border between ports of entry, where the border is 
difficult to patrol and the chances of being apprehended are lessened. 
 Motivated by the need to maintain a Canada-US border open to trade, Canadian 
policymakers have strengthened the bilateral security relationship by proposing a bilateral 
agreement that aimed to link economic and security issues. The Smart Border 
Declaration border security agreement, signed by US Director of Homeland Security 
Tom Ridge and Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley in December 2001, 
outlines a four-pillar action plan that sets out to resolve the conflict between trade and 
security at the Canada-US border. The Declaration’s objectives are meant to improve 
collaborative security efforts while making it even more efficient for legitimate goods 
and people to cross the border.7    
The 9/11 attacks created a newfound focus on securing the border between ports 
of entry and investing resources to patrol areas where cross-border crime is most likely to 
occur. Maintaining a Canada-US border that is open to trade but closed to illicit activity 
can only be achieved through strategic initiatives like Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams (IBETs), which police cross-border criminal activity between official ports of 
entry. These teams were developed before 9/11, but were given priority in the Smart 
Border Declaration. The Declaration states that intelligence and information 
coordination and sharing will be improved through the establishment of joint teams like 
                                                            
7 Canada, The Canada-US Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan, 2001.  
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IBETs, and that these teams will be expanded across Canada and the United States.8  
IBETs were expanded after 9/11 as part of the United States and Canada’s attempts to 
monitor cross-border terrorist activity. In doing so, these teams have also played a major 
role in policing the cross-border trafficking of illicit drugs, small arms, and people 
between official ports of entry. 
This qualitative research study examines Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
and their efforts to curb the illicit flow of small arms, drugs, and humans along the 
Canada-US border. This study will focus on addressing the following research question: 
have Integrated Border Enforcement teams met their operational objectives since the 
signing of the Smart Border Declaration?  
Recognizing the dynamics of post-9/11 border security has generated the 
following thesis: the 9/11 attacks generated the political will to prioritize collaborative 
border security initiatives like Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, which enabled 
these teams to achieve their operational objectives.  
Even if Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have succeeded in meeting their 
operational objectives, it cannot be assumed that these teams are an effective method of 
policing cross-border criminal activity due to the limitations of assessing effectiveness. 
Effectiveness would imply that because of IBET efforts, the interdiction rate at the border 
has increased. There have been various initiatives after 9/11 to better secure the Canada-
US border, making it impossible to isolate the effects of IBETs alone. The absence of 
reliable statistics also makes it impossible to accurately assess effectiveness. IBETs are  
                                                            
8 Ibid. 
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responsible for policing illicit industries. Statistics on these industries are estimates at 
best, and since it is impossible to know the rate at which illicit activity has been 
increasing, the rate of interdiction cannot be determined. In spite of these limitations, 
examining IBETs abilities to meet their operational objectives is worthwhile, because it 
explores innovative methods of fighting international crime with international policing 
efforts. 
The first chapter of this thesis provides a theoretical analysis of economic 
liberalism, and discusses the global shift away from protectionism and towards regional 
integration. This chapter examines the benefits of globalization, specifically the positive 
outcomes of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Finally, this chapter discusses how globalization has 
changed the role of political borders, focusing on the reduced power of the state to 
monitor and control the growth of global business. Chapter 2 examines the negative 
consequences of globalization, namely the parallel rise of global legitimate business and 
the illicit drug, small arm, and human smuggling industries. This chapter also studies the 
ways in which these illicit criminal organizations have undermined efforts to police the 
porous Canada-US border during the 1990s. Chapter 3 discusses the re-emergence of the 
Canada-US border after the 9/11 attacks. Efforts to close the border to criminal activity 
while keeping it open to trade are critically analyzed. Chapter 4 discusses the 
methodology of this qualitative study. This chapter outlines the operational objectives 
that were used to analyze the role of IBETs in securing the Canada-US border between 
ports of entry. Information obtained from media reports, government documents, and 
elite interviews were used to explain the origins, purpose, and goals of IBETs after 9/11. 
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These documents and interviews were examined in order to determine whether IBETs 
have fulfilled the goals outlined in the Smart Border Declaration. Case studies of 
intelligence-led IBET operations and patrolling sessions were examined in order to 
determine whether their presence along the border is a useful method of curbing cross-
border criminal activity. Chapter 5 outlines Canada’s efforts to maintain its economic 
interdependence with the United States through improving its border security. This 
chapter also highlights the need for cooperative efforts to combat global crime through 
initiatives like Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs), and provides a survey of 
the origin, composition, and goals of IBETs. Chapter 6 critically analyses IBET 
operations, and through the examination of media reports, interviews, and official 
documents, discusses the extent to which IBETs have fulfilled their operational 
objectives, which were generated from the Smart Border Declaration. Other benefits of 
IBETs that were not addressed in the Smart Border Declaration, particularly the increase 
in seizures and arrests between ports of entry, will also be mentioned. Chapter 7 
examines the limitations of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. This chapter also 
provides conclusions and recommendations based on a comparison of IBETs with 
collaborative policing efforts between European Union member-states. 
Chapter 1: Globalization and Regional Integration in North America  
1.1 Economic Liberalism  
Illicit industries have become global since the 1990s, increasing both in power and 
scope.  There is a wide consensus that the larger process of globalization has fueled the 
growth of these industries. Although globalization can be discussed in social and cultural 
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terms, this study will focus on the economic component of globalization. The process of 
globalization is based on the theoretical principles of economic liberalism. Proponents of 
this theory denounce state-run economies,9 instead advocating for an independent private 
sector.10 According to economic liberalism, the state should have limited control over 
prices and economic activities,11 and should avoid placing domestic restrictions on the 
international movement of commerce.12 State action should be limited to allowing for the 
free movement of the market economy and providing an infrastructure and legal system 
that safeguard private property.13 State governments should also take proactive measures 
to lower barriers to trade and encourage the growth of private business14 through actions 
like reducing the number of state-owned enterprises.15 
   These ideals have only recently become the foundations of a global economy, but 
proponents of economic liberalism have opposed tariffs and other state-imposed 
limitations on the global movement of economic goods for hundreds of years.16 
Economic liberalists argue that free-market economies are more efficient than state-run 
economies,17 claiming that “market-led, short-term efficiency will lead to long-term 
                                                            
9 Gerd Nonneman, “Economic Liberalization: The Debate,” in Political and Economic Liberalization: 
Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative Perspectives, ed. Gerd Nonneman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1996), 4.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization, A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 
16. 
13 Moisés Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New 
York: Doubleday, 2005), 18. 
14 Nonneman, 6.  
15 Naim, 18.  
16 Scholte, 38.  
17 Scholte, 16.  
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growth.”18 Furthermore, privatization and deregulation are said to reinforce the principles 
of freedom, democracy, and peace.19  
By the 1980s, a general consensus had emerged that the global economy could be 
more effectively stabilized through the market economy than by the state.20 Commonly 
known as the Washington Consensus, 21 this consensus emerged after many state-run 
economies during the 1970s were found to be extremely inefficient due to the lack of 
competition, incentives, and rewards. State-run economies wasted government resources 
and created deficits instead of predicted revenues. Ultimately, state-run economies were 
blamed for the global debt crisis of the 1980s.22 By the late 1980s, support for state-run 
economies was plummeting, and the ideals of economic liberalism soon became the 
“compass for economic policymakers around the world.” 23  
Economic liberalism in practice soon became known as globalization, which 
Barbara Harriss-White defines as the “worldwide integration of markets.” 24 This 
interconnectivity of markets was complemented by global advances in information 
technology and communications, which have contributed to an unprecedented level of 
global integration.25 Supporters of economic liberalism had long argued that a market-led 
global economy would lead to more efficient production and contribute to global 
stability. Transforming theory into policy has only demonstrated the validity of these 
                                                            
18 Nonneman, 4.  
19 Scholte, 38.  
20 Nonneman, 6.  
21 Nonneman, 3.  
22 Nonneman, 5.  
23 Barbara Harriss-White, “Globalization, Insecurities and Responses: An Introductory Essay,” in 
Globalization and Insecurity: Political, Economic, and Physical Challenges, ed. Barbara Harriss-White 
(New York: Palgrave, 2002), 18.  
24 Harriss-White, 1.  
25 Ibid. 
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claims: communication is instant26 and trade has become increasingly efficient.27 More 
importantly, globalization has decreased the likelihood of war by creating a global 
marketplace and global culture. According to Moisés Naim, states that are linked to one 
another through trade agreements and investments are more likely to maintain positive 
relations. For example, the process of economic and political integration within the 
European Union (EU) has greatly reduced the possibility of another war in Europe.28 
Harriss-White believes there to be a positive correlation between globalization and global 
stability, arguing that “by making war both unlikely and unprofitable, our era of 
globalization is capable of bringing an end to it.”29 
1.2 Regional Integration  
By the mid-1990s, the emergence of regional and international integration, 
combined with the reduction of regulatory trade barriers in developed and developing 
countries, served as evidence that the global economy was based on principles of 
economic liberalism.30 Although proponents of this theory supported limited control by 
the state, they still recognized the need to develop regional and international institutions 
to support the processes of globalization.31 States have increasingly chosen to give up 
some of their sovereignty in exchange for the economic and security benefits of these 
                                                            
26 Naim, 270. 
27 Free trade made price competition global in scope, which has pressured producers to become as efficient 
as possible. The result has been lower prices for consumers. (Malcolm Payne and Gurid Aga Askeland, 
Globalization and International Social Work (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008), 12) 
28 Naim, 270. 
29 Harriss-White, 2. This statement has been widely disputed. P.W. Singer argues that globalization has 
created a profit factor for war, citing the rise of private military firms that sell military services. For 
example, between 1994 and 2002, the U.S. government entered into various contracts with US-based 
military firms that cost over $300 billion. (P.W. Singer, “War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized 
Military Firms and International Law,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 521 (2003): 522.  
30 Scholte, 16.  
31 Scholte, 25.  
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institutions: “Isolationism of the pre-Second World War era is long gone. In the face of 
regional economic powers, the need for aggregation in order to remain viable in a global 
market is paramount.”32 Political support for regional and global integration led to a surge 
in institution-building, as evidenced through the creation of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs) like the Asian Pacific Economic Corporation (APEC)33 and 
the European Union (EU).34 The WTO reports that 109 RTAs were formed between 1948 
and 1994 alone. One-third of these agreements were implemented between 1990 and 
1994.35 Writing in 2005, Gerald Blake observed that “the majority of states today belong 
to an economic or political grouping of some kind.”36   
The pressure to become increasingly efficient has motivated states to become 
involved in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Michael Byers defines free trade as “an 
absence of tariffs, quotas and other restrictions that make imports more expensive than 
domestically produced goods.”37 According to the Law of Comparative Advantage, free 
trade makes it possible for countries to produce and export goods that they can produce 
most efficiently and import goods that cost less than they could to be produced 
domestically.38 Efficient production is paramount in a globalized world: now that 
businesses have become global in scope, so has competition. Regional integration and the 
                                                            
32 Thomas M. Edwards, “Information Geopolitics: Blurring the Lines of Sovereignty,” in Holding the Line: 
Borders in a Global World, ed. Heather N. Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 
35.  
33 Haggart, Canada and the United States.  
34 Scholte, 207.  
35 Robert Went, Globalization: Neoliberal Challenges, Radical Responses (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 21.  
36 Gerald Blake, “Boundary Permeability in Perspective,” in Holding the Line: Borders in a Global World, 
ed. Heather N. Nicol and Ian Townsend-Gault (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 18. 
37 Michael Byers, Intent for a Nation: What is Canada For? A Relentlessly Optimistic Manifesto for 
Canada’s Role in the World (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007), 192.  
38 Ibid. 
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subsequent reduction of state regulation and tariffs have increased product 
specializations, and efficient production39 has resulted in lower prices being paid for 
products.40 According to Gerd Nonneman, “increased competition and trade end up 
creating more wealth overall.”41 The promise of efficient production, lower prices for the 
consumer, and improved economic and social conditions42 have encouraged countries 
around the world to enter into Regional Trade Agreements. 
1.3 Regional Integration in North America  
The proposal of a North American trading bloc was thus part of a larger trend of 
regional economic integration and the dismantling of tariffs and other protectionist 
measures. Discussions of free trade originated between Canada and the United States 
during the 1980s, and expanded to include Mexico in the mid-1990s. The right-wing 
policies of former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who held office between 1984 and 
1993, were very similar to the policies of Ronald Reagan, the President of the United 
States at the time. Mulroney was determined to remove barriers to trade between the two 
countries while in office.43 In September 1985, he announced that Canada and the United 
States were entering into negotiations to reduce trade barriers and increase levels of 
bilateral trade.44 Even as he supported free trade with the US, Mulroney was aware of the 
controversial nature of the subject. The Canadian elections in 1891, 1991, and the 
election that Mulroney won in 1988 were all fought over the issue of free trade with the 
                                                            
39 Scholte, 12. 
40 Scholte, 206. 
41 Nonneman, 6. 
42 Scholte, 39.  
43 Byers, 193.  
44 Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World Into the Twenty-First 
Century, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Nelson, 2008), 293. 
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US.45 Mulroney said in 1983 that “Canadians rejected free trade with the US in 1911. 
They would do so again.”46 There had also been concern in the United States about how 
free trade would affect domestic industries.47 
By 1988, however, the world was gradually forming into three distinct trading 
blocs: Europe, Asia, and North America.48 The Mulroney government recognized that the 
United States was its most important export market, and that it was thus in Canada’s best 
interest to support further integration with its neighbor.49 Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal 
government had already tried to alter the patterns of trade away from the US and towards 
Europe during the 1970s. However, the percentage of trade with the US continued to rise 
while the percentage of trade with Europe continued to decline, evidencing the long-
standing importance of the US to Canada’s economic stability.50 The Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement (CUFTA) was signed on January 2, 1988 by Prime Minister Mulroney 
and President Reagan.51 The Agreement stipulated that almost all tariffs on most goods 
would be eliminated by January 1, 198852 in order to further expand the bilateral trading 
relationship.53 
The US had always been an important market for Canada because of its large 
population, powerful economy, and geographic proximity to Canada.54 Table 1 shows 
                                                            
45 Haggart, Canada and the United States. Canadians worried that developing close relations with would 
come at the expense of Canadian sovereignty. 
46Hillmer and Granatstein, 293. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Haggart, Canada and the United States.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Hillmer and Granatstein, 293.  
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that in 1988, the year in which CUFTA was implemented, two-way trade already totaled 
$153 billion. The free trade negotiations between Canada and the US created an 
unprecedented level of economic integration and generated a sharp increase in two-way 
trade.55 Between 1988 and 1998, trade between Canada and the US increased by more 
than 150% to $329.5 billion. Throughout the 1990s, an increasing percentage of 
Canadian exports were headed to the US: between 1988 and 2002, the percentage of US-
bound Canadian exports increased from 75% to 87%.56 This rise in the US share of 
Canadian exports can be attributed to the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, as well as to 
the low Canadian dollar and the economic boom in the US during the 1990s.57 Table 1 
shows a continuous rise in two-way trade after the signing of the CUFTA.  
CUFTA’s success motivated Prime Minister Mulroney to enter into trade 
negotiations with the US once again in September 1990 that aimed to include Mexico in 
the free trade agreement. This extension of CUFTA would safeguard North American 
corporations from Asian and European competitors by creating a North American trading 
bloc.58 Even during negotiations, Canada and Mexico were the United States’ largest and 
third-largest trading partners, respectively. Once signed, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) would lead to a further increase in trade between the three 
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countries through a gradual phasing-out of tariffs. NAFTA was officially implemented on 
January 1, 1994.59  
The first objective stated in the text of the NAFTA is to “eliminate barriers to 
trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services between the 
territories of the parties.”60 Following its implementation, the North American economy 
was marked by deregulation, privatization, and foreign investments. Between 1994 and 
2000, trade between Canada and the US grew at an average annual rate of 13%.61 The 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) reported that Canada’s 
merchandise trade with the US had risen 80% in value between 1994 and 1998. During 
the same period, US investments in Canada increased by 63%.62 Within the first decade 
of NAFTA’s implementation, the Canadian economy grew at about 3.4% per year, and 
approximately 2.5 million jobs were created as a result of free trade.63 Table 1 shows the 
continued increase in two-way trade from 1994-2000. 
Amidst the successes of free trade, critics point out that CUFTA and NAFTA 
were directly responsible for widening the income gap in Canada. From 1995-2007, the 
average income of the richest of Canadian families increased by 16.8% while the income 
of the poorest 20% Canadian families fell by an average of 7.6%.64 Critics of free trade 
agreements claim that the implementation of CUFTA and NAFTA made it difficult for 
governments to protect domestic industries, which led to job losses in Canada and the 
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US. However, Granatstein and Hillier argue that a low-valued Canadian dollar reduced 
the costs of Canadian exports, and the resulting increase in the US demand for exports 
“mitigated the effects of unemployment.”65 
By the year 2000, 86% of Canadian exports were US-bound, accounting for 33% 
of Canada’s GDP. Canada also held a consistent trade surplus with the United States,66 
which compensated for the trade deficits that were accumulated from trading with the rest 
of the world.67 It was clearly in Canada’s best interests to remain economically dependent 
on the US market.68 The US economy had also become more economically dependent on 
Canada since the signing of CUFTA and NAFTA. By 2001, Canada was the United 
States’ largest foreign market, with approximately 23% of US exports headed north. A 
greater percentage of US exports went to Canada than the entire EU, despite the fact that 
Canada has only one-tenth of the EU’s population.69  
Industries vital to the US and Canadian economies have also become completely 
dependent on the bilateral relationship. The integration of the Canadian and US auto 
industries began in 1965 when the two countries were engaged in an escalating dispute 
about Canadian export subsidies. The result was a sectoral free trade agreement known as 
the Canada-US Auto Pact. Under this agreement, the Big Three no longer had to pay 
tariffs, regardless of whether their production plants were located in Canada or the US. 
The Auto Pact laid the foundation for NATFA negotiations that pertained to the auto 
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industry.70 By early 2001, 30% of Canadian auto exports were headed for the US and 
25% of US auto exports were Canada-bound.71 Dependence normally increases 
vulnerability, but in the case of economic integration between Canada and the US, 
dependence created power and economic stability. Andrew Cooper argues that “from the 
criteria of national interest, the US [had become] Canada’s first, second, and third 
priority.”72 
1.4 Regional Integration and the State   
By the 1990s, free trade had become synonymous with economic efficiency. It is 
of great importance to examine the changing role of the state amidst economic 
globalization. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia invested in states the power to conduct their 
own affairs within their territory, thereby establishing a permanent connection between 
territory and sovereignty. European imperialism spread this notion of state sovereignty 
around the globe, making it “the cornerstone of international order.”73 The recent 
liberalization of markets has increased the power of global business. Amidst global and 
regional integration, the role of borders has evolved from a means to security to a means 
to trade. Borders have become gateways for economic efficiency and profits. In the EU, 
for example, political boundaries have become very porous to facilitate the transfer of 
people and commerce.74  
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During a 1996 speech to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Canadian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy discussed the relationship between 
globalization and the emergence of porous political boundaries. He admitted that national 
defence and sovereignty were of decreasing importance because of regional and 
multilateral alliances.75 According to Axworthy, borders could no longer guarantee 
security amidst economic globalization. Integration had reduced state power to harness 
the national economy and to act as a regulatory force.76 Harriss-White claims that there is 
a conflict between the state and globalization, calling the state “an unnatural and even 
dysfunctional unit for managing economic interests in a borderless world.”77  
Globalization has created permanent economic ties between countries around the 
world, which according to Harris-White, have decreased the possibility of renewed global 
conflict.78 In North America, regional integration has arguably created jobs79 and made 
the production of goods much more efficient. In spite of these successes, there have been 
many negative outcomes of globalization. Profits created by globalization have in many 
cases come at the expense of communities that are dependent upon local business and 
domestic production. For example, some workers in the North American auto production 
industry have suffered from lowered wages and decreased prospects of employment due 
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to competition from developing countries, such as India and China.80 The adverse effects 
of globalization, particularly the evolving role of borders amidst economic liberalization, 
must be further investigated. Chapter Two will discuss the parallel growth of legitimate 
and illegitimate global trade and the ways in which these industries have undermined the 
security of the Canada-US border.  
Chapter 2: The Globalization of Illicit Industries 
2.1 The Globalization of Crime 
Laissez-faire economic policies that have been supported by many economists, 
political leaders, and academics do not come without consequence. Although economic 
liberalism claims that globalization advances democracy and peace, the theory does not 
address the potential for technological advancements and open markets to facilitate 
global activity that undermines these goals. The free flow of licit goods across political 
boundaries and the globality of communications and finance technology have both 
facilitated and encouraged the flow of illicit goods.81 From 1990-2000, global trade 
increased by 6% each year82 as barriers to trade were continually lowered multilaterally 
through institutions like the WTO and regionally through trade agreements like the EU 
and NAFTA.83 Market reforms of the 1990s reduced the ability of governments to control 
who and what crossed through their borders. During this time period, it also became more 
financially rewarding to engage in illicit trade.84 Illicit trade is defined as “trade that 
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breaks the rules- the laws, regulations, licenses, taxes, embargos, and all the procedures 
that natives employ to organize commerce, protect their citizens, raise revenues, and 
enforce moral codes. It includes purchases on sales that are strictly illegal everywhere 
and others that may be illegal in some countries and accepted in others.”85  
Although illicit business has always existed, the macroeconomic changes of the 
1990s altered illicit trade in two distinct ways: It has caused it to increase exponentially 
in value, and it has expanded the type of activities it will engage in.86 There was a 
complete reorganization of criminal organizations during the 1990s, similar to the 
processes that legitimate companies undertake to increase productivity.87  Whereas 
criminal organizations were traditionally structured hierarchically with a central 
authority, globalization has made it safer and more profitable to have a networking 
system that in many ways mirrors the structure of corporations.88 The result of this 
restructuring was the emergence of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). These 
networks engage in the trafficking and distribution of anything illegal, including: drugs, 
small arms, art, counterfeit products, nuclear material, and people.89  
A decentralized structure enables TCOs to change locations, develop new ways of 
doing business, and maximize profits90 while operating under less risk than ever before.91  
TCOs have also benefited from the globalization of transportation and technology. More 
efficient methods of global transportation have significantly reduced the cost of shipping 
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anything illegal.92 Improved technology has created more efficient container vessels, 
better logistics, just-in-time shipping, satellites, and tracking systems; all of which have 
made trade faster and more accessible for legitimate businesses and criminal 
organizations. 93 Remote shipping capabilities are particularly challenging to state 
governments, since the people who are in charge of trafficking illicit goods through their 
borders are often halfway around the world. The internet has encouraged criminal 
organizations to conduct business via instant messaging and text messaging, and to track 
parcel shipments online. The global availability of internet cafés and anonymous e-mail 
accounts make these criminal networks virtually untraceable94 by enabling them to “play 
across borders and cover their tracks without impeding the actual flow of goods.”95  
Michael Byers notes that in the face of globalization, the state is burdened with an 
important function: “Balancing the costs and benefits of trade, and guarding against its 
excesses, are among the most important responsibilities of any national government as it 
negotiates, ratifies, oversees and sometimes renegotiates trade agreements.”96 However, 
globalization has made it increasingly difficult for the state to harness its power, 
especially amidst increasingly porous borders. Moisés Naim argues that the globalization 
of business has strengthened global criminal organizations while simultaneously 
weakening the ability of states to police them.97 The surge in cross-border flows of 
commerce and people and innovative shipping technologies are making it increasingly 
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difficult for law enforcement authorities to monitor cross-border criminal activity.98 
Globalization has resulted in border enforcement officers around the world being 
bombarded by the massive flow of goods and people between border crossings.99 It has 
become impossible to check 100% of the goods in cargo ports and every FedEx and DHL 
package that crosses political boundaries. 100 Furthermore, recent technological advances 
in shipping have made illicit trade more complex than ever before. 101 Shipping tracking 
can be done online, and the person in charge of an operation can be anywhere in the 
world when items are shipped. 102   
Various laws and sovereignty concerns often prevent domestic law enforcement 
officials from finding the ringleaders of smuggling operations that undermine security at 
their borders.103 Many of the world’s richest countries have failed in their efforts to 
interdict the trafficking of illicit goods and people. Domestic law enforcement officials 
are still unable to curb these booming industries, even after funding increases, the 
imposition of stricter laws, and improved operational technology.104 The laws of supply 
and demand dictate that if the demand for a good exceeds the supply, the price of that 
good will rise. As states increased border security and cut off supply routes to prevent the 
trafficking of illicit goods, the increased risk of being apprehended makes it even more 
profitable for criminal organizations to satisfy the demand for these goods. Moisés Naim 
concludes that “in the global clash between governments and criminals, governments are 
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systematically losing. Everywhere.”105 The failure to curb illicit trafficking industries is 
alarming. Global illicit trade is interconnected with international terrorism, the global 
proliferation of weapons, ethnic and regional violence and conflict, and has the potential 
to wreak havoc on the environment and the global financial system.106 It is of great 
importance to determine the most effective ways to counter, if not eliminate, the illicit 
trafficking of goods and people.  
According to the Canada-United States Organized Crime Threat Assessment, the 
three largest sources of revenue for organized crime globally are drug trafficking, arms 
smuggling, and human trafficking/migrant smuggling.107  The lines separating each of 
these industries are becoming increasingly blurred, and these industries are harder to 
differentiate from legitimate business since “much of what makes illicit trade so 
successful today is the result of deliberate policies, ones aimed at global integration, open 
economies, and open societies.”108 Section 2.2 will trace the rise of the three most 
powerful global illicit industries. 
2.2 The Globalization of Illicit Drug, Small Arms and Human Smuggling  
The illicit drug industry has experienced great success in the era of free trade.  
The covert nature of the industry makes it difficult to generate statistical information on 
revenues.  However, experts claim that the illicit drug trade is one of the most profitable 
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industries in the world,109 generating upwards of $400 billion in annual profits and 
accounting for 8% of all international trade.”110 In 2005, the United Nations Office for 
Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCCP) reported that the past 20 years have been 
characterized by the “global spread of drug trafficking.”111 
Simple charts of drug flow patterns have evolved into complex networks that link 
almost every country in the world to the production and/or trafficking of drugs.112 The 
illicit drug trade industry is directly correlated with increases in domestic violence and 
crime, worsened health statistics, unstable economies,113 and political corruption.114 
The globalization of the illicit drug trade began during the late 1980s and early 
1990s when the production and transfer of illicit drugs was taken over by major criminal 
organizations, several of which controlled large sectors of the illicit drug market. These 
organizations became extremely powerful as the illicit drug trade became a global 
industry, spreading to all major regions of the developed and developing world. 
According to Moisés Naim, “the entire legal and technological apparatus of globalization 
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has made the illicit drug trade faster, more efficient, and easier to hide.”115 The blurring 
of the licit and illicit transfer of goods is achieved primarily through the ability of drug 
entrepreneurs to operate in a similar fashion as legitimate transnational corporations. 
Rapid technological advances offer the same conveniences to multinational corporations, 
small businesses, and drug traffickers alike.116 Drug entrepreneurs are able to send 
packages through express mail, track shipments online, and coordinate drug sales through 
cell phones and instant messaging.117 A sharp increase in global travel combined with the 
sheer impossibility of checking every FedEx package has made “the drug export 
sector…an unintended beneficiary of these economic changes.”118 
Curbing such a booming industry through policing efforts is nearly impossible: 
Raymond Kendall, Secretary-General of the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) admitted that “there is no doubt that the illegal trade in narcotics is being 
increasingly interwoven with the regular economy on a national as well as an 
international level.”119 Throughout the 1990s, there were approximately 300,000 drug 
seizures around the world each year. By 1999, this number had quadrupled to 1.4 
million.120  However, increases in seizures do not necessarily indicate that policing 
methods have improved. It is more likely that there has been a sharp increase in the 
production and trafficking of illicit drugs since the early 1990s.121  
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A small arm is defined as a weapon that one or two people are able to carry. Small 
arms include anything from hand guns to stinger missiles, and include mortars and 
rocket-propelled grenades.122 The legitimate global trade in small arms creates over $4 
billion in annual revenues, accounting for 80-90% of small arms trading around the 
world. The remaining 10-20% of global arms trade falls into the category of the illicit 
arms trade industry.123 By definition, the illicit trade of small arms includes the illegal 
trafficking of small arms, as well as trading small arms for currency, illicit drugs, or 
anything else that crosses a border between two countries.124 The trafficking of illicit 
small arms generates approximately $1 billion in annual revenues. This industry is 
particularly elusive, since many countries fail to provide accurate or transparent data on 
small arms exports.125  
 The processes of globalization were directly responsible for creating a global 
market for small arms trafficking. According to RT Naylor, the early 1990s were witness 
to the “emergence of an international underground economy [for small arms].That 
economy consists of a set of interrelated black markets supported by their own systems of 
information, their own sources of supply, their own distribution networks, and their own 
modes of financing.”126 Around the same time, the massive stockpiles of outdated small 
arms that were used during the Cold War presented a major profit-making opportunity for 
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entrepreneurs.127 Since the 1990s, the illicit trade in small arms has become completely 
dependent on elements of globalization. Criminal networks use techniques similar to 
illicit drug entrepreneurs to conduct their business.128 
 In his 1995 Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali expressed concern about the illegal proliferation of small arms and the lack of 
international regulations.129 This industry is especially difficult to regulate and police 
because many countries have opposing laws regarding the production and exportation of 
small arms. The line between licit and illicit small arms has always been blurred, and has 
resulted in a near absence of international regulations. Ghali’s effort to make the UN the 
overarching body to regulate the proliferation of small arms was largely unsuccessful. 
His talks sparked major controversy from governments who refused to give the UN the 
authority to regulate the small arms industry.130 
 The absence of a rule of law regarding arms control has become particularly 
evident through US actions since the September 11th attacks. Rachel Stohl, Senior 
Analyst at the Center for Defense Institute claims that since 9/11, “the US has made the 
global war on terror its priority in determining arms transfers and military assistance.” 
The Bush administration has increased US sales and transfers of weapons, military 
training, and other military assistance to countries around the world, regardless of 
whether they hold poor human rights records or democratic principles. The only 
precondition to receiving this assistance is that they remain allies with the US in its War 
Against Terror. The administration has opposed and effectively blocked several UN-led 
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initiatives to develop a system of international regulation on arms trading and military 
assistance.131 
Despite the lack of international consensus on the issue, regulating and policing 
the small arms industry is of great importance. Small arms are the weapons of choice in 
many regional and ethnic conflicts in the developing world,132 as seen in Bosnia and 
Somalia during the 1990s.133 The proliferation of small arms increases the level of crime 
and violence on a global scale,134 and is often linked to terrorist organizations and other 
illegal activities: “Firearms are used by members of criminal organizations and individual 
criminal entrepreneurs to facilitate their illicit activities like drug trafficking.”135 
Effective policing methods must be employed in order to reduce cross-border smuggling 
of small arms.  
The UN reports that human trafficking and migrant smuggling are quickly 
becoming “booming international trades.” 136 It is estimated that human trafficking for the 
purposes of the sex trade alone amounts to $5 billion in annual profits.137 Human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling both involve the movement of persons across borders, 
but there are notable differences between them. Trafficking in persons “involves the use 
of threats, force, coercion or fraud resulting in the conditions of servitude, slavery or 
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commercial sexual exploitation.”138 According to the United Nations Global Report on 
Trafficking in Persons (2009), the two most common forms of human trafficking are 
forced labour and sexual exploitation.139 Migrant smuggling is defined as “the illegal 
movement of persons across international borders.”140 In the case of human trafficking, 
the movement across borders is not voluntary and if it is, deception is normally involved. 
Conversely, migrant smuggling is a voluntary activity. People in search of better 
economic opportunity and a peaceful life often pay substantial fees to be transported 
illegally into another country.  
Globalization has created more porous borders, which have given criminal 
organizations easy access into countries around the world. In the case of migrant 
smuggling, it has become much less risky to transport migrants from their country of 
origin through transit countries and to their destination. Border officials have the 
resources and time to check only a small percentage of goods and people crossing 
political boundaries, which has lowered the risks for criminal organizations engaged in 
migrant smuggling.141  
The United Nations is particularly concerned about the rise in human trafficking 
because it is considered to be an international human rights violation. These concerns led 
to the implementation of the United Nations Protocol Against Trafficking in Persons in 
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2003.142 This Protocol presented an agreed-upon definition of human trafficking and 
established an international consensus that the trafficking of persons, particularly of 
women and children, is a criminal offense.143 Despite these international regulations, 
migrant smuggling and human trafficking are two of the largest illicit sources of revenue 
around the world. It is of great importance to determine the most effective ways of 
curbing these industries, which undermine international human rights and domestic social 
welfare systems.  
2.3 Free Trade in North America and Global Crime 
 This section will outline the ways in which regional integration and free trade 
have impacted criminal organizations operating in Canada and the United States. The 
Criminal Code of Canada defines a criminal organization as a group that “is composed of 
three or more persons in or outside Canada; and has as one of its main purposes or main 
activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if 
committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, 
including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the 
group.”144 Until the 1990s, most organized crime in Canada involved Outlaw Motorcycle 
Gangs (OMGs), which effectively controlled Canada’s illicit drug trade. The processes of 
globalization expanded illicit activity in Canada during the 1990s. Law enforcement 
officials report that drugs, small arms, humans, contraband cigarettes, counterfeit 
currency, art, and anything else that that is illegal in either Canada or the United States is 
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smuggled across the shared border.145 The National Security Policy of Canada outlines 
the ways in which the globalization of criminal activity has impacted the security of 
Canadians: “Organized crime in Canada is increasingly becoming part of a global 
network that supports the narcotics trade, migrant smuggling and the trafficking in 
persons, weapons smuggling, money laundering, theft, commercial fraud, and extortion. 
A number of terrorist networks have advanced their activities by developing links with 
organized crime. Elements of organized crime are also increasing their attempts to 
undermine our justice system.”146  The National Security Policy makes it evident that the 
Canada-US border plays a major role in global illicit criminal networks.  
Regional integration in North America has increased the volume of goods and 
people that cross the Canada-US border. Since the two countries chose not to create a 
customs union as was done in the European Union, customs officials on both sides of the 
Canada-US border are still responsible for inspecting vehicles and completing the 
necessary paperwork. Increasing volumes of goods and people crossing the border has 
made it more difficult for customs officials to efficiently and effectively move people and 
goods through designated ports of entry.  
While the increased movement between political borders has made trade more 
efficient, economic logic dictates that this process of globalization has unintentionally 
provided ideal conditions for the trafficking of illicit goods and people along the Canada-
US and US-Mexico borders. Peter Andreas of Brown University, who specializes in 
border issues, argues that “opening economies through market liberalization reduces the 
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ability of governments to withstand external market pressures, and the enormous demand 
for illegal drugs in the US is no exception.”147 Unilateral and bilateral efforts to police the 
Canada-US border and control the supply side of these illicit industries may alleviate the 
problem temporarily, but different laws pertaining to illicit goods,148 the prioritization of 
free trade between the two countries, and the long-term economic trend of open borders 
have continuously hindered the ability of the US and Canadian governments to 
permanently solve the problem. During the negotiation process of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, there was concern that the increased flow of goods and the 
prioritization of efficient traffic flows would make it easier to smuggle illicit goods and 
people across political boundaries. Mexico was a major concern to the US, but officials 
also recognized the potential for illegitimate goods and people to cross into the US from 
Canada. According to Gary Hufbauer, an economist at the Institute for International 
Economics in Washington, D.C., even as the US administration was trying to minimize 
public outcry about the issue, official concerns about controlling illicit smuggling after 
the implementation of NAFTA were effectively ignored during negotiations. Hufbauer 
speculates that it was placed in the “too hot to handle” category for fear of upsetting the 
progress of the Agreement.149 Law enforcement officials who did not accord with this 
view were reportedly silenced. When former US Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) officer Phil Jordan was interviewed on ABC News Nightline, he maintained that 
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the DEA agency ordered all of its officials to keep quiet about any negative outcomes 
that were likely to result from NAFTA.150  
The implementation of NAFTA has created a surge in the cross-border flows of 
goods and people. Cargo trade between Canada and the US doubled during the 1990s and 
is expected to double again during the first decade of the twenty-first century.151 Amidst 
this increasing volume of cross-border traffic, customs officials have been faced with the 
cumbersome task of distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate while 
maintaining an efficient flow of traffic across the border.152 Although customs officers 
are obligated to prioritize criminal enforcement even if it slows the flow of commerce 
and people, it is realistically impossible to do so without creating chaos in traffic flows 
and undermining the open borders that were mandated under CUFTA and NAFTA. The 
covert nature of trafficking industries makes it difficult to gauge the amount of smuggling 
that takes place at the border, but the removal of economic barriers has without a doubt 
lowered the risks for transporting drugs across the border.  
The US spent a total of $30 billion in 1997 alone to curb the flow of drugs into the 
US, yet the United Nations reports that Americans still spend around $60 billion annually 
on illicit drugs. These drugs are readily available in the US, and their prices are falling. 
By the late 1990s, the purity of cocaine and heroin in the US was increasing. Cocaine 
prices had also fallen by 50% and heroin prices by 40% since the early 1980s.153 The 
high demand for illicit drugs in the US combined with the small percentage of vehicles 
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that are actually inspected by US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) has made it easier than ever to smuggle contraband into 
the United States. The obligation of the Canadian and US governments to safeguard their 
common border has been undermined by more powerful economic forces.  
2.4 The Globalization of Illicit Industries in North America  
This section will focus on how criminal organizations operate in Canada and the 
United States, and the ways in which these organizations use the Canada-US border to 
maximize their profits through the trafficking of illicit drugs, small arms, and people. For 
decades, the United States has had the largest demand market in the world for illicit 
drugs. Prior to the economic globalization of the 1990s, organized criminal groups 
working both inside and outside the US had control over the supply of drugs that entered 
the country. Globalization has gradually caused the illicit drug industry in North America 
to evolve and to widen in scope, involving in some cases corrupt governments that 
managed illicit drug supplies headed for the US.154 Increased demand pressured the US 
government to spend billions of dollars to cut off the supply routes for drugs entering the 
United States. The US government continues to spend about $20 billion at the federal 
level alone each year to combat the use and trade of illicit drugs. Each year, there are 1.7 
million arrests and 250,000 incarcerations that involve illegal drugs.155 Although US 
authorities reported major increases in drug seizures throughout the 1990s,156 Moisés 
Naim maintains that “a stronger force is winning: the market.”157  
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In recent years, the United States government has focused on militarizing the 
Mexico-US border to curb the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico to the US. At the same 
time that the US was cracking down on Mexico as a supply route and the forces of 
globalization were changing the nature of illicit criminal industries, criminal 
organizations operating in Canada were playing a larger role in supplying the US illicit 
drug market. Authorities report that ecstasy and marijuana are generally smuggled from 
Canada to the US, while cocaine, contraband cigarettes, and small arms are brought 
illegally into Canada from the US.158 
Before 2004, the majority of ecstasy (MDMA) seizures in Canada involved 
powder and tablets that were being shipped from Europe to Canada. Authorities claim 
that from 2004 onwards, there has been a major surge in ecstasy production in Canada,159 
which has made this drug more readily available within Canada.160 Between 2004 and 
2006, 15 million dosage units of ecstasy were seized in Canada and 2 million dosage 
units were seized in the US. Considering the population differences between the US and 
Canada, this disparity suggests that there are major quantities of ecstasy being produced 
in Canada with the intention of being smuggled into the US. RCMP officials confirm that 
“a significant quantity of the MDMA [ecstasy] produced in Canada is eventually destined 
for sale in the US.”161 Asian Criminal Organizations (ACOs) are involved in the majority 
of ecstasy production in Canada.162 These networks typically import chemicals from Asia 
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that are used to make ecstasy.163 Aspects of globalization like improved technology, the 
development of efficient business practices, and decreased transportation costs have 
drastically increased the profits for these criminal organizations.164 
 Although there is a sizeable demand for cocaine in the US, most supply countries 
for this drug are located in South America. The US is generally used as a transit country 
for cocaine that is grown and produced in South America and destined for Canada.165 In 
2004, the amount of cocaine seized by Canadian border enforcement authorities doubled 
from the previous year.166 As previously discussed, increases in seizures do not always 
signal a decrease in demand. There is no sign that consumption is decreasing, which 
indicates that there are increasing amounts of cocaine travelling from the US that are 
destined for Canadian markets.   
 The Canada-US Organized Crime Threat Assessment claims that Mexico is the 
primary supplier of marijuana to the United States.167 However, the US focus on 
interdicting drug shipments from Central America and Mexico has made Canada a prime 
supplier for marijuana intended for sale in the US.168 The Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment claims that “marijuana grow operations and trafficking are increasing across 
Canada,” particularly along the borders of Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec.169  
Marijuana is grown all over Canada, but authorities are primarily concerned with 
BC Bud, which is high-grade marijuana grown in British Columbia and smuggled 
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illegally along the British Columbia-Washington border. Organized criminal groups in 
Canada manufacture marijuana with high levels of THC, making it much more potent 
than other types of marijuana.170 In 1999, the RCMP estimated that the total value of BC 
marijuana crops exceeded $6.5 billion.171 According to law enforcement officials, there is 
a clear preference for this potent strain of marijuana amongst the US demand market.172 
Whereas BC Bud sells for $2,800 to $3,200 per pound in Canada, smugglers can make up 
to $4,000 per pound selling it in the US. This potential for higher profits has created a 
lucrative smuggling industry for BC Bud destined for sale in the US.173 By 2004, the 
increase in BC bud crossing the border had driven marijuana growers in Washington out 
of business,174 and in 2007, the United States government identified BC Bud as the 
primary narco threat along the northern US border.175 The discovery of an underground 
tunnel between BC and Washington that was used to smuggle illicit drugs further 
legitimizes these claims.176  
Along the US border with Quebec, border enforcement authorities are battling the 
lucrative cross-border smuggling of high-grade hydroponic marijuana known as Quebec 
Gold. Whereas a pound of Quebec Gold sells for about $3,000 in Canada, the same 
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amount sells for $5,600 Canadian in the New York state area and $7,000 in California.177 
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia are heavily 
involved in the production and smuggling of marijuana across the Canada-US border. 
Other organized criminal networks involved in smuggling marijuana to the United States 
are generally linked to these Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs.178 
The smuggling of cocaine, marijuana, and ecstasy were discussed separately, but 
the trafficking routes of these three drugs are intertwined. For example, Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs often smuggle BC Bud across the Canada-US border to sell in 
California. The marijuana is exchanged for methamphetamine, which in turn is smuggled 
into Canada.179     
Statistics show that the number or drug seizures at the Canada-US border 
increased throughout the 1990s, suggesting that law enforcement efforts to police this 
booming industry were becoming more effective. The total value of drug seizures at and 
between ports of entry in 1996 totaled $750,000. The number of seizures increased by 
500% in 1997 and another 300% in 1998, when over $10 million of contraband was 
seized along the Canada-US border. The US Border Patrol reported an 800% increase in 
seizures/arrests between 1996 and 1998 at designated ports of entry.180 One cannot 
assume that this rise in arrests and seizures is a sign of better enforcement. Higher drug 
purity and falling street prices of illicit drugs indicate that there were more drugs crossing 
the border during the late 1990s than the early 1990s. A simultaneous increase in arrests 
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and seizures suggests that the rate of interdiction has remained the same. Despite 
interdiction efforts, “drug trafficking is a major element of illicit traffic across the 
border.”181  
The smuggling of small arms between Canada and the United States is the result 
of differences between the Canadian and US legal systems. In most American states, 
residents are legally able to own a handgun, but “unless exempted by a provision of the 
Customs Tariffs,” 182 it is illegal to import a small arm into Canada. These conflicting 
laws and the proximity of the two countries have together created a lucrative illegal 
market for handguns in Canada.183 The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) reports 
that 92% of all handguns that are seized at land ports of entry are headed towards Canada 
from the US.184 Small arms are smuggled into Canada in personal and commercial 
vehicles, planes, and boats. The majority of illegal small arms are smuggled into Canada 
between official ports of entry by people carrying the weapons on their person or in 
private vehicles. Smugglers also make use of Aboriginal land that straddles the border to 
either bring handguns from the US to Canada or to store them for future smuggling 
ventures or distributions.185 These factors make it impossible to estimate the number of 
handguns that are smuggled from the US to Canada each year.186 When smugglers are 
caught, it is generally at official land ports of entry. The CBSA reported 4,281 firearm 
seizures between January 2001 and December 2005.187 US Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) reported seizing only 233 firearms between January 2001 and 
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December 2005,188 providing further indication that the majority of guns smuggled across 
the border are destined for Canada.  
Migrant smuggling and human trafficking organizations use the porous Canada-
US border to their advantage. Canada’s Immigration Department reported that in 1998, 
approximately 15,000 people entered Canada illegally from countries around the world. 
The Department believes that these numbers have increased substantially since then.189  
Between 1,500 and 2,000 people are illegally transported from Canada to the US each 
year.190 Many of these individuals enter Canada illegally prior to being smuggled into the 
US. There are also many criminal networks that smuggle humans from the United States 
to Canada. In the late 1990s, Canadian authorities reported that many petty drug dealers 
from South and Central America were travelling through the United States and sneaking 
across the border to Canada in order to evade law enforcement authorities.191 
  The RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Division reports that approximately 2,200 
people are trafficked from Canada to the US each year.192 According to the US-Canada 
Binational Assessment of Trafficking in Persons report, criminal organizations use 
various entry points along the border to sneak people into the US. These enterprises focus 
on smuggling people along marine and rural areas like the Quebec-Vermont border 
region.193 Staff Sergeant Glen Rockwell of the RCMP Integrated Border Enforcement 
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Team claims that human trafficking is also a major problem along the BC-Washington 
border. Asian women are often brought into Canada and smuggled across the border into 
the US, where they are forced to enter the sex trade.194 
 Officials at ports of entry have discovered people hidden in freight trains and 
transport trucks trying to cross through the Canada-US border unnoticed.195 Criminal 
organizations have found it much easier to move people through official points of entry 
because of the heavy traffic flow: “Exploitation of designated entry points is facilitated 
by the large volume of commercial and traveler traffic between the two countries, and in 
some instances, aided by criminal elements influencing or operating at these ports.”196  
Even before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US officials expressed concern about 
people being transported illegally into the US from Canada. In a testimony before US 
Congress in 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Counterterrorism 
Coordinator labeled Canada as an “alternate gateway” to Mexico for illegal migration.197 
In 1995 alone, US officials prevented 15,000 illegal attempts to cross from Canada into 
the US.198  
It is clear that the Canada-US border has created a lucrative market for the illicit 
drug, small arm, and humans smuggling/trafficking industries. The increased border 
traffic and unguarded areas between official ports of entry have greatly decreased the risk 
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of being apprehended. The following section will outline pre-9/11 initiatives to curb the 
globalization of crime in North America.  
2.5 Pre- 9/11 Bilateral Initiatives to Curb Cross-Border Crime in North America 
The globalization of communications and technology have in many ways enabled 
criminal networks to become more advanced than law enforcement authorities in terms of 
high-technology ways of conducting business. For centuries, Canada and United States 
law enforcement agencies recognized the importance of effectively policing these 
networks, but also realized that policing must not undermine the bilateral trading 
relationship. This realization created a consensus that having a heavily guarded border 
was not in the interests of either country,199 and that partnerships were the most effective 
way to disband criminal organizations.200 The positive relationship between Canada and 
the US and the history of intelligence sharing and joint investigations, particularly in 
regards to illicit small arms smuggling, have created a unique opportunity to secure the 
border through bilateral initiatives.201  
Throughout the mid-1900s, US authorities became increasingly frustrated by the 
influx of cross-border smuggling between Canada and the US. Policing official ports of 
entry proved largely ineffective since most of border remained porous and vulnerable to 
the smuggling of illegitimate goods and people. In its efforts to develop effective border 
policing methods, the US Border Patrol became more proactive in its day-to-day 
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activities. US Customs Officers began to travel undercover on railways to catch 
smugglers, and US agents were sent undercover into Canada to infiltrate smuggling 
organizations and provide intelligence to law enforcement authorities. These methods 
proved to be much more effective than relying solely on border security at official ports 
of entry.202 
As the 19th century drew to a close, the continued success of cross-border 
criminal activity between Canada and the US created an urgent need to develop 
innovative ways to curb illegal migration and the smuggling of illicit goods.  A New York 
Times correspondent writing in 1877 outlined the benefits of  collaborative border 
enforcement efforts: “The situation, therefore, instead of involving two countries in 
hostilities, ought to unite them in earnest attempts to suppress crime and protect the 
honest, bona fide settlers along the border.”203 The long-standing history of friendship 
between Canada and the US made it possible for the two countries to collaborate in 
border policing efforts, but these joint ventures enjoyed only limited success. Efficient 
cooperation was often blocked by variations between the Canadian and US legal systems, 
sovereignty concerns, and the absence of an overriding authority for bilateral 
enforcement efforts.204 
 Criminal entrepreneurs have benefitted from these shortcomings of bilateral 
policing initiatives.  The border has always been an asset to smugglers, since it is the 
illicit nature of smuggling across a political boundary that makes the industry so 
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profitable and enticing. Conversely, “the border has symbolized the limits of police 
powers, a line across which they have no control and are typically dependent on foreign 
authorities, and one they have crossed only at the risk of being arrested by foreign law 
enforcement officers and angering central governments on both sides of the border.”205 
The RCMP often pursued smugglers in Canadian territory who intended to cross into the 
US illegally. If smugglers were able to evade the RCMP and cross into US territory, the 
RCMP did not have the authority to apprehend them.  
Despite these limitations, Canadian and American border enforcement agencies 
developed a long-term cooperative relationship during the early 20th century that operated 
within the limitations of each country’s sovereignty.206 By the 1950s, joint efforts to 
police cross-border smuggling had become more formalized. Illegal activities were 
monitored by border patrol agents at ports of entry. These agents worked in collaboration 
with other law enforcement departments, and Canadian and US border enforcement 
officers often crossed into each other’s territory to patrol the border or to conduct 
enforcement operation without first having to seek departmental approval.207 
By the 1990s, relations between US and Canadian law enforcement authorities 
were considered to be “very close and professional.”208 This positive relationship was 
evidenced by the development of bilateral initiatives that aimed to integrate US and 
Canadian immigration and border security systems. In February 1995, President Bill 
Clinton and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien signed the Canada-US Accord on Our Shared 
Border, which would establish the necessary infrastructure to manage the surge in cross-
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border traffic flows resulting from NAFTA, as well as improve coordination between the 
Canadian and US immigration and customs departments.209 The Anti-Smuggling Working 
Group and the Northeast Border Group were established in February 1997 out of shared 
concerns over illegal smuggling.210 These groups aimed to curb cross-border smuggling 
through improved intelligence and information-sharing systems. 211 Two months later, 
Canada and the United States created the New Border Initiative, which concentrated 
primarily on immigration issues. The Initiative planned to harmonize the US Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS) with Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and to 
create a system to openly share intelligence related to illegal migration.212 In September 
1997, the United States and Canadian governments established the Cross-Border Crime 
Forum. Whereas the New Border Vision Initiative had focused on immigration issues, 
this Forum was wider in scope, bringing together law enforcement agencies from both 
countries to develop effective ways to combat transnational organized crime. The Forum 
also laid the ground work for the development of two initiatives that would be expanded 
after the terrorist attacks of 9/11: the testing of the first Integrated Border Enforcement 
Team in the BC-Washington region, and the establishment of Bi-National Threat 
Assessments.213 1999 marked the establishment of the Canada-US Partnership Forum, 
which was intended to “facilitate improved communication between representatives of 
border communities, governments, and businesses on border management issues and 
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policies.”214 More specifically, the Forum was developed to resolve the paradox of 
creating a border open to trade but closed to illegitimate goods and people.215  
Although these initiatives improved coordination between law enforcement, 
customs, and immigration agencies in Canada and in the US, their differing laws about 
gun control and drug possession and distribution limited their success.216 Canadian and 
US authorities were concerned that too much intelligence sharing would infringe on each 
nation’s sovereignty, which further impeded these initiatives.217 Christopher Sands 
criticizes the Canadian and US governments for failing to devote sufficient funding to the 
projects, particularly in the area of advanced technology.218 George Haynal similarly 
argues that the two governments failed to allocate much-needed funding for the projects, 
and that a severe lack of priority on a national level “kept change within narrow 
limits.”219   
The concepts of bilateral cooperation and intelligence sharing had been firmly 
established before the 9/11 attacks, but the governments of Canada and the United States 
failed to give sufficient priority to these issues. However, it was these continuous 
discussions that laid the foundation for post-9/11 border security cooperation between 
Canada and the US. The next chapter will discuss the evolving role of borders after the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.  
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Chapter 3: Security Versus Trade After September 11th, 2001  
This chapter examines post-9/11 US efforts to militarize the Canada US border, 
and how these efforts affected the bilateral trade relationship. 
3.1 The Immediate Effects of 9/11 on the Canada-US Trade Relationship 
 Even before the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on 
September 11, 2001, policymakers recognized the importance of finding the right balance 
between securing the Canada-US border and keeping it open to trade. The Bush 
administration reacted to 9/11 by prioritizing security over the economy in its efforts to 
prevent future terrorist attacks. The administration’s attempt to guard its borders 
unilaterally is based on the traditional belief that border security threats like illicit drug 
trafficking and cross-border terrorist activity are the result of poor border security 
measures. The administration used this logic to justify its decision to beef up US border 
security.220 Within hours of the 9/11 attacks, US border guards were put on level-one 
alert, which is defined as a “sustained, intensive anti-terrorism operation.”221 The US 
borders with Mexico and Canada were effectively slammed shut, and borders reemerged 
as a means to security rather than economic efficiency.222 
 It was soon evident that the US preoccupation with border security would have a 
detrimental effect on its trading relationship with Canada. Former US Ambassador to 
Canada Paul Cellucci said that “security trumped trade” in the post-9/11 era, emphasizing 
that anyone who wanted to do business with the United States must understand this 
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emerging reality.223 Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley was openly 
supportive of the United States in his public statements, and reaffirmed Canada’s loyalty 
to it neighbour in its War Against Terror. Manley’s support for the US was likely 
motivated by his concern that the Bush administration’s efforts to build up US borders 
unilaterally would undermine the bilateral trade relationship and thereby devastate the 
Canadian economy.224 
 Manley’s concerns were well-founded: Critics of the Bush administration’s 
unilateral border policies claim that in its rush to harden US borders to keep out potential 
terrorists, the administration failed to properly consider the damaging effects that these 
policies would have on regional trade in North America.225 This Fortress America 
mentality, which entails a shift away from internationalism towards unilateralism,226 has 
motivated the US to slam shut its borders on pervious occasions. In the 1970s, the US 
shut down its border with Mexico to pressure the Mexican government to invest more 
resources in its drug interdiction program. Operation Intercept halted trade between the 
two countries and temporarily crippled Mexico’s economy. Canadian policymakers were 
well aware that the free trade agreements of the 1980s and 1990s had created an 
unprecedented level of economic interdependence between Canada and the US. With 
86% of Canadian exports destined for US markets, there was no doubt that the economic  
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consequences of 9/11 could be disastrous for Canada.227  
These fears were confirmed as the line of trucks waiting to cross from Windsor to 
Detroit at the Ambassador Bridge, the busiest border crossing in North America, 
stretched for 36 kilometers within hours of the 9/11 attacks. Immediately after the 
attacks, US officials ordered that every truck crossing into the US must be inspected, 
which caused delays at the border up to 18 hours.228 According to the former Governor of 
Michigan John Engler, “things really ground to a halt” after the attacks.229 Integrated 
companies with components of production on both sides of the border were hit hard by 
these security delays. The heart of the North American auto industry is located in the 
Detroit-Windsor area, and the industry is completely reliant on just-in-time230 shipments 
of auto parts that keep assembly lines running.231 In turn, just-in-time shipments depend 
on the efficient flow of trucks across the Canada-US border. 14 million trucks cross the 
border each year, or one every twenty seconds.232 Most auto-related trade shipments cross 
the Ambassador Bridge in transport trucks.  Security delays at this crossing created major 
losses for the North American auto industry.  Ford Motors, one of the Big Three, reported 
that delays at the border prevented their company from producing more than 47,000 cars. 
Ford Motors had to temporarily shut down three plants in Windsor alone.233 General 
Motors and Honda were also forced to stop some components of production in North 
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America because of border security delays.234 It was clear that US unilateral border 
security measures would at achieved at the expense of one of the most prosperous 
bilateral trade relationships in the world.  
Despite Paul Cellucci’s assurances that the US wanted to maintain a Canada-US 
border open to trade,235 US post-9/11 security policies reflected a clear prioritization of 
security over the economy. The USA Patriot Act provided the legislative framework for 
post-9/11 US security policies. Approved by US Congress, the Patriot Act gave the 
federal government increased policing powers within the US and internationally to more 
effectively combat terrorism. These policing powers include US efforts to beef up 
security236 along its northern and southern borders through the development of military-
inspired border policing methods and high-tech border control elements.237 The Bush 
administration announced on December 2, 2001 that hundreds of National Guard troops 
would be policing the US-Canada border at designated ports of entry, and that military 
helicopters would be patrolling unguarded areas of the border.238 These measures were 
funded by the 2003 US Federal Budget, which allocated $2 billion for border security 
upgrades.239 The USA Patriot Act also outlined plans to improve intelligence sharing 
amongst various US law enforcement agencies,240 which led to the consolidation of 
several US departments and agencies into the cabinet-level Department of Homeland 
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Security (DHS).241 This restructuring process is considered to be “the largest 
reorganization of the US Federal Government in over fifty years.”242 
3.2 The Emergence of Canada as a Security Threat  
After 9/11, US efforts to prevent another terrorist attack inspired policies that 
aimed to beef up security along its borders. The Bush administration’s determination to 
increase security along the Canada-US border represented a major shift in US border 
policy. Whereas the Mexican border had been perceived as a security threat to the US for 
decades,243 Canada and the US had enjoyed a long history of friendship and trust that was 
reflected by a porous shared border. However, 9/11 created newfound concerns amongst 
US officials that the routes and methods that were employed to smuggle illicit drugs, 
small arms, and people across the Canada-US border could also be used to transport 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction into the United States.244 US authorities were 
equally concerned that more than 90% of the Canadian population resides in urban areas 
within 100 miles of the Canada-US border. The “2007 IBET Threat Assessment” claims 
that there is generally more cross-border smuggling activity in urban border crossing 
areas.245 A US Customs and Border Protection report warned that there are organizations 
and people who reside in Canada close to the border who are potential threats to US 
national security. The report also claimed that powerful criminal organizations based in 
Canada that are involved in cross-border smuggling operations could be linked to the 
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cross-border movement of potential terrorists and dangerous weapons.246 According to 
the Washington Times, the Bush administration has since made it a priority to secure its 
border with Canada: “Since the September 11 attacks on America, transforming the 
northern border from a liability into a hardened line of defense has become the mission of 
both ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] and the Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection [CBP], two new agencies within the Department of Homeland 
Security.”247 These unilateral security initiatives were justified by US intelligence reports 
that terrorist cells, including Al Qaeda, were carrying out their operations from “sleeper 
cell” bases in Canadian cities like Vancouver and Toronto.248  
Immediately after 9/11, New York Senator Hillary Clinton claimed that the 
terrorists that hijacked the planes had entered the US illegally through Canada. These 
allegations were completely false, but the US had legitimate reason to worry about the 
terrorist presence in Canada and the porous border.249 Even before 9/11, US officials had 
been concerned about the security risk posed by the open border, especially amidst 
mounting evidence that terrorists were using Canada as a launching pad to stage attacks 
in the US. In 1997, US authorities arrested a Palestinian named Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer 
and three other people at Mezer’s apartment in Brooklyn. Authorities searched his 
apartment and found bombs that he intended to detonate in the New York subway 
system. Mezer later claimed that he had lived in Canada so that he could illegally cross 
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the open border into the US and carry out this act of terrorism.250 Two years later, an 
Algerian named Ahmed Ressam was apprehended by US border patrol agents when he 
attempted to take a ferry from Victoria, BC to Seattle, Washington. A US border officer 
became suspicious of Ressam, and upon searching his car, officers found explosives in 
his trunk that he was planning to use to blow up the Los Angeles Airport. 251 The 
Millennium Bomber incident alarmed US officials, who had already criticized Canada’s 
disorganized immigration and refugee systems and questioned the effectiveness of 
Canadian intelligence and counterterrorism efforts.  
Canadian law enforcement and intelligence authorities were well aware of a 
terrorist presence in Canada. Former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) Ward Elcock admitted in 1998 that “with perhaps the singular exception 
of the US, there are more international terrorist groups active here than any other country 
in the world.”252 In its 1999 report, the Canadian Senate Subcommittee on Security and 
Intelligence similarly claimed that “Canada itself is not a major target for terrorist attacks, 
but Canada is a venue of opportunity, a place where terrorists organize, plan, finance, and 
mount terrorist attacks elsewhere, particularly against the United States.”253 A secret 
Department of National Defence report, released in 2000 and obtained by the Ottawa 
Citizen, admits that “Canadian territory is increasingly seen as part of the problem, and 
less of a solution.”254 In his book Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports 
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Terrorism Around the World, Stuart Bell claims to have obtained an internal CSIS report 
written immediately after the 9/11 attacks. According to the report, “since its inception, 
Al Qaeda has used Canada as an offshore base, [and] has operatives and intelligence 
gatherers in Canada.”255 Even though the 9/11 hijackers did not enter the US from 
Canada, they very well could have. The Bush administration failed to consider the 
economic consequences of militarizing the Canada-US border, but their efforts to secure 
the porous border were justified by mounting evidence that Canada is a security risk to 
the United States.   
3.3 Militarizing the Canada-US Border Not an Option 
Before the 9/11 attacks, US intelligence sources confirmed that multiple terrorist 
organizations were operating inside Canada and could easily cross the border to strike US 
targets. Canadian policymakers were convinced that the post-9/11 bilateral trade 
relationship would be paralyzed as the US increased security at ports of entry and 
invested resources to effectively monitor the 9,000-kilometer border. Despite these 
concerns, by mid-2002, the northern border was patrolled by only 345 US border guards. 
Even though the Mexico-US border is only half the length of the Canada-US border, by 
2002 it was monitored by 9,065 US border guards. The US government was pressured by 
the public, the media, and policymakers to increase security along its northern border, but 
the politically powerful North American business community was adamant that the 
border remain open to trade, since many North American companies and entire industries 
depended on the open border for their survival.256  
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American policymakers were also hesitant to beef up the Canada-US border 
because of US economic interests in the bilateral trade relationship. As shown in Table 2, 
a significant percentage of US imports come from Canada.257 The North American auto 
industry is completely dependent upon bilateral integration and the quick movement of 
goods between Canada and the US.258 Despite the pressure from the North American 
business community to keep the border open to trade, Table 1 shows that there was a 
sudden drop in two-way trade in 2001. Two-way trade in 2002 was even lower. This 
sudden decrease in bilateral trade suggests a negative correlation between border security 
and the efficient cross-border flow of goods. Increased border security impeded the 
efficient flow of goods across the Canada-US border, creating huge financial losses for 
Canadian and US businesses. An Ontario Chamber of Commerce report released on April 
21, 2005 claims that the US economy is losing $4.1 billion per year and the Canadian 
economy is losing $8 billion per year due to increased security delays at the Canada-US 
border. The report lists the economies of Ontario, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Ohio as the hardest hit by increased security delays and inadequate staffing at official 
ports of entry along the border.259  
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Before 9/11, the US government had accepted the reality that some illicit goods 
and people would invariably slip through the borders, but in the immediate aftermath of 
the attacks, US Customs officials were pressured by the Bush administration to keep out 
100% of illegal goods and people.260 After the initial shock of the 9/11 had subsided, 
policymakers admitted that building up borders at official points of entry does not 
guarantee security:  
Closing the border is certainly appealing to nationalistic sentiments and to the  
basic human instincts of building moats and walls for protection. But when 
 threats travel via fiber optics, or when finding the way to move a load across  
the border ensures unimaginable wealth or the chance of a better life, the 
 wisdom of relying mostly on unilateral security measures is highly  
questionable…it is an utterly naïve expectation to assume that nations can  
successfully fend off threats just by relying on tighter border controls.261  
 
The case of the Mexico-US border further evidences the limitations of border 
security. From 1990 to 1996, the number of US border agents along the Mexico border 
increased by 65%. 262 However, the laws of supply and demand dictate that if there is a 
high demand, the supply will be provided by any means necessary. People often risk 
being apprehended if they are motivated by economic opportunity or financial gains. In 
the case of the militarized Mexico-US border, beefing up border security made it more 
risky to smuggle goods and people into the US, which in turn increased the profits for 
those who were willing to take the risk. One US border patrol officer admitted that “the 
more difficult the crossing, the better the business for smugglers.”263  
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 US attempts to militarize its border with Mexico have failed to curb illegal 
immigration. Migrants are instead adapting to the increased border security by crossing 
the border between designated ports of entry: “The border patrol all but shut down the 
traditional border jumping towns of San Diego, El Paso, and Laredo, Texas. As a result, 
more migrants are taking more dangerous routes through the deserts of Arizona and an 
increasing number of migrants are losing their lives-491 in 2001 to dehydration in the 
desert, freezing in the mountains, or shooting by angry rangers.”264  In its efforts to curb 
illegal smuggling from Mexico, the US government launched Operation Hold the Line, 
during which a 20-mile area of the Mexico-US border prone to smuggling was patrolled 
on a 24/7 basis. US officials admitted that although the operation reduced the number of 
illegal border-crossers in that area, eliminating the chance to smuggle along one area of 
the border simply causes people to cross the border in a more remote area.265 Even 
though the Mexico-US border is only 1/3 the length of the Canada-US border and is 
patrolled by eight times as many agents, it is estimated that over one million illegal 
immigrants slip through the border into the US undetected each year.266 
US efforts to cut off supply routes for drugs entering the US from its southern 
border proved to be equally ineffective. During the 1980s, US law enforcement cracked 
down on Colombian shipments of cocaine through the Caribbean to southern Florida. In 
response, powerful Colombian drug cartels started to rely on Mexican trafficking groups 
to deliver the goods to the US. Before this series of developments, cocaine had been 
transported from Colombia to Mexico using small planes, but once Mexico became the 
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primary outlet to ship cocaine to the US, the nature of trafficking changed and trucks and 
ground shipments became the preferred means of smuggling cocaine across the Mexico-
US border.267 This example proves that unilateral efforts to increase border security have 
failed to reduce the cross-border flows of illicit goods and people, since building up the 
border encourages smugglers to reroute their ventures to a more porous area of the 
border.  
Despite this clear evidence that militarizing its borders does not permanently 
reduce levels of cross-border smuggling, the US post-9/11 efforts to beef up border 
security was based on the presumption that the biggest threats to the US lay on the 
opposite sides of its borders. Yet the discovery that the perpetrators of the London, 
England terrorist attacks were born and raised in England created the realization that 
border security can only do so much to prevent terrorist attacks. Even the best border 
controls cannot guard against home-grown terrorists and people who are determined to 
cross the border: “Despite tighter enforcement after 9/11, the US is failing to defend itself 
from the illegal things and people that seem to have no problem violating its borders.”268  
Militarizing the 9,000-kilomter border is thus an infeasible policy option for the United 
States. Securing the border unilaterally would place a huge financial burden on US 
taxpayers, and closing the border would have devastating effects on the Canadian and US 
economies. Furthermore, the case of the Mexico-US border provides evidence that 
militarizing the border is an ineffective deterrent to crime. The increased financial gain 
only inspires criminal networks to develop new and innovative ways to meet the demands 
of the US and Canadian black markets.  
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3.4 North American Security Perimeter Not an Option  
The previous section discussed the infeasibility of militarizing the Canada-US 
border. The enormous investments made by the Canadian and US governments to 
increase North American economic interdependence have made it impractical for the US 
to revert to isolationism through a highly militarized border. With the US determined to 
prevent another 9/11, US and Canadian policymakers have struggled to develop bilateral 
policies to make the border safer while keeping it open to trade. An alternative option to 
militarizing the border unilaterally was to create a common security perimeter around 
Canada and the United States. This perimeter would facilitate an open Canada-US border 
by integrating US and Canadian border controls, environmental laws, 269 and immigration 
and refugee policies. 270 The idea of forming a common security perimeter in North 
American predated the 9/11 attacks. After the Ressam incident of 1999 and the 
subsequent concern of a terrorist presence in Canada, former US Ambassador to Canada 
Gordon Giffin suggested that a common security perimeter be developed in order to curb 
the cross-border flow of terrorism and other criminal activity.271 Just months before the 
September 11th attacks, US Ambassador to Canada Paul Cellucci revisited the idea of this 
perimeter. In what he called a “NAFTA-Plus arrangement,”272 forming a perimeter 
around the entire continent would further dissolve the borders between the NAFTA 
signatories. The perimeter concept was supported by former Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, who argued that political borders within North America should be eliminated 
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to facilitate the free movement of people and goods.273 However, efforts to dissolve the 
border were harshly opposed by the Canadian public and the Chrétien government, who 
feared that this agreement would erode Canadian sovereignty. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
John Manley responded to sovereignty concerns in a public statement. He said that 
Canada-US relations should be managed via bilateral arrangements rather than by 
completely integrating the two countries through the dissolution of the Canada-US 
border.274 Lamar Smith, a Republican Congressman from Texas and Chair of the House 
Subcommittee on Immigration, hinted that Canada presented a security risk to the US, 
and was thus equally adamant that the Canada-US border stay in place.275  
After 9/11, the Canadian government’s stance on a common security perimeter 
completely reversed. Fearful that increased US border security would damage the trade 
relationship, Canadian leaders proposed that the NORAD defence agreement be 
transformed into a common security perimeter that would increase both physical and 
economic security.276 The business communities in Canada and the US were particularly 
supportive of developing a perimeter,277 arguing that it was the most feasible way to 
maintain the Canada-US economic relationship. Canadian business leaders were adamant 
that Canada and the US integrate their security policies if it would reduce wait times at 
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the border.278 Politically influential CEOs lobbied actively for the creation of a common 
security perimeter for fear that a militarized US border was the only other option. David 
O’Brien, then-CEO of Pacific Railway, argued that the survival of the Canadian economy 
in the post-9/11 era would depend on a Canadian willingness to harmonize its policies 
with those of the US, admitting that “we’re going to lose increasingly our sovereignty, 
but necessarily so.”279 Bouchard and Chandler agreed that a common security perimeter 
would be the most effective way to secure North America, since it would regulate 
everyone and everything coming into North America based on the same security 
standards.280 In November 2001, academics and business executives from Canada and the 
US wrote a letter to President Bush and Prime Minister Chrétien as a collaborative effort 
to create a “zone of confidence” in North America.281  
A common security perimeter would have improved security and preserved North 
American economic interdependence, but it was never implemented. US policymakers 
were wary of dissolving its borders with Canada and Mexico and refused to support the 
perimeter concept, thereby proving that the traditional link between borders and security 
still affects policy. The Chrétien government seemed to support the idea of a common 
security perimeter, but failed to take the necessary initiative or pressure the US to 
consider its potential benefits. In its December 2002 report, the House of Commons 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade advised that the effects of creating 
a common security perimeter be studied further by the Canadian government. However, 
the vague response hinted that this initiative would never become a priority: “[The 
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Government of Canada] is committed to examining any options for improving operations 
while providing appropriate security at the border.”282 Canadian and US policymakers 
continued to wrestle with the task of balancing economic interdependence with security 
concerns. Peter Andreas had predicted just before 9/11 that “trying to tighten controls 
over the cross-border flow of drugs while loosening controls over the flow of legal 
commerce will no doubt continue to be a formula for policy frustration. How this 
frustration is politically managed will significantly shape the future of the border region 
and the bilateral relationship.”283 The validity of his statement only became more evident 
in the aftermath of 9/11.  
3.5 Resolving Trade and Security Through Bilateral Cooperation  
The previous section discussed Canada and the United States’ attempts to resolve 
the conflict between securing their common border and keeping it open to trade. US 
efforts to militarize the border were unsuccessful due to the economic interests of 
keeping it open to trade as well as the realization that barricading the border would not 
keep out 100% of illegitimate goods and people.  The policy initiative to create a 
common security perimeter around North America was equally unsuccessful. Although it 
was in the best interests of integrated businesses in North America to dissolve the 
Canada-US border, actions were blocked by US security and Canadian sovereignty 
concerns. 9/11 had created a deep-seeded fear of the busy Canada-US border because of 
the emerging links between cross-border smuggling and terrorism. This fear made it an 
immediate priority for the Canadian and US political administrations to develop 
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innovative methods of bilateral policing that were suited to the nature of global criminal 
activity.284 Nadelmann and Andreas acknowledge that “finding a balance between 
facilitating the growing volume of legitimate border crossings and enforcing laws against 
unwanted crossings had long been the defining challenge of border control, but given the 
rising stakes, the balancing act became more difficult to sustain with the same old 
inspection methods and tools.”285 Since it was impossible to barricade the border and 
equally impossible to dissolve it, policymakers were forced to reach a compromise 
between these opposing actions. The most effective way to create a border open to trade 
and closed to criminal activity was to preserve the border and develop innovative 
methods of bilateral collaboration.  
The Bush administration reacted to the 9/11 attacks by unilaterally increasing 
security along US borders to keep out dangerous goods and people. Post-9/11 US policy 
was influenced by traditional realism, which in most cases advocates unilateral security 
policies. But after US efforts to militarize the Canada-US border were deemed 
impractical, it became in the country’s best interest to pursue bilateral security 
agreements with Canada. According to Colin Robertson, since the Roosevelt-Mackenzie 
King partnership of the 1930s, US leaders have acknowledged that the Canada-US border 
can be secured most effectively if bilateral relations are strong. Throughout the 20th 
century, the US benefited from maintaining a positive relationship with Canada. During 
the Cold War, Canada played a crucial role in US defence against Soviet missiles and 
bombers. The establishment of the North American Aerospace Defence Command 
(NORAD) reflects the permanency of the bilateral security relationship, and has provided 
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a strong foundation for other joint security initiatives.286 US leadership thus recognized 
that it was in its best interests to work with Canada to maintain the current level of trade 
interdependence and create a safer border: “To create borders that performed as better 
security barriers and more efficient economic bridges, US law enforcement strategists 
aggressively pushed for more intensive use of new technologies and more expansive 
cross-border surveillance and law enforcement coordination.”287 
This chapter outlined the US post-9/11 security policies and discussed the ways in 
which these policies affected the Canada-US economic relationship. The paradox of 
increasing border security and keeping borders open to trade is evidenced through US 
attempts to militarize the Canada-US border and the North American business 
community’s efforts to implement a North American security perimeter. This chapter 
outlined the drawbacks of both dissolving and militarizing the border, and highlighted the 
need for Canada and the US to develop innovative policing methods that would 
effectively respond to the changing nature of globalized crime. The following chapter 
will outline the methodology of the study of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and 
their role in making the border more secure and efficient. 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams have achieved their operational objectives since 9/11, as stated in the 
Smart Border Declaration. This investigation was conducted through a qualitative 
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research study of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs). Statistical data was not 
relied on for the purposes of this study. Any statistics involving illicit industries are 
estimates at best. Relying solely on such data is an ineffective method in itself to examine 
the outcomes of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.  
This research study involved an examination of media reports and government 
websites and reports, as well as elite interviews with a representative of the Windsor-
Detroit IBET and a representative of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in 
Windsor.  
The operational objectives of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams are as follows:  
• Increase the number of agents policing the border between official points of entry. 
• Establish permanent joint enforcement teams comprised of various Canadian and 
US law enforcement agencies. 
• Increase levels of information and intelligence sharing amongst Canadian and US 
law enforcement agencies. 
• Ensure that patrolling is conducted covertly. This includes actions like patrolling 
at night and deploying plain-clothed agents. 
• Develop policing methods that are suited to fight global crime. This includes 
actions like forming joint Canada-US patrol teams so that territorial jurisdiction 
will not prevent arrests and seizures from being made.  
These objectives were generated from Points 23-25 of the Smart Border Declaration:  
 
 
  65
Point 23: Integrated Border and Marine Enforcement Teams 
• Expand Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and Integrated Marine 
Enforcement Teams (IMETs) to other areas of the border and enhance 
communication and coordination.  
 
Point 24: Joint Enforcement Coordination 
• Work toward ensuring comprehensive and permanent coordination of law 
enforcement, anti-terrorism efforts and information sharing, such as by 
strengthening the Cross-Border Crime Forum and reinvigorating Project 
Northstar.  
 
Point 25: Integrated Intelligence 
• Establish joint teams to analyze and disseminate information and intelligence, 
and produce threat and intelligence assessments. Initiate discussions regarding a 
Canadian presence on the US Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.288 
 
   Although an IBET had been established prior to 9/11 and the operational objectives 
had been presented, the governments of Canada and the US did not sufficiently prioritize 
bilateral policing initiatives, nor did they devote the necessary funding to expand these 
teams across Canada. The IBET was thus unable to achieve its operational objectives due 
to a lack of political support. After 9/11, the need to keep the Canada-US border open to 
trade amidst increasing security generated the political will to expand Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams along the border. The dependent variable for this study is IBETs 
achieving their operational objectives. The independent variable for this study is political 
will, since it was the Canada and US governments’ post-9/11 prioritization of 
collaborative security efforts that enabled IBETs to successfully achieve their operational 
objectives.  
    Although the concept of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) was 
introduced in the late 1990s, there has been little academic study of their role in creating 
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a smart Canada-US border289 since 9/11. This study examines the efforts of Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams by using the following methods of data collection: 
Departmental websites and reports, media reports, and elite interviews. These reports and 
interviews were used in order to determine whether IBETs have achieved their 
operational objectives, which were outlined in the Smart Border Declaration.  
Departmental websites and reports provide little information on IBETs beyond their 
basic composition and functions.  Information from these websites and reports290 were 
used to outline the composition and goals of IBETs.  
Media sources have reported extensively on the origin of IBETs and their role in 
policing cross-border crime. Media reports of IBET contributions to arrests and seizures 
of illicit goods between official points of entry along the Canada-US border were 
examined, since the media is the only source that provides this type of data. Media 
reports were also useful in assessing the limitations of IBETs.  
Departmental websites and media reports were very useful for the purposes of this 
study, but they lacked first-hand accounts of the purposes and functions of IBETs. 
Conducting elite interviews with high-ranking officials from the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and the Canada Border Services Agency made the results of this study 
more comprehensive. Lewis Anthony Dexter defines an elite as anyone “who in terms of 
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trafficking of humans, small arms and illicit drugs (The Canada-US Smart Border Declaration). 
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the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, non-standardized treatment.”291 
Elite interviews differ from the structured, standardized format of survey research. The 
nature of some research studies makes it impossible for researchers to develop a 
structured survey instrument or a uniform list of questions that can be distributed to elite 
respondents. Janet Buttolph Joseph and H.T. Reynolds claim that researchers are often 
interested in the respondents’ interpretations of issues or policies, and do not want to lose 
“valuable information that an elite ‘insider’ may possess by unduly constraining 
resources.”292  
Elite interviews involve face-to-face interaction between the interviewer and 
respondent. These types of interviews are more individualized and less standardized than 
survey research, since they give the researcher more flexibility in asking open-ended 
questions and follow-up questions based on the responses of participants.293 Elite 
interviews are a particularly useful method of generating data when the topic of study can 
be most effectively explained by the people who are directly involved in the process:  
“[Elite interviews] often provide a more comprehensive and complicated understanding 
of political phenomena than other forms of data collection, and provide researchers with a 
rich variety of perspectives.”294 
Elite interviewing was an effective method of obtaining first-hand accounts of the 
functions of IBETs. These representatives are more familiar than the media with the 
specific functions of IBETs, and since they are directly involved in border security 
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operations, they contributed valuable information about the importance of IBETs and the 
ways in which these teams collaborate with other law enforcement agencies. 
Before contacting the two permanent Canadian IBET partner agencies, the CBSA 
and the RCMP, I submitted an application to the University of Windsor Research and 
Ethics Board to request permission to conduct elite interviews (see Appendix 1). Once 
approval was granted, I contacted the agencies to request interviews. Interview 
respondents were recruited in the following manner: The RCMP website does not provide 
a list of high-ranked officials, so a fax explaining the details of this study and requesting 
an interview with an RCMP representative was sent to the RCMP Windsor Detachment. 
RCMP Staff Sergeant Bob Bergoine, Commander of the Windsor-Detroit IBET, 
contacted me to discuss details of the interview. A colleague who works for the CBSA 
provided me with the name and contact information of Gerry Dundas, the CBSA Chief of 
Enforcement Operations for the Windsor Area. This representative was contacted and an 
interview was requested. Once contact was made with representatives from both 
agencies, they were given Letters of Information.295 These letters provided details of the 
study and informed the representatives that the interviews would be audio-taped and that 
they would be identified in the results of the study by their names and official titles. Once 
they agreed to participate in an interview, representatives were verbally informed of their 
right to withdraw at anytime during and after the interview. The Letter of Information 
provided written affirmation of this withdrawal right.  
                                                            
295 As per the requirements of the University of Windsor Research and Ethics Board. 
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An interview with RCMP Staff Sergeant Bob Bergoine was conducted at the 
CBSA Headquarters in Windsor on January 26, 2009,296 and an interview with the CBSA 
Chief of Enforcement Operations Gerry Dundas was conducted at the CBSA office at the 
Windsor-Detroit tunnel on February 5, 2009. The interview questions, which are located 
in Appendices 2 and 3, were approved by the University of Windsor Research and Ethics 
Board prior to the interviews.  
At the start of the interviews, the participants signed a form consenting to the 
terms of the study and having the interview audio-taped.297 Since participants were not 
guaranteed confidentiality, they were permitted to review the transcripts of the interview. 
Audio tapes were kept in a locked cupboard and were not shared with anyone. They were 
kept for 24 hours and erased immediately after the relevant interview responses were 
transcribed and verified by the participants. Participants had the opportunity to verify the 
transcripts of the interview through their choice of encrypted email or hard copy. The 
transcripts were kept for 48 hours after being reviewed by the participants so that they 
could be reviewed and the information data could be gathered.298 After the study was 
completed, participants were provided with a brief summary of the research results. 
Elite interviews, media reports, and departmental websites and reports were used 
to evaluate whether IBETs have achieved their operational objectives. IBET efforts to 
achieve their operational objectives during the 1990s were compared post-9/11 efforts in 
order to determine whether political will has made IBETs more successful in achieving 
                                                            
296 Canadian members of the Windsor-Detroit IBET work out of the Canada Border Services Agency 
headquarters in Windsor. 
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their operational objectives. The data from these sources was also used to assess the 
limitations of IBETs in making the border more secure.  
The primary limitation to this research study was the absence of interviews with 
low-level CBSA and RCMP employees, who work directly at the border and who could 
have provided a first-hand account of the limitations of IBETs. However, since the 
RCMP and CBSA are tax-payer funded agencies, the agencies are obligated to convey a 
positive image to the public. The CBSA and RCMP both have designated spokespersons, 
who are trained specifically to conduct interviews with the media and academics. Low-
level agents are not permitted to speak on behalf of their agencies, and must direct any 
inquiries to the designated spokespersons. The University of Windsor Research and 
Ethics Board stipulates that all interviews must be conducted in accordance with rules 
and regulations of any agencies that are involved in the interview process. Any outgoing 
information to the public must be approved by the RCMP and CBSA communications 
departments prior to being disseminated. Because of this censorship, it was evident that 
the spokespersons would not freely discuss many of the limitations and inefficiencies of 
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, which made it difficult to objectively assess both 
the strengths and limitations of these teams.  
This chapter outlined the methodology of the study by defining the variables, and 
justifying the utility of elite interviews, media reports, and websites/reports from US and 
Canadian government agencies. The next chapter will discuss Canada’s response to US 
pressures to improve its border security, immigration, refugee, and intelligence systems. 
Canada’s strong support for bilateral initiatives that would improve security while 
facilitating legitimate goods and travelers will be the focus of the chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Canada’s Commitment to Creating a Smart Border 
           The Canadian economy enjoyed decades of prosperity during the 20th century, due 
in large part to the open Canada-US border. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, however, 
one of the United States’ closest allies was suddenly viewed as a security threat.  Jean 
Chrétien’s Liberal government faced intense criticism from the US that Canada’s borders 
were unguarded, immigration and refugee systems were ineffective, and anti-terrorism 
efforts were mediocre. The Bush administration made it clear that the Canadian 
government must launch a complete reorganization of its immigration, border security, 
and intelligence divisions. Even though Chrétien had been adamant to preserve Canadian 
sovereignty by avoiding initiatives that would further integrate the two countries, he was 
aware of the consequences if his government failed to meet US demands.  If the Bush 
administration was not satisfied by Canadian efforts to improve its immigration, border 
security, and intelligence divisions, the US could easily revert to isolationist policies and 
shut down its northern border. Such action would devastate the Canadian economy, 
which is completely dependent on the US market and the efficient flow of trade across 
the border: “A country that sends 87% of its exports to the US must keep its biggest 
customer happy. It has little choice. Short of reconfiguring the economy, Canada cannot 
do business if its trucks are lined up for miles at the border near Detroit and Buffalo.”299 
In order to maintain the existing trade interdependency, it became Chrétien’s priority to 
prove that Canada was a committed US ally. Chrétien knew that the US would not accept 
commitment in the form of empty promises. The Bush administration expected concrete 
financial investments aimed at improving Canada’s security divisions. The long-term 
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sustainability of the Canadian economy thus depended on the Chrétien government’s 
contribution to creating a safer North America.  
5.1 Canada’s Post-9/11 Security Policies  
The 2002 Federal Budget reflected Canada’s changing priorities and its success in 
meeting US demands. When he tabled the budget, Canada’s Finance Minister Paul 
Martin told the House of Commons that: 
Canada was severely affected by delays and disruptions at the US border,  
reminding us of the vital importance of keeping an open flow of people and  
products between our two countries. Our challenge, therefore, is to create a  
border that is open for business but closed to terror. This means going beyond  
our simple restoration of things as they were before Sept. 11. It means we must  
create the most modern, sophisticated border possible using state-of-the-art 
 technology to speed legitimate traffic while stopping those who would do our 
 countries harm.300 
 
             The 2002 Budget stipulated that $7.7 billion would be spent over a five-year 
period to improve the security of Canadians. 301 Of this, $1.2 billion was allocated for 
border infrastructure improvements and the development of joint intelligence and 
policing efforts that would reduce security threats along the border while keeping it open 
to trade.302 Between the years 2000 and 2008, the Canadian government would spend 
over $10 billion to improve its law enforcement and border security divisions.303 
In addition to funding these security initiatives, the Canadian government 
developed legislation that would integrate several of its departments and agencies, and 
thereby improve intelligence and information sharing.  In many ways, this legislation 
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mirrored the US consolidation of multiple government departments into the Department 
of Homeland Security. Canada’s National Security Policy outlined Canada’s security 
interests after 9/11, which served as the foundation for Canadian foreign policy during 
the 21st century: 
1) Protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and 
abroad 
2) Ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies 
3) Contributing to international security304 
 
These national security objectives would be pursued through the creation of the 
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Major Canadian intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the 
RCMP, and the newly-formed Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) are now part of 
this overarching department that takes a proactive, intelligence-driven approach to 
national security.305 For example, the CBSA Immigration Intelligence Branch is 
responsible for screening possible terrorists or persons suspected of being involved in 
organized crime. Since its establishment, this branch of the CBSA has greatly improved 
the screening of visa and refugee applicants before they actually arrive in Canada.306 
Improving visa and refugee screening was critical in order for Canada to satisfy post-9/11 
US security demands. According to Canada’s National Security Policy, “these actions 
are helping us better integrate intelligence and law enforcement officials with those 
responsible for making risk-based decisions on the flow of people and goods at our 
borders.”307 Canada’s prioritization of its intelligence departments is clear: In the early 
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1980s, the intelligence division of Canada Customs had nine full-time employees. Since 
9/11, this number has increased to 780. All Canadian law enforcement and national 
security agencies have experienced similar staffing increases since 9/11.308 
Chapter 3 outlined the drawbacks of militarizing the border and creating a North 
American security perimeter. Policymakers were aware that the US and Canada must 
reach a common ground so that “the integrity of the Canada-US border [can] be 
maintained while still allowing for the free flow of people and goods.”309 The history of 
cooperation between US and Canadian border enforcement agencies indicated to 
Canadian and US policymakers that bilateral initiatives would be the most effective way 
to secure the border while maintaining the current trade interdependency. In the case of 
Mexico, high levels of corruption in the policing and court systems have consistently 
undermined the success of bilateral policing initiatives between Mexico and the US, and 
led the US to militarize its southern border.310 In contrast, Canada’s strong legal and 
justice systems are equally transparent to those in the US, making it much more feasible 
for the two countries to establish joint law enforcement teams. Furthermore, as John 
Noble argues, “neither country can individually address all of the threats posed by 
terrorists to the North American continent. Heightened security for North America can 
only come with increased cooperation between the countries concerned.”311 
By the beginning of 2002, Canada and the US had already developed and 
implemented new methods of securing their shared border that entailed an integration of 
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their national security and law enforcement agencies.312 The importance of this 
collaboration was reiterated in the 2004 National Security Policy, which said that to keep 
Canadians safe in the 21st century,  the federal government must create permanent 
partnerships with municipalities, provinces, and other countries around the world, 
particularly the United States.313 These bilateral agreements were very similar to the 
bilateral partnerships developed during the 1990s, which were discussed in Chapter 2. 
The key difference is that the Canadian and US governments have made these ideas and 
concepts a priority since 9/11 by providing the political support and funding to fulfill the 
objectives of these bilateral agreements.314 
The Safe Third Country Agreement was signed on December 3, 2001 with the 
goal of improving Canada-US cooperation on illegal migration issues. Specifically, the 
Agreement aims to reduce the likelihood of illegal migrants accessing Canada through its 
liberal immigration and refugee policies and subsequently entering the US illegally 
through the porous border.315 The Binational Planning Group emerged in 2002 out of the 
realization that Canada and the US faced many common domestic security threats. The 
group organizes joint response plans for terrorist attacks and other emergency situations, 
which involve such actions as sending Canadian and US troops into each other’s 
territory.316 The Binational Planning Group also develops innovative methods of 
intelligence sharing and coordinates the Canadian and US surveillance maritime waters 
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surveillance systems.317 Whereas the Binational Planning Group facilitates the 
integration of the Canadian and US defence systems, the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership Agreement focuses on maintaining a positive trade and security relationship 
between the signatories of NAFTA. Created in 2005, this trilateral initiative established a 
framework that would preserve the trade agreement while improving security in North 
America through increased cooperation and intelligence sharing.318  
The Security and Prosperity Partnership Agreement complemented the Smart 
Border Declaration, which was signed by US Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley on December 12, 2001319 in order to rectify 
Canadian economic concerns and US security fears. 320 Soon after 9/11, Canadian 
policymakers took advantage of the US uncertainty about how to effectively secure its 
borders, knowing that this was the ideal occasion to put forward bold and innovative 
policy ideas. The “political oxygen” provided by 9/11 was used effectively by the 
Canadian government to create a proposal for the Canada-US border that viewed 
“economic prosperity and security as reinforcing rather than competing objectives.”321  
Ideas that had been discussed before 9/11 were put into a smart border strategy that 
aimed to make the border a filter rather than a barrier. This would be achieved through a 
framework aimed to increase the speed at which legitimate goods and people cross the 
border while weeding out high-risk elements. Whereas the USA Patriot Act advised that 
the border be secured by increasing the number of guards at ports of entry, the smart 
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border proposal incorporated proactive techniques like risk assessment, information 
sharing, licensing, pre-clearance, and the use of advanced technology.”322 
This framework is outlined through the four pillars of the Smart Border 
Declaration and 32-Point Action Plan, which aims to facilitate “the secure flow of 
people, the secure flow of goods, secure infrastructure, and the coordination and 
information sharing.”323 Prime Minister Chrétien and President Bush met in Detroit, 
Michigan in September 2002 to assess what steps had been taken to implement the 
Declaration’s objectives.324 Three months later, the Canadian and American governments 
announced that the Smart Border Declaration would be expanded to increase the level of 
intelligence and criminal data sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
like the RCMP and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This expansion would 
also include the development of joint databases between the Canada Border Services 
Agency and US Customs and Border Patrol. According to Canada’s National Security 
Policy, “the initiative makes both countries partners in systems and programs that 
expedite the flow of low-risk goods and people while increasing the information that is 
needed to screen higher-risk flows.”325 Although Canadian leaders have normally shied 
away from supporting agreements that infringe on Canadian sovereignty, Chrétien and 
Martin’s Liberal governments recognized that the Smart Border Declaration was 
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preserving the bilateral economic relationship, and thus supported the resultant policies 
and initiatives.326  
5.2 The Expansion of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams Across Canada  
The Smart Border Declaration discredited the argument that trade and security 
are opposing goals. Although it emphasized the importance of securing the border 
through bilateral partnerships and increased intelligence sharing, the Declaration 
acknowledged the need to maintain an open Canada-US border.  Gerry Dundas, the 
Canada Border Services Agency Chief of Enforcement Operations for the Windsor area, 
estimates that 97% of people who cross the Canada-US border are classified as legitimate 
travelers.327 In the case of the Windsor-Detroit sector, thousands of people cross the 
border daily or several times a week for work or school. For example, there are 5,000 
Registered Nurses who live in the Windsor area but work in Michigan. These nurses use 
the Ambassador Bridge and the Windsor-Detroit tunnel to commute to and from work 
every day. Dundas argues that it is simply impractical and a waste of resources to force 
commuters to answer multiple questions each day, since the ultimate goal for border 
patrol agents is “to find a way to identify you quickly, clear you quickly, and get out of 
your way.”328 In recognizing these concerns, the Smart Border Declaration laid the 
foundation for programs like NEXUS329 and FAST,330 which have facilitated the efficient 
cross-border flow of legitimate goods and people. 
                                                            
326 Hillmer and Granatstein, 327. 
327 Gerry Dundas, CBSA, interview. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid. Through the NEXUS program, travelers fill out an application and provide the required 
information, after which a background check is conducted. If the person in question is deemed a low-risk 
  79
Political leaders in Canada and the US have always acknowledged the importance 
of effectively securing their common border, but the events of 9/11 turned this common 
objective into a priority. Both countries were particularly concerned that their border 
security systems were limited to official ports of entry along the border. Although 
Canadian and US Customs officials operate 119 land border crossings and several marine 
border crossings,331 the Canada-US border stretches for almost 9,000 kilometers.332 The 
ratio of border crossings to the length of the border makes it clear that most of the border 
was left unguarded prior to 9/11.333 Joe Comartin, New Democrat Member of Parliament 
for the Windsor-St. Clair riding, said that “we have all sorts of border points primarily in 
the Prairies, through BC, where they are just completely open. You just walk across the 
imaginary line that is there.”334  
The Bush administration was particularly concerned that using marine ports of 
entry to secure the 3,830 kilometers of shared waters335 posed a major security risk to the 
US.336 If someone wanted to cross the border into the US with the intention of 
committing an act of terrorism, s/he would likely use these isolated areas between ports 
of entry to sneak into the US, since it would reduce the chance of creating suspicion or 
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being apprehended.337 It was clear that in the aftermath of 9/11, innovative methods of 
bilateral cooperation would replace the traditional approach of building up borders as the 
most effective way to fight globalized terrorism and other criminal activity. According to 
Marcel LeBeuf of the RCMP, “the events of September 11 had a determining effect on 
developing partnerships between law enforcement regarding the border”338 by 
highlighting the importance of forming joint Canada-US enforcement teams that would 
patrol the border between official ports of entry.339 The importance of these teams was 
emphasized in the Smart Border Declaration’s 32-Point Action Plan: 
Point 23: Integrated Border and Marine Enforcement Teams 
• Expand Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and Integrated Marine 
Enforcement Teams (IMETs) to other areas of the border and enhance 
communication and coordination.  
 
Point 24: Joint Enforcement Coordination 
• Work toward ensuring comprehensive and permanent coordination of law 
enforcement, anti-terrorism efforts and information sharing, such as by 
strengthening the Cross-Border Crime Forum and reinvigorating Project 
Northstar.  
 
Point 25: Integrated Intelligence 
• Establish joint teams to analyze and disseminate information and intelligence, 
and produce threat and intelligence assessments. Initiate discussions regarding a 
Canadian presence on the US Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.340 
 
    Like many other components of the Smart Border Declaration, Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams pre-dated the 9/11 attacks. The first IBET was established in 1996 
near Chilliwack, British Columbia as an RCMP initiative to patrol the British Columbia-
Washington border, which had recently emerged as a major smuggling route for illicit 
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drugs.341 The RCMP, US Border Patrol, and US Customs Service spoke extensively with 
residents of border communities to better understand the operations of criminal 
organizations in the BC-Washington region. Using this information, the agencies then 
discussed the ways in which specific limitations of border policing could be overcome 
through collaborative efforts.342 This pilot project enabled US and Canadian law 
enforcement from local, provincial, state, and federal agencies to conduct joint forces 
operations and more effectively share information and intelligence.343 This cooperative 
effort enjoyed great success: IBET agents made major seizures and arrests between 
official ports of entry along the BC-Washington border. In a 10-day period during 1999, 
the team intercepted three cross-border smuggling attempts and seized a total of 71 
kilograms of marijuana and 10 kilograms of cocaine.344 In May 1999 alone, the BC-
Washington IBET seized US $2.5 million worth of cocaine and marijuana,345 suggesting 
that this team was effectively policing the most porous areas of the BC-Washington 
border region. The RCMP reports that prior to 9/11, “IBETs continued to succeed in BC 
and gained a reputation as an effective method in managing border enforcement 
issues.”346 Between 1996 and 1998, seizures of illicit goods and people between ports of 
entry increased by 600%.347 But until the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent concern over 
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the porous border, the IBET concept was not formalized, nor did the BC-Washington 
team receive sufficient funding to expand across the entire Canada-US border.348 
    After 9/11, the Government of Canada recognized the need to patrol its borders 
with the US between designated ports of entry. Part of Canada’s 2002 Federal Budget 
allocations for border security, anti-terrorism, and public safety were used to create 23349 
new Integrated Border Enforcement Teams350 in 15 strategic locations along the Canada-
US border.351  Since 9/11, IBETs have been comprised of two Canadian and three US 
permanent partner agencies:352 The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), US Customs and Border Protection (US CBP), the 
US Coast Guard (USCG), and the US Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(US ICE).353 The participation of these five core agencies gives IBETs land, air, and 
marine components.354 These agencies also work closely with local, state, and provincial 
law enforcement agencies on an ad hoc basis. According to the RCMP, these teams were 
expanded across Canada and the US in order to “enhance border integrity and security at 
our shared border by identifying, investigating, and interdicting persons and 
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organizations that pose a threat to national security or are engaged in other organized 
criminal activity.”355 Figure 2 shows the 15 IBET locations along the Canada-US border.  
     Since 9/11, the main role of IBETs has been to work in collaboration with the 
CBSA and the US CBP to secure the Canada-US border. Whereas these two agencies are 
primarily responsible for securing the border at official ports of entry, IBETs are 
mandated to police criminal activity between these ports of entry. IBETs are responsible 
for monitoring all land and marine borders between ports of entry. The marine borders 
include: The Atlantic Ocean between Nova Scotia and Maine, the Pacific 
Ocean/Washington State area, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway region, and various 
other marine areas in the Atlantic and Red River regions.356  
    IBETs were expanded across Canada and the United States as part of the post-9/11 
effort to more vigilantly monitor the porous Canada-US border. RCMP Sergeant Bob 
Bergoine attests that IBETs “number one priority is and always has been national 
security.”357 Even though the majority of IBETs activities involve the smuggling of 
drugs, small arms, and humans, their primary function is to police terrorist activity at the 
border and contribute intelligence to terrorism investigations. As terrorist attacks have 
become increasingly sophisticated, it became crucial in the aftermath of 9/11 that Canada 
and the US develop integrated policing efforts to effectively monitor and impede cross-
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border terrorist activity.358  Even though the FBI and RCMP National Security Criminal 
Investigations (NSCI) are responsible for coordinating terrorism investigations in Canada 
and the US, IBETs contribute to national security by patrolling the border between ports 
of entry for terrorism-related activity, assisting in investigations, and sharing relevant 
intelligence with the FBI and the RCMP NSCI.359  
  Monitoring cross-border terrorist activity is the primary function of IBETs, but the 
US National Security Strategy and Canada’s National Security Policy acknowledge that 
there are other national security threats besides terrorism.360 Statistically, the majority of 
IBET activity involves organized crime, which the “Canada-US IBET Threat Assessment 
2007” claims is the principal threat along the Canada-US border.361 In an internal report, 
the RCMP listed IBETs priorities as follows: “National security, organized crime, and 
other border criminality between ports of entry.”362 
   IBET operations focus exclusively on the Canada-US border. In many cases, IBET 
arrests and seizures produce intelligence about the sources of criminal organizations. Any 
inland operations that result from seizures or arrests become the responsibility of the 
designated Canadian and US agencies. For example, if an IBET team seizes a large 
amount of money that is being smuggled across the border by boat, that money is likely 
related to the illicit drug trade. After the IBET makes seizures and/or arrests, their role in 
the investigation would end there. The money and those arrested would be handed over to 
the appropriate unit within Canada or the US, which would then proceed with the 
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investigation. Since the investigation would likely take place far away from the borders, 
IBETs would not take part since it would take the teams away from patrolling the 
Canada-US border. According to “O” Division IBET Commander Bob Bergoine, this 
duty is the main reason for their existence: “If an IBET investigation required inland 
investigations for long periods of time, we don’t want to be away from the border for too 
long. We don’t want to avoid the activity at the border. That’s our main focus.”363 
     This chapter has outlined the role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams after 
9/11, the origins of these joint enforcement teams, and their basic composition. The 
following chapter will explain in greater detail the functions and priorities of IBETs, and 
will assess how these teams fulfilled the operational objectives set out in the Smart 
Border Declaration. 
Chapter 6: The Smart Border Declaration and Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams 
This chapter will analyze IBET efforts to fulfill their operational objective, which 
were outlined in the Smart Border Declaration. It will also examine the outcomes of 
IBETs that were not specifically mentioned in the Declaration, focusing on the increase 
in seizures and arrests between designated ports of entry. Points 23-25 of the Smart 
Border Declaration were used to generate five operational objectives for Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams. This section will examine how IBETs have fulfilled each of 
these objectives. The link between political will and the post-9/11 success of Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams will also be examined. 
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6.1 More Agents Policing the Border Between Official Ports of Entry 
The first operational objective of  IBETs is for an increased number of law 
enforcement agents to police the border between official ports of entry. Even before 9/11, 
these porous areas of the border presented a major security risk to the Canada-US border. 
Windsor-Detroit IBET commander Bob Bergoine admits that before 9/11, “the areas 
between the ports of entry were, I’m not going to say neglected, but not as much attention 
was paid as were the ports.”364 Michael Pearson, Executive Associate Commissioner for 
the US Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) Field Operations, addressed this 
security issue to a Subcommittee of the US House Judiciary Committee in 1999. 
Although Pearson spoke highly of the RCMP for cooperating closely with US border 
patrol staff to secure the border, he said that the lack of attention paid to porous areas 
between ports of entry had made the Canada-US border “a potential terrorist threat.”365 
 Law enforcement officials found it particularly difficult to patrol marine areas of 
the border. Some of these marine crossings freeze during the winter, making it easy for 
people with both legitimate and criminal purposes to travel easily between the two 
countries.366 Authorities report that water bodies that span across Canada and the US are 
a haven for illegitimate activity like the smuggling of drugs, money, tobacco, weapons, 
liquor, and humans. Water bodies that straddle the border make it relatively easy for 
people to slip between Canada and the US through cargo and cruise ships, pleasure crafts, 
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and ferries.367 Marine enforcement officials have also caught people trying to sneak 
across the border on foot or by using all- terrain-vehicles, sleds, snowmobiles, boats, 
rafts, trains, and aircrafts. Criminal organizations often employ drivers or pilots to move 
people or goods across the border. They use technology like GPS, scanners, decoy 
vehicles, and counter-surveillance techniques to avoid being detected by law enforcement 
authorities.368  
When anyone crosses the border without offering themselves for investigation, 
which is the case when anyone crosses between designated ports of entry, their action is 
considered to be an immigration offense, since official permission has not been granted to 
cross the border. According to RCMP Staff Sergeant Bob Bergoine, when people avoid 
points of entry, they may be involved smuggling operations, or they do not want 
authorities knowing that they are crossing into another country.369 It is thus crucial that 
the border be guarded between ports of entry. Gerry Dundas, Canada Border Services 
Chief of Enforcement Operations for the Windsor area, claims that IBETs are responsible 
for apprehending these individuals who try to slip past customs authorities at official 
border crossings: “[IBETs] job is to be between those points of entry and to be in those 
covert areas and to be those eyes and ears out there.” 370 
 Since they have expanded across Canada and the US, IBETs have greatly aided 
the CBSA and US CBP with the daunting task of effectively securing the border. The 
RCMP has taken a lead role in the development and expansion of IBETs across Canada, 
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recognizing the limitations of reactive border security measures like CBSA/CBP vehicle 
searches at ports of entry. According to Sergeant David Mackay, unit commander of the 
Rocky Mountain IBET, “the volume of activity along the border requires inter-agency 
co-operation.”371 
A US Customs and Border Protection report similarly claims that law 
enforcement cooperation is a more effective way of securing the Canada-US border than 
unilateral efforts, since customs agents at ports of entry cannot be expected to interdict 
100% of illicit goods and people that cross the border: “While resources have been 
significantly increased since 9/11 from approximately 350 agents to 1,000 agents, the 
Border Patrol’s ability to detect, respond to, and interdict illegal cross-border penetrations 
along the Canada-US border remains limited.”372 The CBP report goes on to highlight the 
importance of collaborative efforts like IBETs to secure the porous areas of the border: 
“To identify specific northern border threats, CBP Border Patrol has strengthened its 
partnerships with Canadian law enforcement authorities and intelligence officials, and 
with officials from other federal, state, local, and tribal organizations by leveraging 
information and increasing communication and cooperation. The Integrated Border 
Enforcement, Maritime, and Intelligence Teams (IBET/IMET/IBIT) are examples of this 
effort.”373 The RCMP reports that unlike the US CBP and CBSA, whose operations are in 
many cases limited to designated ports of entry, 374 “the area IBETs cover is vast and 
requires the team to be mobile and operate in strategically chosen locations based on 
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investigative priorities targeted through information and intelligence-sharing.”375 While 
the US CBP report clearly outlines the limitations of the CBP actions alone, it advocates 
for joint initiatives like IBETs to effectively curb criminal activity along the Canada-US 
border. By the summer of 2008, US CBP had contributed a great deal of personnel 
towards the IBET effort to patrol the Great Lakes region376 and remote forest areas,377 
which suggests that the agency favors bilateral cooperation over unilateral efforts to 
secure the border. 
The expansion of IBETs across Canada has increased the number of agents 
patrolling the border between ports of entry, but each team is still responsible for policing 
a sizeable area of the border. It is unreasonable to expect these agents to patrol hundreds 
of miles of borderland on a 24/7 basis. Recognizing the limitations of IBET agents, the 
governments of Canada and the US have provided the funding to open satellite offices for 
IBETs that are responsible for patrolling vast geographic areas.  For example, the Prairie 
IBET is based in Estevan, but there is a satellite office located in Eastend. This additional 
IBET office has improved response times in emergency situations, and has enabled IBET 
agents to more effectively patrol remote areas of the border. Corporal Brian Jones, an 
RCMP Spokesperson, said that the Eastend satellite office will improve the Prairie 
IBET’s ability to curb cross-border criminal activity and “enhance…the ability to follow-
up with any reports or information that is coming in.”378 IBET satellite offices like the 
one based in Eastend are complemented by improved information analysis and sharing 
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between IBET partners, as well as emerging technical capabilities like joint radio 
systems379 and $2.2 million Bell 206L-4 helicopters, which are used by IBETs to patrol 
rugged, marine, and isolated areas of the border that are difficult for officers to patrol on 
foot.380 Gerry Francois, head of the “K” Division Border Integrity, highlighted the 
importance of advanced technology like the 206L-4 helicopters: “We are limited in terms 
of human resources but we take advantage of some pretty advanced technology to 
monitor traffic across the border and remote areas that we can’t get to as easily and as 
often as we’d like to. We’re using a blend of technology and human investigations to do, 
I think, an effective job.”381 
Post-9/11 funding for IBETs has increased the number of law enforcement 
personnel that patrol the border between ports of entry, and the use of satellite offices and 
improved technology have made law enforcement teams far more effective at policing 
illicit activities between ports of entry than before September 11th. Lloyd Easterling, the 
US Customs and Border Patrol’s Assistant Chief for Border Security Operations, attests 
that “we’re out there more and a greater deterrent.”382  
6.2 Permanently-Established Joint Enforcement Teams 
The second operational objective of IBETs is the establishment of permanent joint 
law enforcement teams. Even before 9/11, there was a consensus amongst Canadian and 
US law enforcement agencies that establishing joint forces was the most effective way to 
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curb cross-border criminal activity.383 The Smart Border Declaration formalized this 
consensus, and since then, IBETs have had permanent staff members from law 
enforcement agencies in Canada and the US. Each IBET has a Joint Management Team 
(JMT), which is comprised of representatives from the five permanent IBET agencies. 
JMTs meet each month to determine which operations the IBET partners will work on 
collaboratively and how many resources and staff each agency will contribute to that 
particular operation. According to Sergeant Bob Bergoine, who oversees the RCMP 
component of the Windsor-Detroit IBET, JMTs open lines of communications between 
the agencies so that they can determine what joint actions should be taken through the 
IBET based on what individual action is already being taken by each agency.384  
In addition to the JMTs, the Governments of Canada and the United States have 
developed a National Joint Management Team, which is comprised of senior officials 
from each IBET partner agency. This team acts as an overarching body to regulate IBET 
operations, and meets 2-3 times each year to discuss the findings and concerns of 
individual JMTs. IBET operations are also centrally coordinated through a National 
Coordination Team, which is made up of representatives from the five permanent IBET 
partners. If a local JMT has a concern, inquiry, or intelligence that should be shared 
nationally, they contact the National Coordination Team, which disseminates the 
information in the appropriate manner. This centralized authority makes IBET operations 
both transparent and organized.385 
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 Permanent coordination between IBET partner agencies has also been 
implemented on a local level. Many RCMP and CBSA members of IBETs work out of 
the same office.386 Gerry Dundas of the CBSA is a strong supporter of this inter-agency 
cooperation: “I guarantee you that two CBSA guys and two RCMP guys working 
together is better than 4 RCMP guys working together. It’s a matter of wider-ranging 
authorities, because you get the benefits of the RCMP authorities and the CBSA 
authorities, which are sometimes similar but are much more wide-ranging from a search 
perspective.”387 
Although Canadian and US IBET partners do not work in such close proximity as 
do the CBSA and the RCMP, partner agencies work on the same cases while respecting 
the territorial jurisdiction of each other’s country. For example, US and Canadian staff 
will both patrol the same marine border area, but American agencies remain on the 
American side of the border and Canadians work on the Canadian side while maintaining 
regular communication.388 This cooperative effort has become a permanent fixture of 
Canada-US border enforcement. RCMP Constable Randell Wong of the IBET considers 
these joint enforcement teams to be vital in border enforcement operations, admitting that 
“I don’t think either of us could do our job as efficiently without each other.”389 
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6.3 Increases in Information and Intelligence Sharing. 
Establishing permanent joint enforcement teams was the best way to facilitate 
intelligence-led policing,390 which was quickly emerging as the most effective way of 
securing the Canada-US border in the post-9/11 era.391 There was a growing consensus 
that amidst the economic integration in North America, proactive bilateral initiatives 
would replace unilateral border security policies. Professor Don Alper, Director of the 
Centre for Canadian-American Studies at Western Washington University, notes that “the 
real solution is not building bigger walls or creating these new impediments. The solution 
is the close intelligence cooperation between the countries.” 392  
Canada’s National Security Policy identified intelligence as the foundation of 
policies and initiatives that would keep Canadians safe in the 21st century,393 suggesting 
that the Government of Canada’s border security policies would continue to prioritize 
intelligence-sharing initiatives and proactive law enforcement efforts. Gerry Dundas, the 
Canada Border Services Agency’s Chief of Enforcement Operations for the Windsor 
Area, has a background in intelligence, and considers it “the way to go to use your 
resources to the nth degree.” 394 The CBSA and the US CBP’s efforts are often reactive in 
nature, since agents must in most cases wait until cars and trucks pass through border 
crossings before they can conduct inspections. In contrast, IBETs embody the notion that 
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proactive, intelligence-based joint operations are the most effective way to police the 
Canada-US border in the 21st century. According to Marcel LeBeuf of the RCMP,  
IBET is intelligence-driven. All information must be shared. Intelligence support  
builds upon existing inter-agency, intelligence structures by enhancing 
 information gathering, evaluation, fusion, analysis, and reporting. The  
primary mission [of IBETs] is to provide tactical and operational intelligence 
 for specific cross-border operations related to national security and 
 organized criminal activity. Enforcement operations target cross-border  
criminal activity geographically, regardless of the direction of travel or  
the commodity of travel involved, and are designed to arrest as many  
perpetrators and seize as much contraband as possible.395  
 
IBETs are responsible for conducting routine patrols of border areas, but most of 
their operations are based on shared intelligence. The development of IBETs has 
provided a framework for law enforcement agencies like the FBI and the RCMP to share 
intelligence and work collaboratively to disband international criminal organizations.396 
For example, if the Canada Border Services Agency searches a car at a designated port of 
entry and finds dozens of illicit firearms, this seizure may be the beginning of a massive 
operation that could potentially be linked to terrorism or the illicit drug trade. The CBSA 
would proceed by informing their intelligence staff and their partner agencies within 
IBET about this seizure and any related intelligence. Gerry Dundas explains that “once 
that contact is made, they just fan out and try to find out who is involved and what’s the 
scope of it…is it just a small-time or is it organized crime? Is it related to terrorism?” In 
some cases, seizures made by CBSA at border crossings lead to investigations that last 
for months or even years.397 This organized system of information sharing has greatly 
improved the efficiency of law enforcement operations related to cross-border criminal 
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organizations. Sergeant Dennis Daley, who coordinates the RCMP component of the 
IBET office in Woodstock, claims that “if there is a border incident anywhere at the New 
Brunswick-Maine border or at the Quebec-Maine border, we instantaneously get that 
information. There is a specific process as to how information is shared.”398 Daley says 
that because these teams work proactively based on shared intelligence, IBETs should be 
a model for effective policing.399   
Many IBETs, such as the team in the Windsor-Detroit area, have created a 
permanent system of intelligence sharing called Joint Intelligence Groups (JIGs). These 
groups are comprised of representatives from the five permanent IBET partners. These 
agencies soon realized that this system of sharing intelligence should be expanded to 
include provincial and local law enforcement agencies, since its members have often 
come across valuable intelligence that may contribute to national and international 
operations. Representatives from the permanent IBET agencies now meet regularly along 
with provincial, state, and local law enforcement officials with the sole purpose of 
sharing intelligence and information. For example, members of the Ontario Provincial 
Police (OPP) and the Windsor Police often attend Detroit-Windsor JIG meetings. Gerry 
Dundas says that because of JIG meetings, “there is no risk of important intelligence not 
being shared because of IBETs. Everyone finds out at the same time.”400 This initiative 
has formally opened the lines of communication between law enforcement agencies in 
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Canada and the US, and has greatly contributed to improved intelligence sharing since 
9/11.401 
After the RCMP seized eight men in 2006 that were suspected of planning a 
terrorist attack in Toronto, the US renewed its focus on Canada as a security threat.402 On 
the CBS News coverage of the incident, US terrorism analyst Christopher Whitcomb 
claimed that the reason there have been no major terrorism-related incidents involving the 
Canada-US border since 9/11 is because of what is going on behind the scenes. 
According to Whitcomb, Canada and the US have engaged in proactive border 
enforcement techniques based on intelligence sharing and joint law enforcement 
activities, which have proven to be an effective way of creating a more secure border.   
Catching them through some kind of a strain moving across the borders is not  
the answer. It’s doing investigations to find them before they try to cross the  
border. We don’t need knee-jerk reactions. We don’t need to go out with  
National Guardsmen along the Canadian border. We need to do what’s worked  
for the last five years very very effectively. It is to concentrate on the  
 investigations, it is to concentrate on the intelligence, it is to concentrate  
on those relationships that we have with Canada and with other countries 
 that have proven very effective.403 
 
Whitcomb’s perception of Canadian law enforcement greatly contrasts the 
negative tone of comments made by US officials before and immediately after the 9/11 
attacks, suggesting that initiatives like IBETs have improved the US’s perception of 
Canadian law enforcement capabilities.  
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6.4 Methods are More Covert 
Whereas the presence of the Canada Border Services Agency and US Customs 
and Border Protection at designated ports of entry is very overt and agents are clearly 
identified, the efforts of IBET agents are more covert and “behind the scenes.404 This role 
is necessary because of the intelligence-based nature of IBET operations. 405 Travelers are 
aware that when they cross through designated ports of entry, they will likely encounter a 
CBSA or CBP agent. In contrast, people who sneak between these ports are usually doing 
so to avoid detection by law enforcement authorities. If IBET agents wore traditional 
RCMP uniforms or CBSA/CBP attire, illegal crossers would quickly identify the 
presence of law enforcement officials and divert their path accordingly. Ensuring that 
IBET agents are plain-clothed enables them to conduct their operations more covertly and 
more effectively detect illicit cross-border activity. 
 Gerry Dundas of the CBSA stresses the importance of conducting IBET 
operations covertly: 
Some people say ‘forget about the intell and all the undercover guys…you should 
 have uniformed officers out there with guns standing along the border.’ Well,  
the border I’m in charge of, just for my marine division, is 780 kilometers long.  
How many Border Services Officers with guns do I need to line up? And even if 
I had them all, if you gave me 1000 extra people, at a huge cost to the taxpayer,  
I still wouldn’t be any more comfortable than I am with 5 IBET guys, because  
you don’t know where they’re ever going to be. If you’re a bad guy, you’ve got 
 to be careful. Because if we were lined up along the border, they would know  
where we were and where we weren’t. Whereas with IBETs, you don’t know if 
 they are waiting for you or if they have intell on you…it’s just too vast an area 
 to say that a non-intelligence, non-covert type of enforcement is applicable,  
because it’s not. You can give me as many uniformed officers as you want, but  
I will not guarantee you that something is totally secure…sometimes not  
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knowing where IBETs are will be is a big deterrent to bad guys.406 
It is evident that the covert nature of IBET operations is integral to their success 
in policing the Canada-US border. In addition to these covert patrolling efforts, IBETs 
are able to conduct their operations behind the scenes by making use of border 
community residents. Recognizing that it is impossible for IBETs to patrol the entire 
Canada-US border on a constant basis, these teams have developed a community watch 
program in regions that are especially prone to cross-border smuggling. The IBET 
National Coordination Team created and disseminated a brochure that informs 
community residents about what type of suspicious activities they should look out for and 
report to law enforcement authorities. 407 For example, if an agent is patrolling the Lake 
St. Clair area between Lasalle and Amherstburg, s/he may give a phone number to locals 
who reside near the water and marina workers who could potentially contribute valuable 
intelligence on criminal organizations operating in the area. The agent would instruct 
residents and marina workers to call the number if they notice any suspicious activities 
along the border. By operating in this manner, one IBET agent is able to quietly form a 
web of local contacts to help guard miles of intricate waterways along marine borders.408 
These covert operations have been entrenched in the IBET concept since the 1990s, and 
have greatly aided these teams in policing illicit activity along the Canada-US border. 
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6.5 Methods are More Suited to Fight Globalized Crime 
Canada’s National Security Policy acknowledges the emerging globality of illicit 
industries, recognizing that “the threats we face today do not respect national or 
international boundaries.”409 Global criminal operations in North America must be 
combated with global policing initiatives that take advantage of the positive relations and 
mutual trust that have come out of economic interdependence. Moisés Naim, Editor-in-
Chief of Foreign Policy Magazine, agrees that “public safety [is] more likely to be 
ensured by a government’s close collaboration with other nations allied in the fight 
against illicit traffickers than through continuous attempts to plug leaking borders with 
sealants that do not work.”410 
Since they were expanded across Canada and the US in 2002, IBET operations 
have evolved in response to globalization and the changing role of borders. For years, one 
of the biggest impediments to successful joint enforcement operations between Canada 
and the US was the prevailing concern over territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty. The 
US Coast Guard often pursued boats near the Canadian border that were suspected of 
being involved in drug smuggling operations. If the drivers of these boats were able to 
speed into Canadian waters, the US Coast Guard would have no authority to apprehend 
them or search the boats. The same situation applied to Canadian law enforcement 
operating near US waters.  
Much has changed since then. The Shiprider Program was launched in 2007 as an 
IBET pilot project to more effectively patrol smuggling operations in marine areas. For 
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two months, US and Canadian law enforcement authorities patrolled border waters in the 
same boats, which gave law enforcement authorities on board the authority to enforce 
both US and Canadian laws. During August and September 2007, officers involved in 
Shiprider seized a total of 214 pounds of marijuana, more than one million contraband 
cigarettes, six boats, and $38,000 of Canadian cash that would have been used to fund 
additional smuggling ventures. 411 In one instance, law enforcement officials were 
chasing a boat in US territory along the St. Lawrence River that was headed towards 
Canadian waters near the Akwesasne Indian Reserve. On board the law enforcement 
vessel was a member of the US Coast Guard as well as an RCMP officer. The presence of 
US and Canadian law enforcement enabled the officers to apprehend the vessel, 
regardless of whether it was in American or Canadian territory. Once the boat was 
caught, the RCMP and US Coast Guard discovered 103 pounds of marijuana and over 
one million contraband cigarettes on board. The marine area between Cornwall, Ontario 
and Massena, New York, as well as the BC-Washington state region, were also patrolled 
from August-September 2007. A total of 1,000 patrol hours were conducted between the 
two locations that year. 412 Colin Kenny, Chair of Canada’s Standing Senate Committee 
on National Security and Defence, praised the Shiprider Program as a “terrific idea. 
Security issues on the Canada-US border are a huge threat to relations between our two 
countries, and a real threat to the future of the Canadian economy.”413 The 2007 Report of 
the United Nations International Narcotics Board similarly hailed Shiprider as a success, 
claiming that it “strengthened law enforcement cooperation by providing transborder law 
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enforcement authority to Canadian law enforcement officers operating along and across 
the border.”414 Although the Shiprider Program was only implemented for a limited time, 
its success suggests a shift away from the traditional link between sovereignty and 
territory, and towards more globalized methods of law enforcement.  
6.6 Additional Outcomes of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams  
Sections 6.1-6.5 examined the extent to which Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams achieved their operational objectives. It is crucial that the outcomes of their 
presence between designated ports of entry also be examined in order to determine 
whether meeting their operational objectives has contributed to seizures and arrests along 
the Canada-US border.  The 2007 Report of the United Nations International Narcotics 
Board acknowledges that Canadian and American federal, state, provincial, and local law 
enforcement agencies cooperate very closely to curb drug smuggling operations along 
their common border. The report considers Integrated Border Enforcement Teams to be 
“the primary tool” used to ensure that criminals cannot exploit international borders to 
evade prosecution.415 The importance of these teams is clear: Since they were established, 
IBETs have contributed to several national security investigations, disrupted organized 
crime rings, made numerous seizures of illicit drugs and small arms, and broken up cross-
border smuggling networks.416 The “2007 IBET Threat Assessment” attests that “IBETs 
have made tremendous progress since their inception in advancing cross-border 
cooperation between partner agencies, locally and internationally. The coordination and 
continued sharing of criminal information and intelligence by IBET partners has led to 
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the ongoing success of the IBET initiative and the dismantlement of cross-border crime 
between ports of entry on the Canada/US border.”417 
The contributions that IBETs have made to policing cross-border illicit activity 
can be shown quantitatively through statistics of seizures and arrests between ports of 
entry. However, the available data on this subject is limited. The “Canada-US IBET 
Threat Assessment 2007” compares the seizures of illicit drugs, small arms, and large 
amounts of currency made in 2005 to those made in 2006. The statistics seem to indicate 
that IBET efforts are consistently becoming more effective. The quantity of cocaine and 
marijuana seized between official ports of entry decreased from 2005 to 2006, while the 
number of cocaine and marijuana seizures increased.418 Between 2005 and 2006, the 
quantity of ecstasy seized between ports of entry increased, but there was no change in 
the number of seizures.419 The number of seizures of large amounts of currency also 
increased from 2005 to 2006. These types of seizures are a key element of IBET 
operations, since they are usually related to the illicit drug trade. 420 Since the inception of 
IBETs, there have been significantly fewer firearms seizures between official ports of 
entry than at the ports. This disparity could be a sign of ineffective policing methods 
between ports of entry, but it is more commonly assumed that there are more firearms 
seized at ports of entry because US residents are often unaware of the Canadian laws 
restricting firearms, and bring them across the border for recreational purposes rather 
than to engage in illicit activity. Even though there are still more firearms seized at ports 
of entry than between these ports, the number of firearms seized between ports of entry 
                                                            
417 “IBET Threat Assessment.” 
418 Ibid. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Ibid. 
  103
increased from 2005-2006.421 Many of these seizures were linked to illicit drug seizures 
and arrests. Although any increases in seizure amounts or numbers would seem to 
indicate that law enforcement efforts are becoming more effective, they could also be an 
indication that there is more illicit activity taking place at the border. In 2006, for 
example, 1,113 people were arrested between ports of entry while attempting to cross 
from Canada to the US, and 79 people were caught trying to enter Canada from the 
US.422 These figures suggest that IBET presence between borders is having favorable 
outcomes. However, because there is no reliable data that shows whether the number of 
people who have successfully crossed the border illegally has gone up, down, or stayed 
the same, it is impossible to accurately gauge whether the rate of interdiction has gone up 
or down. 
Examining statistics is thus an ineffective method in itself to determine the 
outcomes of IBET efforts. As an alternative to relying on statistics, the following section 
will examine case studies of successful IBET operations, including intelligence-based 
operations and seizures/arrests made by IBETs while patrolling the border between 
various ports of entry. Examining the outcomes of IBET operations will assist in 
determining whether these teams have successfully met their operational objectives.  
6.6.1 Intelligence-Based Operations 
The BC-Washington border has been plagued by illicit drug operations for the 
past decade. Intricate waterways and rugged terrain provide ideal conditions for 
smugglers to transport BC Bud and ecstasy to the large demand market in the United 
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States. Although there is a great amount of smuggling activity taking place in the area, 
most operations can be linked to a few powerful criminal networks. It is thus crucial for 
law enforcement authorities to target the source of these organizations rather than focus 
solely on apprehending people who smuggle illicit goods and people across the border.  
IBET partners use a coordinated system of intelligence-sharing to target the source of 
criminal networks, many of which operate internationally.  
A major criminal organization based in Fraser Valley, BC was successfully 
disbanded after a two-year IBET investigation. The investigation began in February 2002 
after IBET authorities searched a house and found 1,800 marijuana plants. The 
intelligence that resulted from this incident was disseminated to other IBET members, 
and led to search warrants that produced hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash, four 
stolen pleasure crafts, two kilograms of cocaine, 3,000 marijuana plants, a weapons cache 
that included loaded machine guns and ammunition, and multiple jackets with the word 
“police” emblazoned on the back.423 
In March 2008, the ringleader of a criminal organization was arrested by law 
enforcement officials on a cruise ship in Miami, Florida. The Vancouver resident was the 
leader of a drug trafficking organization that smuggled BC Bud into the US and brought 
cocaine back to Canada across the Washington-BC border. A member of the Canada 
Border Services Agency was also found to be involved in the smuggling ring. The 
investigation led to the arrests of several US and Canadian citizens by law enforcement 
authorities. RCMP Corporal Norm Massie of the Pacific IBET said that Canadian law 
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enforcement agencies collaborated with US agencies in the operation, using shared 
intelligence and joint operations to disband the ringleader of the organization.424  
 Between 2005 and 2007, IBETs in the Washington-BC area led the investigation 
into what is described as “one of the most brazen schemes ever to run along the Canada-
US border.” 425 Known in the US as Operation Frozen Timber and Operation E Printer in 
Canada,426 authorities successfully broke up a criminal organization that used helicopters 
and planes to transport BC Bud into the United States. Authorities launched the 
investigation after two men, who had been hired to fly small planes full of marijuana into 
the US and fly them back into Canada with shipments of cocaine on board, were spotted 
by US CBP surveillance planes. The CBP tracked the small plane until it landed in a 
remote Washington state wildlife reserve. Two men who were waiting on the ground 
loaded the marijuana into trucks, after which the US CBP arrested them and seized the 
150 kilograms of marijuana on board. The two pilots were arrested by Canadian 
authorities once the plane landed in British Columbia.427 The intelligence from these 
arrests and seizures was disseminated to members of the Pacific IBET, who worked with 
US Forest Service, National Parks Service, Washington State Patrol, the US Attorney’s 
Offices in Seattle and Spokane, the DEA, the FBI, the Washington Department of Fish 
and Wildlife, the Sheriff’s Departments of Whatcom, Skagit, and Okanogan Counties, 
and the Abbotsford Police Department to reach the source of the criminal network. 
During the two-year investigation, authorities interrupted 17 shipments of illegal drugs 
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that were headed across the border. In one instance, US authorities intercepted a shipment 
of five suitcases in February 2005 that contained a total of 149 kilograms of cocaine, 
making it the largest seizure of cocaine in the Washington area that year. Law 
enforcement agencies seized a total of three airplanes, over 3,600 kilograms of marijuana, 
800 kilograms of cocaine, and over $1.5 million US dollars, and arrested 46 people in 
Canada and the US.428  Ongoing intelligence-sharing amongst IBET partners led law 
enforcement agents to the ringleader of the organization, who was acting as a middleman 
for several organized criminal groups involved in this major operation, including the 
Mafia, Asian Criminal Organizations, and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs.429  
A Washington resident was arrested in January 2007 and convicted of running a 
cross-border smuggling ring, where Indian and Pakistani nationals were charged upwards 
of $40,000 per person to be transported illegally from British Columbia into the US. Five 
Canadian men were also arrested in the US in connection with the case. The investigation 
into this smuggling ring had begun nearly one year before when authorities got a tip 
about three men who visited a small town in Washington near the BC border to buy 
maps, and were questioning residents about border enforcement in the area. Twelve men 
were subsequently arrested for being involved in the operation. Officials claim that over 
100 people were smuggled first into Canada, and then to the US through the smuggling 
ring. RCMP Corporal Massie, an IBET spokesperson, said that the RCMP and US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement worked together to gather the intelligence that 
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enabled law enforcement officials to successfully arrest and prosecute those involved in 
the smuggling ring.430 
 In April 2006, a human smuggling ring was disbanded as a result of Operation E-
Patch, a joint investigation conducted by the Pacific IBET. The network had been 
operating in the Lower Mainland region of British Columbia, where its members housed 
South Asian nationals while they waited to be smuggled into the US. The IBET 
investigation into the ring resulted in the arrests of 14 people by the US Attorney’s 
Office.431 
The Olympic Peninsula (see Fig. 3), a waterway that straddles the BC-
Washington border, has for centuries been one of the most popular smuggling routes 
along the Canada-US border.432 The Peninsula was a notorious rum-smuggling route 
during the Prohibition Era. Recent law enforcement crackdowns on land crossings 
between BC and Washington have contributed to the reemergence of the Olympic 
Peninsula and the nearby Juan de Fuca Strait as popular smuggling routes for BC Bud 
headed for the US. Criminal organizations use planes to drop packages on beaches on 
either side of the Strait, and cross the Juan de Fuca Strait by water on kayaks and 
speedboats.433 IBET operations have evolved in order to successfully respond to this 
emerging threat. Joint law enforcement operations have led to the seizure of 1,000 
kilograms of BC Bud and the arrests of 18 people in the Olympic Peninsula area between 
January and September of 2004.434 From January-December of that same year, a total of 
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2,500 kilograms of BC Bud was seized in the Washington-BC border region. About half 
of these seizures were in the Olympic Peninsula/Juan de Fuca Strait area. In one instance, 
the RCMP passed on intelligence to US border authorities that there may be drugs on a 
pleasure craft that had recently left Canadian waters and crossed into US territory. When 
they caught and searched the boat, US authorities found bundles of marijuana with a 
wholesale value of $627,000 as well as $23,000 of currency. The driver was arrested and 
is facing charges of drug smuggling.435  
 In 2008, a Montreal smuggling ring that included a member of the Canada Border 
Services Agency was broken up by Canadian and US law enforcement authorities 
through an IBET-led operation. The criminal network facilitated the smuggling of 
marijuana and ecstasy into the US and the smuggling of cocaine back into Canada. 
Intelligence-sharing and joint operations led Canadian and US authorities to the source of 
the network.436 
The Prairie IBET busted the largest marijuana grow operation in Saskatchewan’s 
history in August 2003. The IBET collaborated with the Regina Integrated Drug Unit to 
investigate the operation, which led to the seizure of over 1,500 marijuana plants with a 
combined value of $700,000.437  
In April 2006, the Atlantic IBET led a two-year long investigation into a cross-
border smuggling ring that was operating out of Edmundston, New Brunswick. The 
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Bathurst-Edmundston Regional Drug Unit438 and the DEA contributed to Operation 
Jaloux. The investigation led to the arrest of 26 people by Canadian and US law 
enforcement agencies. IBET agents seized a total of 1,529 pounds of marijuana, 111,800 
tablets of ecstasy, and US $1.2 million dollars.439 A successful human smuggling 
organization that operated along the New Brunswick-Maine border was also disbanded 
after a successful intelligence-led investigation that involved the Atlantic IBET partners 
and the RCMP Atlantic Region Passport and Immigration Section in Halifax. Intelligence 
sharing between these agencies resulted in the arrests of three Canadian men who were 
trying to smuggle two Guyana nationals into Maine through a rural border area in New 
Brunswick.440 
A human smuggling operation that took advantage of the remote Montana-Alberta 
border region was broken up by the Rocky Mountain IBET. Intelligence sharing between 
partner agencies made authorities aware that South Korean nationals were being 
smuggled into the US on foot near a designated port of entry along the border. In 
February 2004, Raymond-based IBET members used the intelligence to apprehend 12 
South Koreans who were being smuggled into the US. The leaders of the organization 
were arrested and prosecuted.441 
Regional IBETs also contributed to investigations into criminal organizations 
whose operations extended across Canada and the US. Operation Candystore concluded 
in October 2008, when 18 US and Canadian citizens were arrested. The arrests were the 
                                                            
438 This unit included the RCMP and municipal agencies from Bathurst, Edmundston, and St. Jerome. 
439 “IBET 2006 Joint Cross-Border Operations.” 
440 Chuck Brown, “Human Smuggling Case Adjourned,” New Brunswick Telegraph Journal, February 14, 
2007, C8.  
441 Linda Slobodian, “Human Smuggling Ring Smashed at US-Alberta Border,” Calgary Herald, February 
24, 2004, A1.  
  110
result of a two-year IBET-led investigation into a cross-border operation that smuggled 
marijuana, cocaine, and ecstasy between Ontario, BC, and California. Members of the 
criminal network had evaded law enforcement officials by conducting their operations 
through encrypted blackberries and coded emails rather than in person.442 
In February 2006, 17 members of an international smuggling ring were arrested in 
the concluding stages of the Windsor-Detroit IBET-led Operation O’Boy. Illegal 
immigrants paid the ring thousands of dollars to be smuggled into the US in cars, boats, 
rail cars, and trucks. The majority of illegal crossings from the Windsor-Sarnia area to the 
US in the six-month period before the arrests were involved with this smuggling ring. 
Illegal immigrants were picked up in Toronto by members of the smuggling ring, and 
transported illegally to the US in the Windsor-Detroit area, where they were transported 
to New York City. Operation O’Boy was successfully broken up as a result of 
intelligence sharing and joint operations between the RCMP, US Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), the CBSA, the Windsor Police, the OPP, the 
Canadian Pacific Railway Police, US Customs and Border Patrol, and the Toronto 
Police.443  The investigation led to arrests made in Toronto, Windsor, Detroit, and New 
York City. These arrests produced intelligence that enabled authorities to arrest over 100 
illegal immigrants as they tried to sneak across the border.444 
In September 2007, 25 members of the Nguyen Vo criminal organization were 
arrested by the RCMP and the US ICE in Toronto during the first stages of Operation 
Tien Can. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the RCMP, the CBSA, the 
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OPP, Toronto Polices Service, Peel Regional Police, the Canada Revenue Agency, the 
DEA, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies in Houston, Dallas, Los 
Angeles, Seattle, St. Paul, and Orange Country, California contributed to the operation 
that disbanded a powerful Vietnamese money laundering and drug smuggling 
organization. The network operated in Canada, the United States, Vietnam, and Mexico. 
The 2007 arrests led to federal search warrants for homes in Orange Country, Las 
Angeles, Houston, Dallas, Minneapolis, Davenport, and Cedar Rapids. Searching these 
homes produced intelligence that the source of the organization was located in Toronto. 
US officials then worked with the RCMP to obtain arrests and search warrants in the city. 
After a ten-month long investigation, the leaders of the organization were arrested and 
$7.8 million in US currency, $305,000 in Canadian currency, 85 kilograms of cocaine, 
and 803 pounds of marijuana were seized.445 
  In March 2004, the DEA searched a car in Buffalo, New York that had just 
crossed the border from Canada, and found 30,000 tablets of ecstasy and 10 pounds of 
high-grade marijuana. The DEA had received IBET intelligence that the drivers of the car 
were involved in a drug-smuggling operation, which enabled them to make the seizure 
and arrest the drivers. This incident was one of many in a three-year IBET-led 
investigation known as Operation Candybox.  A total of 64 law enforcement agencies 
from Canada and the US participated in the operation to break up the Vietnamese 
organization, which supplied 15% of the ecstasy in the US by laundering drug money 
through businesses in more than a dozen cities. Three weeks after the seizure in Buffalo, 
officials reached the source of the organization, and 150 people were subsequently 
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arrested in 19 cities across Canada and the US.446 It is clear that these successful 
operations could not have occurred in the absence of cooperation between US and 
Canadian agencies. 
6.6.2 IBET Seizures and Arrests During Routine Patrols 
Integrated Border Enforcement Team operations are primarily intelligence-based, 
but media reports show that regular patrolling of border areas pays off, even when law 
enforcement agents have no prior intelligence that there are criminal organizations 
conducting their operations in the area. The following media reports document the 
outcomes of routine IBET patrols between border crossings.  
The Lake Superior IBET was conducting a routine border patrol in 2004 when 
agents caught two men trying to sneak into the US. Upon searching the men, agents 
seized 41 kilograms of heroin, which is considered to be the largest seizure of heroin in 
Thunder Bay’s history.447 
Routine IBET patrolling of the BC-Washington border has highlighted the 
importance of law enforcement presence between ports of entry. In January 2007, IBET 
agents conducting a routine patrol caught British Columbia’s Labour Party leader Perley 
Holmes in the Washington state close to the BC border, where he was hiding behind a 
bush wearing camouflage pants. They searched Holmes and found a total of 61 kilograms 
of cocaine in two backpacks that he was carrying. US IBET agents informed the RCMP 
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about the seizure and arrest, who then searched Holmes’ home. The RCMP found 43 
weapons, including six handguns and one assault rifle.448     
Between January and December of 2003, 88 South Korean nationals were 
apprehended in one area of the border while trying to sneak into the US. This is ten times 
the number of South Korean nationals that were caught during 2002 in the same area. In 
December 2003, 12 Korean women were caught while crossing a rural area of the 
Washington-BC border. Three days later, 10 Korean women were caught in the same 
location.449 Soon after, the Okanagan IBET in British Columbia caught 10 South Korean 
women trying to cross the border to the US on foot. Most of the women were led into 
thinking that they would get jobs at restaurants, when in reality they would be forced into 
the sex trade once they reached the US.450  
The Alberta/Montana divide is one of the most remote areas of the Canada-US 
border, which has made it a preferred location for smuggling operations. In December 
2005, Rocky Mountain IBET agents were patrolling the area and caught a man driving 
across the border between two ports of entry. Authorities searched the car and found 32 
kilograms of cocaine with a total street value of $3 million. Joel Syr of the Rocky 
Mountain Integrated Border Enforcement Team is confident that the collaboration 
between Canadian and US law enforcement agencies has increased the number of illicit 
drug seizures in the region.451 In July 2004, IBET officers who were patrolling the 
wooded Alberta-Montana border region caught 16 hypothermia and insect bite-ridden 
South Korean nationals trying to make their way to the US. Border officials suspected 
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that since most of them were women, they would have been forced to work in the US sex 
trade.452  
The Atlantic IBET reported three major cash seizures at the New Brunswick-
Maine border in fall 2004, all of which were linked to organize crime in the region. One 
of these seizures occurred when IBET officers were patrolling the border area and caught 
an American citizen trying to sneak into Canada. The officers found over $283,000 on his 
person.453 The Atlantic IBET also contributed to the arrest of a man listed as “armed and 
dangerous” by US authorities. In September 2008, an IBET agent spotted a car near the 
border in Maine that was making its way towards Canada. The man fled his vehicle when 
he realized he was being pursued, after which American and Canadian IBET agents 
conducted a search on both sides of the border with the assistance of a helicopter. The 
man was successfully apprehended, and is now facing charges.454 
During routine patrols, the Champlain and Eastern IBETs455 caught a total of 117 
people attempting to sneak into the US between ports of entry in a one-year period 
between 2007 and 2008. Some of these illegal crossers were charged only with an 
immigration offence, while others were found to be carrying large amounts of illegal 
drugs, including ecstasy and BC hydroponic marijuana.456 
Although media reports, government documents, and interview responses have 
generated information about the role of IBETs in specific operations involving illicit 
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drugs, illegal migrants, human smuggling victims, and small arms, these sources have not 
produced any specific information on their role in counter-terrorism operations. 
Furthermore, reports of IBET arrests and seizures have not discussed whether any of 
these cases are connected to terrorist organizations that are banned in Canada. The RCMP 
reports that IBETs contribute to national security investigations, which indicates that their 
operations do in some cases involve terrorist groups.457 However, the lack of specific 
information about their role in terrorist investigations suggests that the related 
information is confidential. 
These case studies have traced the outcomes of Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams, and have provided further evidence that these teams have fulfilled their 
operational objectives.  
6.7 The Importance of Political Will 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Canada and the United States developed several 
formal agreements on joint border security initiatives before 9/11. According to Marcel 
LeBeuf of the RCMP, close cooperation between American and Canadian cross-border 
police forces is nothing new.458 Gerry Dundas of the CBSA agrees that before the attacks, 
there was already a general consensus that conducting joint forces operations was the 
most effective method of policing the Canada-US border. The RCMP and CBSA often 
shared intelligence and collaborated on various operations, but the border security 
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agreements implemented after 9/11 have made this collaboration more formalized.459 The 
terrorist attacks generated a newfound political willingness to prioritize these initiatives 
and give them the necessary funding to carry out their objectives.460 The post-9/11 
political will to make Integrated Border Enforcement Teams has enabled these teams to 
successfully achieve their operational objectives.  
Chapter 6 has traced the success of IBET intelligence-based and routine patrol 
operations that were covered by the media. The amount and number of seizures of illicit 
drugs, firearms, illegal immigrants, and money associated with criminal activity indicates 
that this bilateral cooperative effort has been more effective at combating global illicit 
crime than the actions of the CBP and CBSA alone. The purpose of this thesis is to 
determine whether Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have achieved their operational 
goals since 9/11. Curbing cross-border criminal activity between ports of entry has 
become a priority for the Canadian and US government since 9/11, who have since the 
attacks provided the necessary funding to expand these teams across Canada. It is these 
actions that have enabled Integrated Border Enforcement Teams to meet their operational 
objectives.  It can thus be concluded that the political prioritization of bilateral initiatives 
like IBETs has enabled these teams to meet their operational objectives, which were 
based on the principles of the Smart Border Declaration.  
Chapter 7: The Limitations of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams  
 Examples of IBET operations, as discussed in the previous chapter, make it clear 
that these teams are a valuable asset to the Canadian and American governments in their 
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efforts to curb global criminal activity in North America. In spite of their successes, there 
are several factors that have limited IBETs ability carry out their operational objectives.  
7.1 Geography  
Despite IBETs success in policing the border between ports of entry, the 
geography of the Canada-US border has undermined efforts to monitor 100% of border 
activity. A US government investigation conducted in 2007 reported that the length of the 
border makes it extremely difficult to seal it entirely. Even with effective law 
enforcement efforts, there remain many security gaps in the border where terrorists or 
people with other criminal intentions can sneak across the border undetected.461 CNN 
News aired a simulation video conducted by the US Government Accountability Office, 
which showed a man carrying contraband and radioactive substances across unmonitored 
areas of the border. In one location, the video showed a man walking past a border 
marker carrying the contraband and radioactive substances. The video also demonstrated 
the ease at which people with illicit goods or who are unauthorized to enter Canada can 
cross through designated points of entry that are left unguarded at night.462  
As discussed in previous chapters, IBETs have experienced great success in 
policing the border, but the geography of the border still presents serious limitations to 
their objectives. For example, there are six designated ports of entry along the Alberta 
border with the US, three of which are located in the Blackfeet First Nations Reserve. 
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The Reserve spans 100 kilometers of the 298-kilometer border between Alberta and 
Montana. The US CBP monitors the six official ports of entry along the border, and 
security has much improved since 9/11. However, there are 14 back roads between the 
ports of entry on the Blackfoot Reserve where anyone can bypass a port of entry and 
cross the border. Robert DesRosier, who lives on the reserve, used to be a state trooper 
and now works with another security officer to monitor border areas of the Blackfoot 
Reserve. DesRosier claims that there is a high volume of suspicious traffic on five of 
these back roads, and that on some nights he spots over a dozen suspicious-looking 
vehicles crossing the border. The Alberta-Montana border runs through thick woods that 
house bears, cougars and insects. Although this rugged and dangerous terrain is a 
deterrent to some, anyone who is willing to travel through this area can generally cross 
the border without being detected. According to DesRosier, money is a strong motivator, 
and many people will brave the rugged terrain to profit from smuggling weapons, drugs, 
or people across: “The bad guys will go to those very isolated spots to cross because they 
know that these are challenges for us. It’s a big needle in a haystack that you’re looking 
for.”463 He claims that residents of these border areas often see vehicle tracks and 
footprints on back roads that no one should travel on: “Whatever they’re bringing across, 
I’ll bet it’s illegal. They’re not smuggling Twinkies.”464  
 DesRosier criticizes the US Border Patrol for doing a poor job at guarding these 
areas, and says that people could easily sneak across the border by foot or on horseback. 
He explains that the RCMP detachment is over one hour away from most of these back 
roads, which has resulted in delayed responses to border security-related incidents in 
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these isolated areas. Authorities estimate that there are about 225 such unguarded roads 
along the Canada-US border.465 The Quebec border region is considered to have more of 
these roads than anywhere else along the border.466 
The Prairie IBET faces similar challenges. Saskatchewan’s 632-kilomter border 
with the US is described is having “a lot of holes, and few plugs.” 467 The border region is 
replete with ditchers, forests, pastures, and dirt trails like the North Star, which is a 
popular drug smuggling route. Al McIntyre, a lawyer in Regina, acknowledged that many 
people can easily cross into the US from the remote trails and roads in Saskatchewan. 
Much of the border is marked by ditches and hills rather than border markers. 
Organizations that smuggle BC Bud to the US are aware that it is less risky for their 
drivers to travel down the Trans-Canada highway and cross into the US in these remote 
areas than to sneak through the BC-Washington border. According to Barb Pacholik of 
the Leader Post, the Prairie IBET Sergeant does not disagree that the border is porous in 
remote areas of Saskatchewan. Authorities estimate that over two tons of Canadian-
grown marijuana destined for US markets in Montana, Washington, and California has 
been smuggled into the US using the North Star route.468 It appears, however, that the 
Saskatchewan border is not the only area that is concerning US officials. In 2007, 
Republican Senator Chuck Grassley said that the Canada-US borderlands are “simply 
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wide open, waiting to be crossed by anyone carrying anything-even a dirty bomb or a 
suitcase-type nuclear device.”469 
 In addition to the porous areas of the border, US officials have expressed concern 
that the border is becoming overgrown, making it difficult for enforcement officers to 
locate the boundary lines between the two countries in some areas. Having a border that 
is clearly marked is crucial during enforcement operations, since agents must know 
whether they are operating in American or Canadian territory when they are patrolling or 
trying to apprehend a smuggler. The Governments of Canada and the United States 
jointly fund the International Boundary Commission, an organization that is responsible 
for maintaining the Canada-US border that runs through mountains, cliffs, prairies, and 
waterways. According to the National Post, the US has increased its payment to the 
International Boundary Commission to $1.2 billion per year since 9/11, but Canada has 
continued to allot only $830,000 each year to the Commission. Canada’s Boundary 
Commissioner Michael O’Sullivan admitted that “we can’t get much done with that.”470 
Currently, the Commission is failing to abide by its 80-year old treaty obligation to keep 
the border clearly marked and free of debris. This failure is largely due to Canada’s 
refusal to allocate the necessary funding to the Commission.471 For legal and sovereignty 
reasons, it is crucial that IBET agents know whether they are conducting their operations 
in Canada or the United States. Canada must allocate the necessary funding to the 
International Boundary Commission for this reason, or the unkempt border will continue 
to undermine IBET operations. 
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Another impediment to IBET operations is the bizarre geography of some border 
regions. Angle Inlet, Minnesota is an enclave that is not physically attached to the rest of 
the United States (See Fig. 4). To get to the small town of Angle Inlet by land, one must 
travel 40 miles through Canada. Residents of the town generally cross to the mainland 
United States through Lake of the Woods by boat during the summer and snowmobile 
during the winter. The border between Angle Inlet and Canada is guarded only by a 
checkpoint that operates on the honour system. Authorities estimate that only about 30% 
of people who cross through the checkpoint actually register with Customs authorities.472 
According to Grand Forks District Patrol Chief Glen Schroeder, Angle Inlet is one of the 
most vulnerable areas along the border in terms of security. Many people trying to cross 
illegally into the US have been apprehended by law enforcement authorities, and the 
town’s sheriff is convinced that terrorists have travelled to Angle Inlet through Canada, 
and proceeded to reach the mainland US by water. Since CNN News aired a broadcast on 
the security risks of border regions like Angle Inlet, there have been even more incidents 
of people trying to enter the US illegally in the area.473 Although IBETs are mandated to 
guard the Canada-US border between ports of entry, areas like Angle Inlet pose a serious 
challenge to IBET authorities, and demonstrate the limitations of IBETs’ ability to guard 
the entire border against potential security risks. 
IBET’s limited success in guarding marine areas of the border make these 
unguarded areas between ports of entry a continued security risk. Bob Bergoine of the 
Windsor-Detroit IBET claims that marine environments, particularly the Great Lakes and 
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the St. Lawrence Seaway (see Fig. 5), present many challenges that are not encountered 
by land border enforcement authorities. Thousands of pleasure crafts, commercial 
vehicles, cruise ships, and ferries travel through the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway 
system and along Canada’s east and west coasts. Amidst this heavily trafficked area, the 
smuggling of drugs, small arms, currency, contraband cigarettes, and people pose a major 
security threat to Canada and the US.474  
In 2006, a CNN News reporter interviewed Ken Befield, who runs chartered boat 
trips between Canada and the US. Befield and his colleagues claim that any boater can 
slip through marine ports of entry undetected: “It’s pretty wide open. It’s more based on 
the honour system, but it’s pretty easy.”475 Along the St Lawrence River, for example, 
boaters cross between Canada and the US by the thousands during the summer. Much of 
the river freezes during the winter, enabling people to simply walk to the other side of the 
border. Befield says that “it makes you really stop and think how easy people who want 
to hurt Americans can come over here and do what they want to do.”476 Authorities have 
only recently started to maintain electronic records of existing pleasure crafts, but it is 
estimated that there are more than one million Canadian registered private boats in the 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway region alone.477 There are also an unknown number of 
unlicensed pleasure crafts travelling through marine areas, which IBET commander Bob 
Bergoine claims is the biggest threat to IBET marine operations.478 Smugglers can travel 
through narrow waterways between Canada and the US in a matter of seconds. 
                                                            
474 “IBET Threat Assessment.” 
475 Bob Franken, “Insecurity on the Canada-US Border,” CNN News, August 14, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/us/2006/08/14/franken.us.canada.border.security.cnn?iref=videosearch 
(accessed March 21, 2009). 
476 Ibid. 
477 “IBET Threat Assessment.” 
478 Bob Bergoine, IBET, interview. 
  123
Authorities suspect that private docking areas and inland canal systems along the St. 
Lawrence River are used by criminal organizations to smuggle illicit drugs and exchange 
payments.479 CNN News interviewed border patrol officers who claimed that changes 
were being made, but the news report said that basing marine border security on the 
honour system gives people opportunities to break laws.480  
Chris Romosz of the Buffalo sector US Coast Guard agrees that illicit activity in 
marine areas of the border is commonplace. He claims that people sneak across the 
border at night in boats, and that some people even swim across small marine crossings to 
avoid detection. Romosz admits that it is impossible to completely seal off the 600 miles 
of shoreline that the Buffalo sector of the US Coast Guard is responsible for patrolling. 
Lieutenant Chris Sweeny of the US Coast Guard similarly reports that “it’s wide open. 
It’s a huge vast area and it’s tough to enforce.”481   
Bob Bergoine, commander of the IBET “O” Division, leads a team that is 
responsible for safeguarding much of the Great Lakes. Bergoine claims that there are 
thousands of pleasure crafts on Lake Saint Clair during the summer season, and considers 
it an operational challenge for IBET members to determine whether any of these boats 
are involved in illegal activities.482 If people want to avoid crossing through a port of 
entry, they could just dock on a shoreline or at a marina close to the border. The “2007 
IBET Threat Assessment” notes that on Lake Ontario in particular, there are many private 
properties located along the shorelines that smugglers use to their advantage. These 
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criminal networks also make use of busy marine areas crowded with boats, where 
smugglers can conceal themselves in the legitimate boater traffic.483  
One of the most troubling shortcomings of IBETs is the continued lack of 
consensus as to who should patrol the marine areas of the border between ports of entry. 
IBETs are technically responsible for guarding the waters to make sure that high-risk 
individuals do not cross the border through marine areas, but most IBET operations on 
the water are intelligence-based, meaning that agents are looking for something specific. 
IBETs are thus not mandated to perform routine security patrols of the waters. The OPP 
was given increased funding to perform routine patrols along the Great Lakes waters in 
Ontario, but in spring 2004 the Ontario provincial patrols were trimmed down to the their 
pre-9/11 numbers. These funding cuts were discussed in 2005, when the federal 
government suggested that municipal police forces take responsibility for patrolling the 
waters. This idea was quickly stuck down when former Windsor Chief of Police Glenn 
Stannard made clear that “our position hasn’t changed. We do not accept responsibility 
for international security.”484 The confusion as to who is responsible for conducting 
routine patrols of border waters was illuminated in a Canadian Senate report, which 
concluded that there is not nearly enough regular surveillance of the Great Lakes waters 
and that the unarmed Canadian Coast Guards are an ineffective deterrent to illicit activity. 
The Binational Planning Group has also published numerous reports that stress the need 
for more maritime surveillance cooperation, especially on the Great Lakes.485 
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A final challenge for IBETs in terms of border geography is the restrictions of 
patrolling First Nations reserves that straddle the border. The Regis Mohawk Indian 
Reserve stretches for 30,000 miles along the St. Lawrence River. About 50% of the 
Reserve covers US territory, and the rest spans across Canadian land. A very small police 
force staffed by members of the tribe has been responsible for securing the land, but laws 
have never been effectively followed in the area. Sovereignty issues have reduced the 
ability for Canadian and US authorities to access the land and guard the borders in the 
same manner as they secure the rest of the shared border. During the Prohibition Era, 
these limitations made the area one of the most popular smuggling routes for bootleggers. 
Now, the Reserve is a major gateway for illegal migrants, illicit drugs, and contraband 
cigarettes.486  Walpole Island, located along the St. Clair River, is the responsibility of the 
Windsor-Detroit IBET. The Island poses one of the biggest operational challenges for the 
team, since many organized criminal groups use this route to smuggle narcotics and 
people between Canada and the US.487 Akwesasne Territory, a First Nations reserve 
adjacent to the Regis Mohawk Reserve, spans across Ontario, Quebec, and the New York 
state, and presents similar challenges to IBET enforcement operations.488 
7.2 Limited Resources 
Although IBETs have received a great deal of funding since 9/11, the operational 
challenges, the geography of the shared border, and the advanced operations of criminal 
organizations have created an urgent need for more resources than are currently being 
allocated to these teams. During a meeting of the Atlantic Integrated Border Enforcement 
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Team Communications Working Group in 2003, speakers stressed the need for shared 
satellites, more interoperable communication devices, and mobile communications 
platforms.489 In 2004, there was also a conference in Texas where academics, business 
owners, military leaders, law enforcement agents, and government officials discussed 
ways in which the NAFTA partners could collaborate to improve security in North 
America. There was a consensus that the most crucial issue to be addressed was the lack 
of effective technology used in border security efforts.490 The Washington Times reported 
in 2008 that despite these initiatives, there is still much room for improvement in these 
areas.491  
An internal US investigation similarly reported that there is an urgent need to 
upgrade the Border Patrol’s Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System. IBETs ability to 
monitor the border between ports of entry is dependent on the effectiveness of this 
system. After 9/11, the Bush administration had planned to increase the number of guards 
between ports of entry, but the administration’s subsequent efforts to cut costs resulted in 
a hiring freeze of US border agents along the northern border. The 2005 US Federal 
Budget only allocated enough money to hire 210 agents, which were subsequently placed 
on the border with Mexico. This number was a major shortfall from the number of agents 
that should have been deployed to the border with Canada as per the Intelligence Reform 
and Prevention of Terrorism Act, which George Bush himself signed into law. The Act 
stipulated that 2,000 full-time CBP agents would be hired each year between the years 
2006 and 2010, and at least 20 percent (400) of these officers would be assigned to patrol 
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the Canada-US border. The Bush administration claimed that only 200 as opposed to 400 
agents needed to be hired each year to patrol the border with Canada, since improved 
technology like the Border Patrol’s Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System has 
reduced the need for extensive foot patrolling in remote border areas. Despite these 
assurances, the internal US government investigation concluded that the Border Patrol’s 
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System, which involves the use of cameras and 
sensors along US borders with Mexico and Canada, is severely flawed. Many of the 
cameras along the Washington-BC border were wired so poorly that they produced only 
blurry images, which were useless for law enforcement purposes.492 The need for 
improved technology to aid the sparsely-located IBETs is clear, and must be addressed so 
that these teams can achieve the objectives set out in the Smart Border Declaration.  
 In addition to the need for more funding for technological improvements, Colin 
Kenny, Chair of Canada’s Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 
addressed the urgent need for more staff to undertake IBET marine operations. He 
praised the success of the Shiprider pilot project, but claimed that there were not enough 
resources on the Canadian side to make it effective as it could have been. He also stressed 
the need to fund the hiring of more RCMP officers to patrol the Great Lakes waters, since 
currently there are 14 officers responsible for patrolling 92,000 square kilometers of 
water. This level of patrolling is simply not a deterrent for terrorism and other criminal 
activity. According to the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, an 
additional 5,000-7,000 Canadian Mounties are needed to create an adequate level of 
security, which would require the Canadian government to invest an additional $1.03-
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$1.95 billion towards the RCMP budget.493 A 2005 report by the Canadian Auditor 
General similarly criticized RCMP understaffing, arguing that there are not enough staff 
members to input national security-related information into data systems and effectively 
perform RCMP objectives.494 
7.3 History of an Open Border 
IBET efforts to police illegal activity along the border have had a negative impact 
on residents of border towns, who have for centuries enjoyed a history of friendly 
relations with their neighbours. The Canada-US border crosses directly through the 
middle of towns and establishments. For example, the Aroostook Valley Country Club 
pro-shop and parking lot are in Maine, but the golf course and club house are located in 
New Brunswick. US Customs and Border Protection officials want to stop people from 
being able to play unless they have first registered with US Immigration, since any 
smugglers or potential terrorists could sneak across the border through the golf course 
and its associated rural areas.495    
The Canada-US border also runs through the middle of border communities, such 
as the towns of Derby Line, Vermont and Stanstead, Quebec. After 9/11, authorities soon 
realized that trying to secure the border between these two towns was impossible. 
Residents share water and sewer systems and various community services. The front 
doors of the Haskell Free Library are in the Canada and the checkout desk is in the US.496 
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Americans and Canadians cross over the border every day to the other side of town, and 
are not accustomed to the increased border security measures that have been implemented 
since 9/11. 
This history of friendly relations has had troublesome consequences for some area 
residents. In October 2002, a resident of a small Quebec town went on a hunting trip, 
during which he crossed 45 feet into Maine to fill up his gas tank. Because he had not 
checked in with the customs station nearby prior to crossing over, which no one had 
made a priority for years, the man was apprehended by the US Border Patrol and charged 
with entering into the US illegally and possessing a firearm. He spent 35 days in a US 
prison before he was released at the Government of Canada’s request.497 
Despite the concerns of residents and the operational challenges of patrolling 
these border towns, the high levels of illegal activity in the area seem to necessitate a law 
enforcement presence. RCMP Senior Sergeant Bob Bergoine said that these border towns 
are a major border security risk, acknowledging that “if somebody wants to cross into 
another country without being detected, what better way to do it? Just blend into the 
crowd.”498 In 2007, US Border Patrol searched two vans that had crossed into Derby Line 
from Canada and found 21 illegal immigrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Mexico, 
and Guyana.499 Between January and June of 2007, the Eastern IBET reported that 32 
people were caught trying to cross the border illegally near the library that divides Derby 
Line and Stanstead. This number was a major increase from the 44 people who were 
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caught in 2006 and 27 in 2005.500 The situation seemed to be growing worse when the 
local IBET caught 31 illegal immigrants from Columbia trying to enter Canada through 
Derby Line in October 2007.501 These incidents motivated IBET authorities to check 
every car that travelled through the official crossing between the two towns, which 
created massive delays and traffic problems. The IBET no longer inspects every car, but 
continued security measures in the area have been a huge burden to the 3,200 residents of 
Stanstead and 800 residents of Derby Line.502  Although IBETs continue to monitor the 
area with cameras and motion detectors on the three streets that straddle the border, “no 
one knows how much smuggling goes undetected” 503 in the Derby Line/Stanstead region.  
7.4 Sovereignty concerns 
Since the expansion of IBETs across Canada, Gerry Dundas of the CBSA claims 
that cooperation between the RCMP and CBSA has much improved, but admits that 
collaborating with their American counterparts has been a much greater challenge.504 
Although these bilateral enforcement teams work together on operations, there remains a 
link between sovereignty and territory that stops IBET agents from crossing over that 
“imaginary line” 505  along the border. These lingering sovereignty concerns have been 
problematic during enforcement operations, since RCMP officers still lack the authority 
to arrest people on American territory and vice versa.  
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In 2007, Prime Minister Harper responded to multiple US accusations that Canada 
has failed to take sufficient action to curb the cross-border flow of humans, small arms, 
and drugs. He was confident that Canada is and will continue to prioritize proactive 
initiatives like Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.506 In spite of Harper’s positive 
response to US criticisms, a US CBP report claims that the limitations of bilateral law 
enforcement efforts have undermined their mandate to safeguard the border from 
terrorism and other criminal activities: “Despite ongoing bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives, cultural, legal, and political differences will continue to allow Canada and 
Mexico to be used as a potential haven or gateway for terrorist and criminal activity 
directed at the United States.”507 
This dilemma reflects the conflict between sovereignty and information-sharing 
related to international law enforcement. While the principle of state sovereignty gives 
states the power to conduct their own affairs within their territory,508 the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty claims that sovereign states have the 
responsibility to safeguard the human rights of its citizens.509 If Canadian law authorities 
share information about a Canadian citizen with US officials, US officials then have the 
power to conduct an investigation in accordance with US laws. Through this process, 
Canada will have lost some of its power as a sovereign nation to protect the rights of this 
citizen in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The sharing of 
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information can thus undermine the responsibility of sovereign states to protect the 
human rights of their citizens in accordance with their laws. 
7.5 Limitations to Intelligence Sharing 
The previous section outlined the limitations of border enforcement cooperation 
between Canada and the United States. The most critical limitation involves the bilateral 
sharing of intelligence. In the aftermath of 9/11, US authorities traced the events leading 
up to the attacks and found numerous systematic flaws that prevented law enforcement 
officials from “connecting the dots” of the terrorist plot. One cannot assume that had 
there been a complete sharing of intelligence, authorities would have easily discovered 
the plot soon enough to prevent the attacks. However, it is clear that these institutional 
obstructions made it nearly impossible to discover such an advanced terrorist plot.510  The 
9/11 Commission Report attempted to rectify these weaknesses, advocating for an 
increase in intelligence sharing by shifting from a “need to know” to a “need to share” 
strategy.511 
Even though data and information sharing between border enforcement agencies 
has improved since 9/11, security experts claim that it is not nearly as effective as it 
should be. The Canadian and American law enforcement communities have both 
struggled to create more effective information sharing systems. However, the majority of 
Canadian law enforcement data banks are not even linked with each other, let alone with 
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US data banks.512  The United States has also grappled with coordinating intelligence 
sharing amongst their security departments. In many cases, intelligence-gathering 
agencies report to different ministries, a process that complicates the sharing of 
information between agencies and places limitations on intelligence sharing agreements 
with other countries.513 Experts say that a much larger system is needed that will 
maximize the utility of the intelligence that is gathered.514 
Since 9/11, authorities report that there are still “missing links” in investigations 
that are overlooked or considered to be too confidential to share with other agencies.515 
Canadian and US privacy laws limit the amount of intelligence-sharing between the two 
countries. In some cases, information sharing is not permitted in order to safeguard the 
privacy of individuals or other matters that authorities deem necessary.516 Some 
intelligence is labeled “For Canadian Eyes Only” or in the case of the US, “No Foreign 
Access” (NOFORN).517 Various legal and statutory limitations that have remained in 
place since 9/11 have restricted the level of cooperation between US and Canadian IBET 
partners and blocked attempts to facilitate a complete sharing of intelligence related to 
border security issues.518 This has been a serious impediment to improved information 
sharing between IBET partners. Unless all intelligence and information is shared, no one 
can be sure what seemingly irrelevant pieces of information are of vital importance to an 
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investigation.519 The RCMP acknowledges the tension between sharing information and 
abiding by domestic privacy laws in the “2007 IBET Threat Assessment:” “The sharing 
of national security information, both inside and outside the IBET domain, remains a 
difficult and challenging issue.”520  
Since the expansion of IBETs, the US has implemented new legislation, such as 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,521 to increase intelligence 
sharing within its departments as well as with key allies. Amidst their efforts, US officials 
have criticized Canadian laws for being too restrictive in terms of sharing results and 
intelligence. Terry Breese, Deputy Chief of Missions for the US Embassy in Canada, 
praised IBETs as a successful collaborative initiative to keep the border safe, but 
admitted that “it is often awkward or difficult to get co-operation on sharing. Canada’s 
laws often prevent the sharing of results.”522  
Canadian and US authorities recognize, however, that if intelligence-sharing 
becomes too open and involves too many people, the risk increases that the information 
will be leaked.523 The Canadian government has also become aware that an increase in 
intelligence sharing with other countries can undermine the rights of Canadian citizens 
that are guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 2002, a duel 
citizen of Canada and Syria named Maher Arar was detained by US Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) at an airport in New York. The INS had received 
intelligence from the RCMP that Arar may be affiliated with an Al-Qaeda terrorist 
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network. The US government placed Arar in solitary confinement for two weeks after 
denying him access to a lawyer. He was then sent to Syria, which has a poor human 
rights record and is known to employ torture in criminal investigations. The O’Connor 
Commission, a public report released in 2006, concluded that Arar’s international human 
rights had been violated when he was denied access to a lawyer and tortured without 
viable proof that he was involved with the Al-Qaeda organization.524 
The case created a major controversy in Canada regarding the Canadian 
government’s role in providing intelligence on a Canadian citizen to the US, and allowing 
Arar to be sent to Syria. A subsequent investigation stated that there was a strong 
possibility that Canadian intelligence was being shared carelessly with foreign law 
enforcement agencies without first ensuring that the information was accurate. An 
internal RCMP report also concluded that the agency did not properly follow the 
regulations pertaining to information-sharing with US law enforcement agencies. The 
official report brought to light the fact that the Canadian government was intent on 
benefiting from the information gathered by Syrian intelligence services, and that the 
overriding concern of the Canadian government was to demonstrate to the US that it was 
committed to fighting terrorism.525 The case made clear that Canadian security agencies 
failed to establish precautionary measures to safeguard the rights of Canadian citizens in 
the midst of increased intelligence sharing with the United States. In many cases, it was 
left to the discretion of individual officers how and when they would share information 
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with other Canadian and US agencies. 526 The Commission of Inquiry Into the Actions of 
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar outlines the importance of respecting 
domestic privacy laws amidst the increased sharing of information since 9/11:  
The RCMP should ensure that, whenever it provides information to other  
departments and agencies, whether foreign or domestic, it does so in accordance 
with clearly established policies respecting screening for relevance, reliability, 
and accurately and with relevant laws [for example, the Privacy Act] respecting 
personal information and human rights.527 
 
 The Arar case severely damaged the reputation of Canadian national security 
agencies, whose actions undermined values that the Canadian public holds in high 
esteem. The incident demonstrated the potential consequences of openly sharing 
intelligence with the US government. As a result of the Arar case, the Canadian 
government will likely be wary of supporting future proposals to increase intelligence 
sharing between Canada and the US. Even before the expansion of IBETs, law 
enforcement authorities have struggled to balance the effective sharing of intelligence 
with privacy and sovereignty concerns. This struggle has continued to undermine joint 
Canada-US law enforcement operations. 
7.6 Impending Threat of US Isolationism  
A major threat to the long-term success of bilateral initiatives like Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams is the impending threat of the United States reverting to 
isolationism and guarding its border unilaterally. In the eight-year period since 9/11, a 
consensus has emerged that bilateral cooperation is the most effective way to maintain a 
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border open to trade and closed to illicit activity. Eberhard Bort notes that “even after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 reinforced borders in many regions, a fortress 
mentality is no longer really conceivable as a practical solution to internal security 
needs.”528 T.J. Bonner, president of the National Border Patrol Council, said in 2005 that 
militarizing the border at designated ports of entry is an ineffective way of policing cross-
border crime: “You can’t just fortify one tiny part of the border and expect all the 
criminals and terrorists to cross through that small corridor.”529 The previous chapter 
discussed case-studies that demonstrate the success of the proactive, intelligence-led 
approach of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. Terrorism analyst and former CIA 
agent Christopher Whitcomb says that bilateral initiatives like IBETs have been very 
successful in deterring cross-border crime, making it impractical for the US to pursue a 
border security strategy that will damage the positive economic relationship: “It’s an 
open and friendly border. We have great relations with the Canadians that we need to 
maintain. There is a time-proven reliance on the Canadians and I think there’s no reason 
whatsoever to jeopardize that.”530 
Despite the positive outcomes of these bilateral initiatives, the Bush 
administration’s border policies throughout the first decade of the 21st century have 
alluded to a continued fear of the open border. The United States has taken measures to 
militarize parts of its northern border since the September 11th terrorist attacks. The Bush 
administration assigned five Blackhawk military helicopters to the Canadian border, 
funded over 350 video surveillance systems, and signed a $2.5 billion contract with the 
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Boeing Company to build upwards of 900 surveillance towers along the Canada-US 
border.531 In November 2005 the United States launched the Secure Border Initiative, 
which provided the funding for boats, helicopters, and sophisticated technology like 
communications equipment, radiation detectors, and three kinds of camera-mounted 
sensors in remote forest areas of the border. The initiative also stipulated that there would 
be a 300% increase in the number of agents guarding Canada-US border.532 Since the 
implementation of the Secure Border Initiative, the US has continued to deploy more 
agents to its northern border. By the end of 2009, the number of US agents guarding the 
Canadian border will have increased from 340 in 2001 to an expected 1,845.533 This trend 
indicates that the US is continuing to take concrete measures to guard its northern border 
unilaterally. 
These unilateral security measures have arguably impeded the flow of trade 
across the Canada-US border. Writing in 2007, Michael Byers, the Canadian Research 
Chair in International Law and Politics, argued that foreign-owned companies located in 
Canada are just as concerned as domestic corporations that “the new American obsession 
with homeland security might impede the free flow of goods across the border.”534 Paul 
Frazer, a former Canadian diplomat, said in early 2008 that because Canada continues to 
see the border in terms of trade while the US sees it in terms of security, “we are 
constantly working at cross purposes.”535 In 2008, Perrin Beatty of the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce voiced his concern about the multitude of US security procedures 
at the border. He said that more inspections on the American side and increased wait 
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times are making the border “thicker, stickier, and more costly.”536 According to Beatty, 
these increased costs are putting millions of Canadian and American jobs in jeopardy, 
which is threatening the economic security of the US537 and undermining the efficient 
cross-border flow of goods and people mandated under NAFTA.538 Even amidst the 
success of bilateral security agreements that aim to keep the border open to trade, the 
United States continues to revert to unilateral border security policies.  
The Bush Administration has justified its isolationist border security measures by 
claiming that the open border is a risk to US homeland security. Canadian law 
enforcement officials like RCMP Staff Sergeant Glen Rockwell of the Pacific IBET 
admit that the US has ample reason to be concerned about the open border. He said that 
in 2003, there were 35,000 outstanding warrants for people who legally entered Canada 
and subsequently disappeared. Many of these people are listed by the US government as 
national security threats. When questioned about these statistics, Immigration Canada 
spokesperson Janet Fergusson said that “the reality is that it’s hard when you share such a 
large border.”539 US concerns about Canadian immigration policies and the porous border 
continued to resonate throughout the decade. In a 2006 report from the Nixon Centre in 
Washington D.C., a senior FBI official said that “Canada is the most worrisome terrorist 
point of entry…Al-Qaeda training manuals advise terrorists to enter the United States 
from Canada.”540 The report added that despite heavy US security on the Mexican border, 
there have been no reports of terrorist activity in Mexico that involve potential attacks on 
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the United States. In contrast, the United States reports that there have been several 
terrorists caught trying to enter the US from Canada.541 Terrorists may be choosing to 
base their operations in Canada since it is less risky to sneak across the Canada-US 
border than the heavily guarded Mexico-US border. When the RCMP arrested 18 
Canadian-born Muslim men in June 2006 for trying to plot a terrorist attack in Toronto, 
US fears of a terrorist presence in Canada seemed to be justified. Even though many of 
the charges on the accused were dropped, the confirmation of terrorist activity in Canada 
caused this sense of fear and distrust to become entrenched in the United States’ 
perception of Canada.542 
In 2007, an ambulance from Canada was transporting a patient across the border 
that needed emergency surgery in Detroit. The vehicle was detained by US Customs and 
Border Patrol, which sparked massive controversy about security along the Canada-US 
border. The Canadian public’s concern about the issue forced Canada’s Security Minister 
Stockwell Day to request that his US counterpart Michael Chertoff review the US CBP 
policies for the northern border. After conducting the review, Chertoff justified the 
actions of the US CBP officers, claiming that over a dozen terrorists had been caught by 
the US Border Patrol trying to cross into the US from Canada since 9/11.543 In his 
statement, Chertoff said that he considered Canada to be a greater security threat to the 
US than Mexico.544 This sour perception of Canada is reflected in media reports of US 
border security concerns. In September 2008, Diane Francis of the Financial Post said 
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that “Americans are not convinced Canada is doing a good job patrolling its side of the 
border,”545 which forecasts a gloomy future for US support of bilateral border security 
initiatives with Canada. An editorial from the Washington Post on January 22, 2009 
similarly noted that “it is a marvel-a sheer stroke of luck rather than design-that since 
9/11, the northern border has not been the source of another calamity on American 
citizens.”546 
Even though the perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not enter the US 
through Canada or Mexico, the United States took immediate action to secure its borders 
with the two countries. Colin Kenny, Canada’s Chair of the Senate Committee on 
National Security and Defence, is concerned that if there is another terrorist attack in the 
US and it is discovered that the terrorists entered the US through Canada, the US would 
likely shut down its northern border.547 Such an action would devastate the Canadian 
economy, which is completely dependent on the US export market and the open border. 
Peter Andreas of Brown University similarly predicts that US actions to secure its 
borders would be much more severe if the perpetrators used the open border to penetrate 
the United States. He predicts that such an event could completely halt economic 
exchanges between Canada and the United States.548 Despite the success of bilateral 
security initiatives like Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, experts predict that in the 
event of another terrorist attack, the US will likely revert to isolationism and build up its 
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borders with Canada and Mexico. Such action would undermine the efforts of the Smart 
Border Declaration to maintain a safe and open border. 
7.7 The Power of Supply and Demand 
The final limitation to the success Integrated Border Enforcement Teams is the 
power of supply and demand. Economic principles dictate that if there is a demand for a 
product, people and organizations will be motivated by financial gain to provide the 
supply to meet this demand. These laws have consistently undermined law enforcement 
efforts to curb global illicit industries. International and bilateral teams that work to 
police cross-border criminal activity have reported increases in seizure amounts and 
numbers throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century. However, these 
increases are not necessarily an indication that law enforcement efforts are becoming 
more effective. The 2005 White House Office of National Drug Policy Report states that 
between 1992 and 2002, the number of drug users who sought treatment options tripled. 
According to the report, marijuana in the US has become more potent, and the number of 
users has actually increased.549 This trend indicates that marijuana is readily available in 
the United States, which calls into question the utility of border enforcement efforts to 
curb the flow of illicit drugs entering the US from Canada. Studies show that the number 
of illegal immigrants in the US is currently growing at the same rate as it was during the 
1990s. The flow of illicit goods across borders in North America is also growing at the 
same rate. In some cases, the rates are even accelerating.550 This consistent increase in 
both the cross-border flow of illicit goods and seizure numbers suggests that the 
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percentage of illicit goods and people that are seized by border security officials has 
stayed the same. When asked whether the increase in seizures is an indication of better 
law enforcement or more cross-border smuggling, Joseph Giuliano of the US Border 
Patrol at Blaine said that “I tend to believe it’s a little of each.”551 
The main impediment to border enforcement efforts to curb illicit activity is that 
when officials crack down along one area of the border, suppliers simply divert their 
operations to more porous areas of the border. For example, IBET arrests made along the 
BC-Washington border have triggered investigations into criminal networks that are 
operating in the area. However, the laws of supply and demand dictate that if there is a 
demand for illicit drugs like BC Bud, these networks will use any means necessary to 
provide the supply. Soon after IBET authorities concentrated on curbing illicit drug 
smuggling along the BC-Washington border, IBET regions east of the area reported 
seeing suspicious-looking low-flying aircraft that were likely engaged in illicit 
activities.552 These recent sightings suggest that criminal networks based in BC have 
diverted their operations further inland to evade law enforcement authorities.553 Increased 
border security along the BC-Washington border has similarly caused human smuggling 
activities to divert to harder-to-patrol, remote areas of the border between ports of 
entry.554 
IBET efforts to curb smuggling along the border have also inspired criminal 
networks to use innovative methods to evade law enforcement officials. IBET 
investigations in the BC-Washington area have significantly reduced the amount of drug-
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smuggling activity in the region that involves helicopters. However, criminal 
organizations in the area have adapted to these new enforcement methods, and have 
started to use fixed-wing airplanes to transport BC Bud and ecstasy to the US and cocaine 
into Canada. Knowing that IBET agents are vigilantly monitoring the coastal areas, pilots 
are now landing these planes further inland to evade law enforcement authorities.555           
Although improved law enforcement along the border deters cross-border 
criminal activity, this section has provided evidence that it can not eliminate it. Motivated 
by the financial rewards, smugglers are willing to risk being apprehended in order to 
satisfy the demand market. RCMP Sergeant Norman Houle of the Eastern IBET 
maintains that in the Quebec border region, US demand for the local high-grade 
hydroponic marijuana known as Quebec Gold is so great that smugglers are willing to 
risk the increased chance of being caught to sneak it across the border. Houle attests that 
“Quebec smugglers can’t get enough marijuana to fill the American demand.”556 
This chapter has outlined the major limitations to efforts made by Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams to effectively secure the Canada-US border between ports of 
entry. The following chapter will discuss the feasibility of overcoming these limitations. 
Chapter 8: Conclusions/Recommendations 
8.1 Overcoming Limitations  
The long-term success of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams is dependent on 
their ability to overcome the aforementioned limitations. It is recommended that the 
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following actions to be taken so that IBETs can more successfully meet their operational 
objectives: 
• The Government of Canada must increase its payments to the International 
Boundary Commission, so that that the border can be more clearly defined and 
agents can more effectively carry out operations.  
• The Governments of Canada and the United States must launch more pilot 
projects like the Shiprider, which work to overcome the limitations posed by 
territorial jurisdiction. 
• Canada and the United States must continue to develop innovative ways to share 
intelligence and information that acknowledge the importance of sovereignty as 
well as the risks posed by a complete sharing of intelligence 
• Canada and the United States must realize that since there are only a limited 
number of IBET agents that patrol the border, they must further invest in 
emerging technologies that will assist agents to police hard-to-patrol border 
regions.  
• In order to maintain a positive economic relationship with the United States, the 
Canadian government must continue to demonstrate its commitment to securing 
the common border. Stephen Harper’s Conservative government has recently 
announced plans to launch a pilot project that will increase security along 
unguarded border areas in Quebec. A special law enforcement unit comprised of 
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CBSA and RCMP agents will patrol the border between ports of entry to secure 
the many unguarded back roads that straddle the border.557 
• The Governments of Canada and the United States must continue to recognize the 
benefits of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and provide adequate funding 
so that their operations can adapt to the ever-changing nature of cross-border 
criminal activity in North America. IBET Commander Bob Bergoine said in 2008 
that funding for the IBET initiative has remained consistent since 9/11, which 
indicates that the Governments of Canada and the United States still consider it a 
priority to effectively police their common border between ports of entry.558 The 
Canadian government in particular will likely continue to prioritize these bilateral 
security initiatives, since its economic security is dependent upon the open 
Canada-US border.559 
8.2 The Effectiveness of IBETs in Maintaining a Safe and Open Canada-US Border 
Although there are several aspects of IBETs that must be improved, these teams 
have successfully met their operational objectives.  These teams combat global crime 
with global crime control, and their prioritization of intelligence sharing has enabled 
them to monitor a sizeable percentage of the Canada-US border. The IBET initiative has 
also improved Canada-US relations since 9/11 by easing the US apprehension of the 
border as a security risk. In 2008, the Calgary Herald listed bilateral border security 
initiatives as one of the factors that have improved Canada-US relations since the 9/11 
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attacks.560 Dan Daglio of the US Naval Institute also listed Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams as a recent example of cooperation between Canada and the US.561 A 
2009 article in the National Post stressed the need for Canada to propose additional 
bilateral agreements like IBETs that will strengthen Canada-US relations by keeping the 
border open to trade but closed to illicit activity: “Canada should prepare an ambitious 
proposal for an open and secure border that addresses legitimate US security concerns, 
but eliminates the unnecessary red-tape that has been bottlenecking the border.”562 
Through this study of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, it has become clear 
that these teams have fulfilled their operational objectives that were set out in the Smart 
Border Declaration. Their success in disbanding criminal networks and seizing illicit 
goods and people between ports of entry along the Canada-US border demonstrates their 
pivotal role in curbing the flow of illicit goods and people across the border. It is the 
political willingness to prioritize this initiative after 9/11 that has made Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams successful in achieving their operational objectives.  
8.3 Areas for Future Study 
Regional and international policing initiatives like IBETs have been implemented 
around the world to effectively respond to the growth of global illicit industries. The 
study of IBETs could be expanded as a comparative study of regional policing initiatives 
in North America and Europe. There is a much greater level of integration amongst 
European countries than in North America. When the European Union was first created, 
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there was a mandate for the “free movement of persons.”563 However, member-states 
could not agree on the meaning of this mandate. Some thought the free movement should 
just apply to EU citizens, while others believed that it should apply to anyone who 
entered an EU member-state. By 1985 a consensus still had not been reached.564 As a 
result, France, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands agreed to dissolve 
their internal borders and harmonize their visa policies to create a common perimeter 
know as the Schengen Area.565 By 1997, 13 additional EU member-states had entered 
into this perimeter566 and in December 2008 there were 25 members of the Schengen 
Area.567 The formation of the EU had created a Single European Market, which lowered 
barriers to trade in the region. Economic integration was complemented by the porous 
borders within the Schengen Area.568  These institutions triggered a growth in both 
legitimate and illegitimate cross-border trade in the EU.569 As was the case in North 
America, leaders of European countries acknowledged that traditional methods of 
policing were unsuited to a type of crime that knows no political boundaries.570  
Political leaders in Europe quickly recognized the benefits of international and 
regional police collaboration. The high level of integration that was needed for joint 
policing efforts had already been formalized by the Maastricht Treaty.571 Collaborative 
                                                            
563 Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst, and Bernardo Mariani, Organized Crime, Corruption and Illicit Arms 
Trafficking in an Enlarged EU: Challenges and Perspectives, Saferworld Arms & Security Programme, 
December 2001, 4.  
564 Ibid. 
565 Andreas, “A Tale of Two Borders,” 15. 
566 “The Schengen Area and Cooperation,” Activities of the European Union: Summaries of Legislation, 
last updated April 4, 2008, http://europea.eu/scadplus/leg/en/vb/l33020.htm (accessed March 19, 2009).  
567 “Q & A: Schengen Agreement,” BBC News, December 15, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4738063.stm (accessed April 7, 2009).  
568 Organized Crime, Corruption and Illicit Arms Trafficking, 4.  
569 Ibid. 
570 Organized Crime, Corruption and Illicit Arms Trafficking, 5.  
571 The Maastricht Treaty is the founding treaty of the European Union 
  149
policing efforts improved coordination between police forces and judicial members in the 
European Union, which enabled law enforcement authorities to more effectively curb 
organized crime and the smuggling of illicit drugs, small arms, and humans within the 
perimeter. Certain sections of the Schengen Agreement also improved coordination 
between law enforcement officials in Europe, enabling them to more effectively curb 
cross-border criminal activity in the perimeter. Member-states agreed to a common list of 
countries whose nationals must obtain visas to enter the perimeter. They also collaborated 
to form the Schengen Information System, which gives consulate employees and law 
enforcement authorities access to a common database which lists dangerous individuals 
and stolen property. Within the common perimeter, police have the right to chase and 
apprehend suspected criminals across political borders, which has made efforts to reduce 
cross-border criminal flows in the area more pragmatic in nature. 572 Bilateral initiatives 
like the United Kingdom-Italian cooperative agreement,573 as well as regional and sub-
regional institution like Europol and the Stability Pact Initiative Against Organised Crime 
in South-Eastern Europe (SPOC), have also aided in curbing the flow of illicit goods and 
people within the Schengen Area.574 
After studying the limitations of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, it could 
be assumed that since there is a greater level of political and law enforcement cooperation 
in Europe than in North America, border enforcement efforts would be far more 
successful at curbing cross-border smuggling. However, a report published by the 
Saferworld Arms and Security Programme states that “the EU is believed by many to be 
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failing in areas key to the fight against organized crime.”575 Even in an integrated 
environment, experts claim that sophisticated global criminal networks can only be 
disbanded through the continued harmonization of international and national databanks. 
They argue that there is a lack of political willingness to develop more effective methods 
of information sharing between national and international agencies and databases, which 
is also one of the greatest drawbacks to integrated policing efforts in North America.576 
Davis, Hirst, and Mariani note that because there are proven links between various  
organized criminal industries, it is imperative that the law enforcement agencies 
responsible for each industry more effectively share intelligence in order to target the 
source of global criminal networks.577  
The level of political commitment to European integration is unprecedented to the 
extent that integration is no longer a domestic political issue for most member-states. 
Processes of European integration are founded upon a strong institutional framework, 
which greatly contrasts with the ad-hoc integration that has resulted from free trade 
agreements in North America.578 Just before 9/11, experts predicted that because 
countries in North America are “more market-driven, more resistant to bureaucracy, more 
pragmatic and more respectful of national autonomy” than those in Europe,579 it was 
unlikely that North American integration would follow in the same path as the EU.580 
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However, the 9/11 attacks created the political willingness to explore innovative methods 
of securing political borders amidst economic globalization.  
Although there are several notable differences between political integration in 
Europe and North America, policymakers in North America can develop innovative 
methods of border policing by examining bilateral and regional initiatives in the 
European Union. In particular, the countries of North America should strive to establish 
effective institutions that will help translate common goals into effective cooperative 
policies.581 A comparison of these initiatives warrants further study in order to determine 
whether the Canada-US border should remain in place and cross-border crime policed 
through bilateral initiatives, or whether cross-border criminal activity could be more 
effectively combated through a “Schengenization” of North America.  
If Canada and the US agreed to dissolve their common border and create a 
security perimeter around the two countries based on the EU model, they would have to 
fulfill specific prerequisites. Developing a single external boundary would require the 
two governments to create a shared customs union, and develop a visa that would be 
required to enter into the perimeter or travel within it. Airports in the Schengen Area 
require that people travelling within the perimeter remain separated from other 
passengers. A similar system would have to be developed in Canada and the United 
States.582 
Developing a security perimeter similar to the EU model would initially be costly 
and time-consuming, as it would require a massive upheaval of policies and legislation in 
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Canada and the US. However, such an effort would likely make law enforcement 
agencies more effective at policing cross-border criminal activity. In the Schengen Area, 
police have the right to chase and apprehend suspected criminals across political borders, 
whereas Canadian and US law enforcement are not permitted to make arrests in each 
other’s territory. The creation of a common security perimeter has also inspired the 
creation of the Schengen Information System, a common database of suspected criminals 
to which all police forces in the area are granted access. Such effective communication is 
lacking between IBET partners, and would greatly improve coordination amongst law 
enforcement agencies in Canada and the US.583  
The government of Mexico has been more vocal of its support of the EU model 
than its US and Canadian counterparts. Of the three NAFTA signatories, Canada has 
shown the most resistance to dissolving North American borders.584 Historically, 
Canadians have always been wary of developing a cozy relationship with their southern 
neighbour, as evidenced by the low levels of public support for Canada-US free trade 
agreements during the 20th century.585 Policymakers will likely use elements of the 
European Union model to propose future cooperative initiatives, while taking into 
account the continued public resistance to extreme economic and political integration 
seen in the European Union. The Canada-US border will likely remain in place, although 
efforts will continue to create a smart border open to trade but closed to crime through 
bilateral initiatives like Integrated Border Enforcement Teams. This thesis has 
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demonstrated that the post-9/11 willingness to prioritize Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams has enabled these teams to successfully achieve their operational objectives.  
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TABLE 1 
CANADA-UNITED STATES TWO-WAY TRADE, 1985-2000 
Note: All figures are in US billions of dollars. 
Year Canadian Exports to US Canadian Imports from US 
1985                        69,006.4 47,251.0 
1986                        68,252.7 45,332.5 
1987                        71,084.9 59,814.3 
1988 (implementation of CUFTA)                        81,398.0 71,622.0 
1989                        87,953.0 78,808.9 
1990                        91,380.1 83,673.8 
1991                        91,063.9 85,149.8 
1992                        98,629.8 90,594.3 
1993                      111,216.4 100,444.2 
1994 (implementation of NAFTA)                      128,405.9 114,438.6 
1995                      144,369.9 127,226.0 
1996                      155,892.6 134,210.2 
1997                      167,234.1 151,766.7 
1998                      173,256.0               156,603.5 
1999                      198,711.1               166,600.0 
2000                      230,838.3                178,940.9 
2001 (9/11 attacks)                       216,267.9                 163,424.1 
2002                      209,087.7                 160,922.7 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, 
Washington D.C. 
 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c1220.html#1986  
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TABLE 2 
US IMPORTS FISCAL YEAR 2004, TOP FIVE COUNTRIES OF IMPORT 
ORIGIN 
Note: In FY 2004, 52% of US imports came from the top 5 countries of import origin. All 
figures are in US billions of dollars. 
COUNTRY  TOTAL VALUE OF US IMPORTS 
Canada                       $215          
China                       $182             
Mexico                       $146 
Japan                       $125 
Germany                         $72 
 
Source: US Government, Securing America’s Borders at Points of Entry: Strategic Plan 
FY 2007-2011, report prepared by US Customs and Border Protection, 18.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  170
FIGURE 1 
CANADA-UNITED STATES BORDERS 
Note: The Canada-US border stretches 6,416 kilometers from the Pacific Ocean to the 
Atlantic Ocean and 2,475 kilometers along the Pacific and Arctic oceans.   
 
 
Source: International Boundary Commission  
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FIGURE 2 
INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS ACROSS CANADA 
 
1. Pacific (British Columbia and Washington) 
2. Okanogan (British Columbia, Idaho and Washington) 
3. Rocky Mountain (Alberta and Montana) 
4. Prairie (Saskatchewan, Montana and North Dakota) 
5. Red River (Manitoba, North Dakota and Minnesota) 
6. Superior (Ontario, Michigan and Minnesota) 
7. Sault St. Marie (Ontario and Michigan) 
8. Detroit/Windsor (Ontario and Michigan) 
9. Thousand Islands (Ontario and New York) 
10. Niagara Frontier (covers Ontario and New York) 
11. St. Lawrence Valley Central Region (covers Ontario and New York) 
12. Valleyfield (Quebec and New York) 
13. Champlain (Quebec, New York and Vermont) 
14. Eastern (Quebec, Vermont and Maine) 
15. Atlantic (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Maine) 
 
Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/ibet-eipf/map-carte-eng.htm  
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FIGURE 3 
THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA 
 
 
Source: http://www.ptguide.com/maps/img_maps/op_distance.jpg 
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FIGURE 4 
ANGLE INLET, MINNESOTA 
 
Source: CBS News  
http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/Winnipeg/photos/map_angleinlet.gif  
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FIGURE 5 
THE GREAT LAKES ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY SYSTEM 
 
 
Source: Encyclopedia Britannica  
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REB #______________ 
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR 
APPLICATION TO INVOLVE HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH 
FOR STUDENT RESEARCHERS 
 
Please complete, print, and submit five (5) copies (original plus four (4) copies) of this form to 
the Research Ethics Coordinator, Assumption, Room 303 
 
CHECKLIST 
 
Title of Project:   The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a        
Safe and Open Canada-United States Border  
 
Student Investigator:  Jessica Shultz 
 
Faculty Supervisor:   Dr. Bill Anderson 
 
Please attach the following items, if applicable, in the following order at the back of the 
Application. 
   
  Decisions Needed From Other REB Boards 
  
X B.3.c.i. Questionnaires and Test Instruments 
 
 B.3.d. Deception (If deception is going to be used, your application will go to Full  
  Review) 
 
 B.3.e. Debriefing Letter - Needed only if deception is used in the study. If submitted, 
application will go the Full Review. 
 
 B.6.b. Letters of Permission Allowing Research to Take Place on Site 
 
X B.6.d. Recruitment Materials: Advertisements, Posters, Letters, etc. 
 
X E.1.  Consent Form 
 
X E.2.  Letter of Information 
 
 E.4. Parental/Guardian Information and Consent Form 
 
 E.5. Assent Form 
 
X F.2. Consent for Audio/Visual Taping Form 
 
X  Certificate of completion of on-line ethics tutorial (MUST BE COMPLETED 
BY ALL  STUDENTS) 
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 REB #_______
 
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR 
APPLICATION TO INVOLVE HUMAN SUBJECTS IN RESEARCH 
FOR STUDENT RESEARCHERS 
 
 
Please complete, print, and submit the original plus four (4) copies of this form to the  
Ethics and Grants Coordinator, Assumption, Room 303 
 
Date:  November 13, 2008        
 
Title of Research Project:  The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a 
Safe and Open Canada-United States Border 
 
Projected start date of project:  November 1, 2008  Projected completion date: April 1, 2009  
 
Researchers from another institution who are a part of a research team, irrespective of their role, 
must seek clarification from their institutional REB as to the requirement for review and 
clearance. For each researcher, please indicate if REB clearance is required or briefly provide the 
rationale for why it is not required: 
 
Since the student investigator is a student at the University of Windsor, REB clearance is not 
required.  
 
REVIEW FROM ANOTHER INSTITUTION 
1.  Has this application been submitted to another university REB or a hospital REB 
  Yes      No X 
2.  Has this application been reviewed, or will this application be reviewed, by another 
person or a committee for human research ethics in another organization, such as a school 
board?  Yes       No X 
If YES to either 1 or 2 above, 
a. provide the name of the board:   
b. provide the date of submission:   
c.          provide the decision and attach a copy of the approval document:   Approved  
 Name Dept./Address Phone/Ext. E-mail 
Student  
Investigator1 
Jessica Shultz Political Science 
1149 CHN 
519-259-
8921 
shultz@uwindsor.ca  
Co-
Investigator(s) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Faculty  
Supervisor2 
Dr. Bill 
Anderson 
Political Science  
G118 CHN 
519-253-
3000 
Ext. 2366 
bander@uwindsor.ca 
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STUDENT INVESTIGATOR ASSURANCE 
  
I certify that the information provided in this application is complete and correct. 
I understand that as Student Investigator, I have responsibility for the conduct of the study, the 
ethics performance of the project and the protection of the rights and welfare of human 
participants. 
I agree to comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement and all University of Windsor policies 
and procedures, governing the protection of human subjects in research. 
 
Signature of Student Investigator: _____________________________________ Date: _________________
 
FACULTY SUPERVISOR ASSURANCE 
 
 
Title of Research Project:   The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in  
           Maintaining a Safe and Open Canada-United States Border 
 
Student Investigator:           Jessica Shultz 
 
I certify that the information provided in this application is complete and correct. 
I understand that as principal Faculty Supervisor, I have ultimate responsibility for the conduct of 
the study, the ethical performance of the project and the protection of the rights and welfare of 
human participants. 
I agree to comply with the Tri-Council Policy Statement and all University of Windsor policies 
and procedures, governing the protection of human subjects in research, including, but not limited 
to, the following: 
-performing the project by qualified and appropriately trained personnel in accordance with REB 
protocol; 
-implementing no changes to the REB approved protocol or consent form/statement without 
notification to the REB of the proposed changes and their subsequent approval of the REB; 
-reporting promptly significant adverse effects to the REB within five (5) working days of 
occurrence 
 
Signature of Faculty Supervisor: _______________________________ Date:_________ 
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A.  PROJECT DETAILS 
 
A.1.   Level of Project 
 
   Ph.D. X  Masters    Undergraduate    Post Doctoral    
  
   Other (specify):       
 
 Is this research project related to a graduate course?    Yes   X  No 
 
 or to your thesis/dissertation?      X  Yes    No 
 
 If yes, please indicate the course number:   N/A 
 
 Please explain how this research project is related to your graduate course.   N/A 
 
A.2.   Funding Status 
 
 Is this project currently funded?      Yes  X  No 
 
 If NO, is funding to be sought?      Yes  X  No 
 
A.3. Details of Funding (Funded or Applied for) 
 
 Agency:  
 
   NSERC  ORS Application Number:             
 
   SSHRC  ORS Application Number:            
 
   Other (specify):              
     
     ORS Application Number:            
 
 Period of funding:  From:               To:              
 
 Type of funding: 
 
   Grant   Contract    Research Agreement 
 
B. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED RESEARCH 
 
B.1. Describe the purpose and background rationale for the proposed project. 
 
 Since the attacks of September 11,2001, the governments of Canada and the United States have been trying 
to increase border security while simultaneously maintaining a border open to trade. Relying solely on border 
security to stop the flow of illegitimate drugs, guns, people and potential terrorists is reactive in nature and 
does not address the source of these illicit flows. In order to ensure that the Canada-US border can 
realistically be open to trade but closed to illegitimate goods and peoples, proactive initiatives like Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams, which  target the source of cross-border criminal organizations, must be further 
examined. The purpose of this project is to assess the extent to which Integrated Border Enforcement Teams 
have aided in keeping the border open while reducing the flow of illicit goods and people across the Canada-
United States border.  
 
B.2.  Describe the hypothesis(es)/research questions to be examined.  
 Research Question: In what ways have Integrated Border Enforcement Teams assisted the Canada Border 
Services Agency in maintaining a safe and open Canada-United States border? 
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B.3. Methodology/Procedures 
B.3.a. Do any of the procedures involve invasion of the body (e.g. touching, contact,   attachment to instruments, 
withdrawal of specimens)?          Yes X  No 
  
 
B.3.b. Does the study involve the administration of prescribed or proscribed drugs?   Yes  X  No 
 
B.3.c.i. Specify in a step-by-step outline exactly what the subject(s) will be asked to do.  Attach a copy of any 
questionnaires or test instruments. 
 
1. A representative of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Windsor will be asked to answer fourteen 
questions (see attached). Note: The RCMP Windsor Detachment has permanent staff members that operate as 
part of the Windsor-Detroit Integrated Border Enforcement Team. When the representative agrees to 
participate in a study, s/he will be asked to fill out a consent form to participate in the study.  
2. A representative of the Canada Border Services Agency will be asked to answer seven questions (see 
attached). When the representative agrees to participate in a study, s/he will be asked to fill out a consent 
form to participate in the study. 
3. Participants will engage in face-to-face interviews with the researcher. 
 
B.3.c.ii. What is the rationale for the use of this methodology? Please discuss briefly. 
 
Although the concept of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) was introduced almost 10 years ago, 
there has been very little academic study of their role in reducing illicit cross-border trade and maintaining a 
secure Canada-United States border. Government websites provide very little information on IBETs beyond 
their basic functions. Various media sources have reported on how the concept of IBETs originated and their 
function in creating a safer border. I will also be investigating media reports of successful IBET missions and 
potential shortcomings of these Teams. However, it would be of great benefit to my study if I could speak to 
high-ranked official from RCMP and CBSA and contrast the view of these insiders with media reports and 
government documents/reports. These representatives are likely much more familiar than the media with the 
specific functioning of IBETs, and can provide more of an intimate viewpoint on IBETs.  Questions that will 
be asked to these representatives will relate to specific functions of IBETs-particularly regarding the local 
Windsor-Detroit IBET. There is currently no specific information as to how the Canadian Border Services 
Agency in Windsor goes about sharing intelligence and operating with the Windsor-Detroit IBET.  
 
B.3.d. Will deception be used in this study?   Yes  X  No 
 
 If YES, please describe and justify the need for deception. 
 
B.3.e. Explain the debriefing procedures to be used and attach a copy of the written debriefing 
 
 N/A 
 
B.4. Cite your experience with this kind of research. Use no more than 300 words for each research. 
 
 Although I have no previous experience in this type of research, my supervisor has conducted interviews with 
representatives of government agencies for research purposes. He will be training me in conducting this type 
of interview.   
 
B.5. Subjects Involved in the Study 
 
 Describe in detail the sample to be recruited including: 
 
B.5.a. the number of subjects  
 
 2 
 
B.5.b. age range  
 
 N/A 
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B.5.c. any special characteristics 
 
 N/A 
 
B.5.d. institutional affiliation or where located 
 
 Canada Border Services Agency-Windsor/Royal Canadian Mounted Police Windsor Detachment  
 
B.6. Recruitment Process 
 
B.6.a. Describe how and from what sources the subjects will be recruited.   
 
o Since the RCMP and CBSA websites do not provide a list of high-ranked officials and their job 
titles, I will be sending a general fax to the RCMP (see attached) requesting an interview with a 
high-ranked official of the Windsor-Detroit IBET. This will be followed up with a phone call.  
o A colleague who works for the CBSA will be providing me with the contact of a high-ranked 
official of the CBSA.  
I will be sending him the interview questions, and he will then forward the questions to the official 
that is most familiar with the subjects of the interview.  
o This process is preferable to a general recruitment since the person who will be interviewed must 
be of high authority and have solid background knowledge on the subjects of the interview. 
 
B.6.b. Indicate where the study will take place.  If applicable, attach letter(s) of permission from organizations 
where research is to take place. 
 
 The interviews will take place either at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada Border Services 
Agency offices in Windsor or at the University of Windsor-depending on the schedule and possible time 
limitations of those being interviewed.  
 
B.6.c. Describe any possible relationship between investigator(s) and subjects(s) (e.g. instructor - student; manager - 
employee).    
 
 There are no possible relationships between the investigator and subjects.  
 
B.6.d. Copies of any poster(s), advertisement(s) or letter(s) to be used for recruitment are attached.     X  Yes (fax to 
RCMP) 
 
B.7. Compensation of Subjects                                    
 
B.7.a. Will subjects receive compensation for participation?   Yes   X  No 
 
 If YES, please provide details. 
 
 N/A 
 
B.7.b. If subjects (s) choose to withdraw, how will you deal with compensation?  
 
 N/A 
 
B.8. Feedback to Subjects 
 
Whenever possible, upon completion of the study, subjects should be informed of the results.  Describe below 
the arrangements for provision of this feedback. (Please note that the REB has web space available for 
publishing the results at www.uwindsor.ca/reb. You can enter your study results under Study Results on the 
website. Please provide the date when your results will be available) 
 
              Following the completion of the thesis paper, I will be providing the participants with a brief summary of my    
              results.  
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C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THE STUDY 
 
C.1. Discuss any potential direct benefits to subjects from their involvement in the project.  
 
 I do not anticipate direct benefits to subjects from their involvement in the project; however, they may benefit 
by knowing they have assisted in constructing academic research in the area of Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams. 
 
C.2. Comment on the (potential) benefits to (the scientific community)/society that would justify involvement of 
subjects in this study. 
 
The academic field of border studies would benefit from gaining insight about post-9/11 initiatives to keep 
borders safe through   collaborative rather than unilateral efforts.  
 
D. POTENTIAL RISKS OF THE STUDY        
  
 
D.1. Are there any psychological risks/harm?   
 (Might a subject feel demeaned, embarrassed, worried or upset?)   Yes   X  No 
 
D.2. Are there any physical risks/harm?      Yes  X  No 
 
D.3. Are there any social risks/harm? (Possible loss of status, privacy, and/or reputation?)  
         X  Yes    No 
 
D.4. Describe the known and anticipated risks of the proposed research, specifying the particular risk(s)/harm 
associated with each procedure or task. Consider physical, psychological, emotional, and social risks/harm. 
 
 There is a possible loss of privacy associated with the proposed research since the name of the representatives 
from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada Border Services Agency will be provided in the results 
and thesis paper.  
 
D.5. Describe how the potential risks to the subjects will be minimized. 
 
I will not be offering confidentiality to the participants since they will be permitted to review the transcripts 
of the interview. 
 
E. INFORMATION AND CONSENT PROCESS  
  
If different groups of subjects are going to be asked to do different things during the course of the research, 
more than one consent may be necessary (i.e. if the research can be seen as having Phase I and Phase II). 
 
E.1. Is a copy of a separate Consent Form attached to this application? X Yes   No 
 
E.2. Is a copy of a separate Letter of Information attached to this application?  X Yes   No  
 
If written consent WILL NOT/CANNOT be obtained or is considered inadvisable, justify this and outline the 
process to be used to otherwise fully inform participants. 
 
E.3. Are subjects competent to consent?    X  Yes    No 
 
If not, describe the process to be used to obtain permission of parent or guardian. 
 
E.4. Is a Parental/Guardian Information and Consent Form attached?   Yes  X  No 
 
E.5. Is an Assent Form attached?       Yes  X  No 
 
E.6. Withdrawal from Study 
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E.6.a. Do subjects have the right to withdraw at any time during and after the research project?  
        X  Yes    No 
  
E.6.b. Are subjects to be informed of this right?   X  Yes    No 
 
E.6.c. Describe the process to be used to inform subjects of their withdrawal right. 
 
 At the stage when representatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada Border Services 
Agency have agreed to conduct a face-to-face interview, I will inform them verbally of their right to 
withdraw at any time during and after the interview. I will also be providing the two representatives with a 
Consent Form (see attached), which offers written affirmation of their withdrawal right.  
 
F. CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Definitions: Anonymity - when the subject cannot be identified, even by the researcher. 
 Confidentiality - must be provided when the subject can be identified, even if only by the researcher. 
 
F.1. Describe the procedures to be used to ensure anonymity of subjects and confidentiality of data. Explain how 
written records, video/audio tapes and questionnaires will be secured, and provide details of their final 
disposal. 
 
I will not be offering confidentiality to the participants since they will be permitted to review the transcripts 
of the interview.  Audio tapes will be kept in a locked cupboard and will not be shared with anyone. They 
will be kept for 24 hours and erased immediately after the relevant interview responses have been transcribed 
and verified by the participants. Participants will have the choice of reviewing the transcripts through their 
choice of email (encrypted) or hard copy. The transcripts will be kept for 48 hours after they are reviewed by 
the participants, to allow sufficient time for me to review them and make use of the relevant responses.  
 
F.2. Is a Consent for Audio/Video Taping Form attached?  X Yes                 No 
 
F.3. Specify if an assurance of anonymity or confidentiality is being given during: 
 
F.3.a. Conduct of research        Yes  X  No 
  
F.3.b. Release of findings       X  Yes    No 
              *if the subjects request it 
 
F.3.c. Details of final disposal      X  Yes    No 
              *if the subjects request it 
 
G. REB REVIEW OF ONGOING RESEARCH   
 
G.1. Are there any specific characteristics of this research which requires  
 additional review by the REB when the research is ongoing?    Yes  X  No 
 
 If YES, please explain. 
 
            
 
G.2. Will the results of this research be used in a way to create financial gain for the researcher? 
           Yes  X  No 
 
 If YES, please explain. 
 
            
 
G.3. Is there an actual or potential conflict of interest?      Yes  X  No 
 
 If YES, please explain for researchers who are involved. 
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G.4. Please propose a continuing review process (beyond the annual Progress Report) you deem to be 
appropriate for this research project/program. 
 
 This is not applicable, since the proposed project will last for less than one year. 
 
Please note that a Progress Report must be submitted to the Research Ethics Coordinator if your research 
extends beyond one year from the clearance date. A Final Report must be submitted when the project is 
completed. Forms are available at www.uwindsor.ca/reb. 
 
H. SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
Generally, but not always, the possibility should be kept open for re-using the data obtained from research 
subjects. 
 Will, or might, the data obtained from the subjects of this research project  
 be used in subsequent research studies?        X  Yes    No 
 
If YES, please indicate on the Consent Form that the data may be used in other research studies.  
 
I.  CONSENT FORM 
 
If a Consent Form is required for your research, please use the following sample Consent Form template. If 
you wish to deviate from this format, please provide the rationale. Print out the Consent Form with the 
University of Windsor logo. The information in the Consent Form must be written/presented in language that 
is clear and understandable for the intended target audience. 
 
 
J.  LETTER OF INFORMATION 
 
If a Letter of Information is required for your research, please use the following sample Letter of 
Information template. If you wish to deviate from this format, please provide the rationale. Print out the 
Letter of Information with the University of Windsor logo. The Letter of Information must be 
written/presented in language that is clear and understandable for the intended target audience. 
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 Consent Form for Canada Border Services Agency Representative  
 
 
Title of Study: The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and Open Canada-United 
States Border 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Masters Candidate Jessica Shultz from the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Windsor. The results of the study will contribute to her thesis. 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact her Supervisor, Dr. Bill Anderson. He 
can be reached at 519-253-3000 ext. 2366. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is designed to assess the ways which Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have aided the Canada Border 
Services Agency in keeping the border open while reducing the flow of illicit goods and people across the Canada-
United States border.  
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview that will last approximately 
one hour. This interview would be a one-time procedure and would be conducted at your choice of the University of 
Windsor or the Windsor office of the Canada Border Services Agency.  
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no foreseeable risks, discomforts or inconveniences involved in this study.  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
The academic field of border studies would benefit from gaining insight about post-9/11 initiatives to keep borders safe 
through collaborative rather than unilateral efforts.  
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participants will not receive payment for participating in this study.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Prior to the interview, participants will have the choice of being identified based on official title only or being identified 
by name and official title. Should you wish that your name remain confidential, any contact information will be 
shredded immediately after the completion of the study. Interviews will be audio-taped, and participants will have the 
opportunity to verify the transcriptions of the interview through e-mail.   No one besides the researcher will have access 
to the audio tapes. These audio tapes will be used for educational purposes only and  will be erased immediately after 
the relevant responses are transcribed and verified. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time 
without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still 
remain in the study.  The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing 
so.  
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
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The predicted date of completion is April 1, 2009. Following the completion of the study, you will be provided with a 
copy of the research report. 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
The data obtained from the subjects of this research may be used in subsequent research studies. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, 
Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
I understand the information provided for the study The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining 
a Safe and Open Canada-United States Border as described herein.  My questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study.  I have been given a copy of this form. 
 
 
______________________________________ 
Name of Subject 
 
______________________________________   ___________________ 
Signature of Subject       Date 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
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Consent Form for Royal Canadian Mounted Police Representative 
 
 
Title of Study: The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and Open Canada-United 
States Border 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Masters Candidate Jessica Shultz from the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Windsor. The results of the study will contribute to her thesis. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact her Supervisor, Dr. Bill Anderson. He 
can be reached at 519-253-3000 ext. 2366. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is designed to assess the ways which Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have aided the Canada Border 
Services Agency in keeping the border open while reducing the flow of illicit goods and people across the Canada-
United States border.  
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview that will last approximately 
one hour. This interview would be a one-time procedure and would be conducted at your choice of the University of 
Windsor or the Windsor detachment  
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no foreseeable risks, discomforts or inconveniences involved in this study.  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
The academic field of border studies would benefit from gaining insight about post-9/11 initiatives to keep borders safe 
through collaborative rather than unilateral efforts.  
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participants will not receive payment for participating in this study.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Prior to the interview, participants will have the choice of being identified based on official title only or being identified 
by name and official title. Should you wish that your name remain confidential, any contact information will be 
shredded immediately after the completion of the study. Interviews will be audio-taped, and participants will have the 
opportunity to verify the transcriptions of the interview through e-mail.   No one besides the researcher will have access 
to the audio tapes. These audio tapes will be used for educational purposes only and  will be erased immediately after 
the relevant responses are transcribed and verified. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time 
without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still 
remain in the study.  The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing 
so.  
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
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The predicted date of completion is April 1, 2009. Following the completion of the study, you will be provided with a 
copy of the research report. 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
The data obtained from the subjects of this research may be used in subsequent research studies. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, 
Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
I understand the information provided for the study The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining 
a Safe and Open Canada-United States Border as described herein.  My questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study.  I have been given a copy of this form. 
 
 
______________________________________ 
Name of Subject 
 
______________________________________   ___________________ 
Signature of Subject       Date 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator     Date 
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Letter of Information for Royal Canadian Mounted Police Representative 
 
 
Title of Study: The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and Open Canada-United 
States Border 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Masters Candidate Jessica Shultz from the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Windsor. The results of the study will contribute to her thesis. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact her Supervisor, Dr. Bill Anderson. He 
can be reached at 519-253-3000 ext. 2366. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is designed to assess the ways which Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have aided the Canada Border 
Services Agency in keeping the border open while reducing the flow of illicit goods and people across the Canada-
United States border.  
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview that will last approximately 
one hour. This interview would be a one-time procedure and would be conducted at your choice of the University of 
Windsor or the Windsor  detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no foreseeable risks, discomforts or inconveniences involved in this study.  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
The academic field of border studies would benefit from gaining insight about post-9/11 initiatives to keep borders safe 
through collaborative rather than unilateral efforts.  
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participants will not receive payment for participating in this study.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Prior to the interview, participants will have the choice of being identified based on official title only or being identified 
by name and official title. Should you wish that your name remain confidential, any contact information will be 
shredded immediately after the completion of the study. Interviews will be audio-taped, and participants will have the 
opportunity to verify the transcriptions of the interview through e-mail.   No one besides the researcher will have access 
to the audio tapes. These audio tapes will be used for educational purposes only and  will be erased immediately after 
the relevant responses are transcribed and verified. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time 
without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still 
remain in the study.  The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing 
so.  
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
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The predicted date of completion is April 1, 2009. Following the completion of the study, you will be provided with a 
copy of the research report. 
 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
The data obtained from the subjects of this research may be used in subsequent research studies. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, 
Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca 
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Letter of Information for Canada Border Services Agency Representative 
 
Title of Study: The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and Open Canada-United 
States Border 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Masters Candidate Jessica Shultz from the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Windsor. The results of the study will contribute to her thesis. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel to contact her Supervisor, Dr. Bill Anderson. He 
can be reached at 519-253-3000 ext. 2366. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is designed to assess the ways which Integrated Border Enforcement Teams have aided the Canada Border 
Services Agency in keeping the border open while reducing the flow of illicit goods and people across the Canada-
United States border.  
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in an interview that will last approximately 
one hour. This interview would be a one-time procedure and would be conducted at your choice of the University of 
Windsor or the Windsor office of  
the Canada Border Services Agency.  
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There are no foreseeable risks, discomforts or inconveniences involved in this study.  
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
The academic field of border studies would benefit from gaining insight about post-9/11 initiatives to keep borders safe 
through collaborative rather than unilateral efforts.  
 
PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participants will not receive payment for participating in this study.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Prior to the interview, participants will have the choice of being identified based on official title only or being identified 
by name and official title. Should you wish that your name remain confidential, any contact information will be 
shredded immediately after the completion of the study. Interviews will be audio-taped, and participants will have the 
opportunity to verify the transcriptions of the interview through e-mail.   No one besides the researcher will have access 
to the audio tapes. These audio tapes will be used for educational purposes only and  will be erased immediately after 
the relevant responses are transcribed and verified. 
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
You can choose whether to be in this study or not.  If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time 
without consequences of any kind.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer and still 
remain in the study.  The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing 
so.  
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FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE SUBJECTS 
 
The predicted date of completion is April 1, 2009. Following the completion of the study, you will be provided with a 
copy of the research report. 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
The data obtained from the subjects of this research may be used in subsequent research studies. 
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
 
You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue participation without penalty. If you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, 
Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca 
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CONSENT FOR AUDIO TAPING 
 
   Research Participant: Representative from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Windsor  Detachment 
          Title of the Project: The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and  
          Open Canada-United States Border  
 
           I consent to the audio-taping of one interview with student researcher Jessica Shultz. 
 
           I understand that this is a voluntary procedure and that I am free to withdraw at any time by requesting  
           that the taping be stopped.  I also understand that taping will be kept confidential. Tapes will be stored           
           in a locked cabinet and destroyed once the transcriptions have made and verified.  
 
           I understand that the audio tapes will be for professional use only. 
 
 
 
____________________________                                                             _____________________ 
                            (Research Subject)                                                                                          (Date) 
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CONSENT FOR AUDIO TAPING 
 
               Research Participant: Representative from the Canada Border Services Agency (Windsor) 
               Title of the Project: The Role of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in Maintaining a Safe and  
Open Canada- United States Border  
 
I consent to the audio-taping of one interview with student researcher Jessica Shultz. 
I understand that this is a voluntary procedure and that I am free to withdraw at any time by 
requesting that the taping be stopped.  I also understand that taping will be kept confidential. Tapes 
will be stored  in a locked cabinet and destroyed once the transcriptions have made and verified.  
I understand that the audio tapes will be for professional use only. 
 
 
 _______________________                        _____________________ 
                       (Research Subject)                                                                                              (Date) 
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APPENDIX 2 
TRANSCRIPTS FROM INTERVIEW WITH RCMP SERGEANT BOB 
BERGOINE 
 
Interview conducted January 26, 2009 
CBSA Headquarters in Windsor, Ontario 
Q1: What types of situations would have to occur that would necessitate the use of 
an Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)?  
A1: it’s anytime there’s a breach of a border between the ports of entry. CBSA is 
responsible for the ports of entry at our border with the United States. For years, the area 
between the ports of entry, were, I’m not going to say neglected, but as much attention 
was not paid to it as were the ports. After 9/11, the IBETs were brought into force to pay 
the attention of the areas between the ports of area. So any criminal activity that has taken 
place at the port of entry, CBSA is responsible for managing all the enforcement at the 
ports of entry, and between the ports of entry, that’s where IBET comes into play. In the 
province of Ontario, we are surrounded by water, so smuggling would almost always be 
by boat crossing the Detroit River, the St Clair River, one of the lakes. If somebody was 
smuggling into the United States people or commodities or vice versa, into Canada, 
people or commodities, that’s where the IBET would come into play. Out on the prairie 
provinces, they’re not surrounded by water, it’s all done by land. So any criminal activity 
between the points of entry is what we’re focusing our efforts on.  
Q2: What types of criminal activity do IBETs focus on? 
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A2: the initial offence is initially an immigration offence. It’s basically an immigration 
offence to come into Canada without going through a port of entry and reporting and 
getting permission to come into Canada. So that’s the primary offence being investigated. 
But the reason they’re doing it, why aren’t they coming through the port of entry, is 
usually because they’re either smuggling people, guns, drugs, whatever other criminal 
reason they have or they just don’t want anyone to know that they’re entering Canada or 
entering the United States, and they know that if they go through a port of entry, 
somebody could record their name, check them out before they go through the port. So 
they get on a boat, and cross the river and they enter Canada or the United States to avoid 
that detection. 
Q3: Why are IBETs so important? 
A3: IBET came to be after 9/11 with the fear of our borders being porous between the 
ports of entry. The United States and Canada have always had good enforcement at the 
ports of entry. They’ve always had strong efforts to secure the border at the ports of 
entry, but we’re such a large country that it left these huge gaps across Canada and the 
United States, and it was just between the ports of entry. So initially, the national security 
aspect was to secure the border because if somebody wants to enter Canada or to enter 
the United States to cause terrorist acts, to cause harm that way, they’ll probably avoid 
the points of entry to do so. They’ll either cross by boat in Ontario or they’ll cross by 
horseback or by foot in Saskatchewan or Alberta or BC to avoid going through the ports. 
So our number one priority with the IBETS is and always has been national security. 
That’s our first reason for existence.  
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Q4: What is the departmental composition of IBETs? Does it change depending on 
what type of investigation takes place? 
A4: When it first came into effect, the IBETs started with partners, there was six of them 
actually. There was Canada Immigration before they joined forces with Canada Customs 
to form CBSA. Canada Immigration was part of IBET when it first started after 9/11. 
There was Canada Customs, there was the RCMP. Those were the three in Canada. On 
the American side it was US Border Patrol, US Coast Guard and US ICE (Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement). Now it’s the same five without Canada Immigration, because 
Canada Immigration was absorbed by the CBSA. So that’s the five partners that we have: 
three in the States and two in Canada. The US has permanent staff responsible for the 
IBETs. Their people on the ground, so to speak, change from day to day. But we have, 
for example, in Windsor/ Detroit, to function here as an IBET, we have what we call a 
Joint Management Team, and it’s made up of representatives from those five agencies, 
and we meet on a regular basis, and it’s the same people over and over again that meet, 
regardless of what department they’re from to manage the program of the IBET here in 
Windsor/Detroit. But the actual people on the road in the United States change from day 
to day. They’re always border patrol people, they’re always ICE, Coast Guard, but they 
might not always be the same enforcement people on the road. The people attending the 
IBET JMTs are pretty much the same people all the time; the managers from all those 
five departments.  
Q5: Explain the command structure of the IBET (primary decision-makers, head 
offices, ratio of Canadians to Americans in the decision-making process, who 
decides what agencies will participate in the operations). 
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A5: The Joint Management Teams are located in all 15 IBET regions have a local joint 
management team; whether it’s one the size of Windsor/Detroit or a smaller one in like 
Thunder Bay. They meet in Fort Francis. They are a smaller group of people but they do 
the same thing. They sit down, they look at the issues, they decide what enforcement 
action they should take as a group, they talk about the enforcement action that they’re 
taking as individual agencies, because everybody has their own mandate and mission to 
fulfill, and then they bring it all to one table and they discuss that openly and they discuss 
what they want to do together as a group. So they do that at all the Joint Management 
Team meetings. And then there’s a National Coordination Team. In other words, if the 
local JMT has any issues they want to bring forward to the International JMT, they 
wouldn’t actually pick up the phone and call the representative from the IJMT, but they’ll 
call somebody from the National Coordination Team. And in Ottawa, there are members 
physically there from the US Coast Guard, Border Patrol and ICE. They are actually 
stationed in our headquarters building in Ottawa, so it’s like a one-stop shopping set-up, 
so if anybody who’s working the IBET program can’t get an answer locally to a question 
or concern they may have, they can pick up the phone and call their representative in 
Ottawa to get an answer on how to proceed on something. There’s an international Joint 
Management Team that is made up senior members from all these agencies. They meet 
two or three times a year. They don’t meet as often. They meet sometimes in 
Washington; sometimes they’ll meet in Vancouver. They change the meeting location to 
suit the partners. They appoint local joint management representatives. I represent the 
RCMP on the Windsor Joint Management Team. We meet here monthly, the Joint 
Management Team, and any kind of decisions with regard to what operations we’re going 
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to jointly take part in the summer or next week or next month are made at that table with 
those representatives from the Joint Management Team. But in addition to those kinds of 
decisions, each agency has their own responsibility to enforce criminal activity at the 
border. Border Patrol is always on the border, enforcing and protecting the border on 
their side, whether it’s an IBET-related project they’re working on or not, they’re always 
on the border doing that work and so are we. But if we come together to work on a 
project, the decision is usually made at the Joint Management Team. And the RCMP that 
is sitting at that Joint Management Team will dedicate so many bodies to that project, so 
many resources, ICE will do the same, Border Patrol will do the same, and Coast Guard 
will do the same.                  
Q6: Proportionally, how much of the IBET activities take place away from borders 
and how much is focused directly on border crossings? 
A6: The IBET activity does not take place at border crossings. CBSA is responsible for 
border crossings at the Ambassador Bridge or the tunnel or up in Sarnia. We don’t go 
there. Most of our work is in close proximity of the actual border. If it’s an inland 
investigation then it has to be followed up, the seizure, at the point of entry. It wouldn’t 
be the IBET that would go in and do the investigation. We have substantive units in the 
RCMP. That would be the IMP and Immigration and Passport section or the Customs and 
Excise Section or the Drug sections, for example. If there is an arrest at the port of entry, 
a large of cocaine comes in through the Ambassador Bridge for example, we have a drug 
section here. It’s not part of IBET. It’s a substantive unit in the RCMP that investigates 
all types of drug investigations. They’d be called in to do the investigation to try to 
determine the sources of the drugs and laid charges for that. If an IBET investigation 
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required inland investigations for long periods of time, we don’t want to be away from 
the border for too long. We don’t want to avoid the activity at the border; that’s our main 
focus. So we would turn it over to the substantive unit of the RCMP. Money, for 
example, we’ve seized money on the border coming across by boat. Most of it is 
proceeds of crime; it’s drug money. We made the seizure and made the arrest of the 
people bringing the money across, but we wouldn’t continue with the investigation after 
that. We would turn over the money and the people over to the substantive unit and they 
would continue the investigation. Because chances are that investigation, the tentacles of 
that investigation would lead inland quite a bit; maybe to Toronto, maybe to one of the 
bigger communities, and we don’t want to be away from the border, so our substantive 
units would look after that.  
Q7: How do IBET’s go about making their forces and teams interoperable?  
A7: We’ve got CBSA working here with us. Two representatives from CBSA are here 
full-time, so we’re interoperable in that regard. With the Americans it’s a bit more 
difficult; especially here, because we are surrounded by water. So what we do normally is 
we work together but we don’t cross over that imaginary line out in the lake, but our 
partners from Border Patrol will be working on the same case; the same people will be 
working on a joint project. They’ll be on duty on the American side doing the work and 
we’ll be on this side doing the work and we’ll be communicating back and forth on a 
regular basis. There have been projects, have you heard of Shiprider? That was a case 
where there was joint projects and they actually got permission for each of us to work in 
each other’s jurisdiction. It was a pilot project, so it was a specific period of time and a 
specific location. It was a pilot project to see how it worked. Across jurisdiction, where 
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you’d have RCMP members in the States armed and carrying out the enforcement 
actions. In the United States and vice versa, the Americans were out in Canadian waters; 
it was a marine project.  
Q8: Explain how the different agencies that participate in IBETs communicate with 
one another, given the constraints of disclosing confidential information.  
A8: The IBET here, for example, has a JIG (Joint Intelligence Group). It is a group of 
intelligence agents from all these five agencies and from some other local agencies 
participate too, because intelligence is one of those things where the sharing of 
information is that important that whether you’re a member of those five core or not, 
intelligence agents from other departments have joined up to share information to keep 
that flow going. The Windsor Police, for example, the O.P.P. are here, even though 
they’re not one of these core five, they’re here on a full-time basis, the intelligence 
agents, to share the information they’re talking about. So it’s much-improved since 9/11. 
There are still some restrictions that have to be followed through; legal restrictions and 
policy restrictions, but they get through them, they deal with them, and they share the 
information. There’s a group here, in this office, these five people all have a desk here; 
the intelligence representatives from most five agencies, and they come here on a regular 
basis and share intelligence and share information.  
Q9: What are some of the challenges faced by IBETs, both in an urban area like the 
Windsor/Detroit crossing and a more remote area like the rural Alberta-Montana 
border? 
A9: The geography of it all is a challenge. I know members out in Alberta and BC. The 
geography there is as big of a challenge as the marine aspect is for us here. It’s a big 
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needle in a haystack that you’re looking for. For example, in Windsor, if you take a look 
at Lake St. Clair in the summertime, you might see 10-15,000 boats out there. The 
challenge is: which one of them or two of them are bad guys? You know that the rest of 
them are just people out fishing or boating, out with their families or having nice days 
and just enjoying the weather but the challenge is finding out which is which. That’s the 
biggest challenge from an operational perspective. And then the sheer geography of it all; 
if you look at the mountains out west; the terrain that the members have to work through 
out there. The bad guys will go to those very isolated spots to cross because they know 
that these are challenges for us; to get people located in these isolated areas. People in 
those townships and towns in Quebec have been living together, and Americans and 
Canadians have been sharing the same main streets for years and people in the past would 
walk back and forth and they still do, but if somebody wants to cross into another 
country, what better place to do it? Just blend into the crowd. Resources are another 
challenge. Having the resources to cover those types of challenges.  
Q10. How do IBETs go about cooperating with U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
and the Canada Border Services Agency? How effective is this cooperation?  
A10: As I said, they’re part of the team so that makes cooperation that much easier, 
because they actually come here every day. We see them every day. Our border patrol 
partners, for example, we don’t see them every day. We may talk to them on the phone, 
communicate with them every day; we do that everyday with Coast Guard and Border 
Patrol and ICE. But our CBSA partners, we see them everyday. We meet with them every 
day. Within the IBET, CBSA’s role is intelligence. The enforcement side belongs to the 
RCMP. But we see them every day for the purpose of gathering intelligence.  
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Q 11: Has the Canadian government’s pledge to financially sustain IBETs been 
matched by adequate staffing and funding? If not, what is still needed?  
A11: Immediately after 9/11, any of the funding issues you are probably talking about are 
the start-up costs. With any new initiative, there is always initially a large among of 
funding required to get them started. Then there’s a certain amount of funding required to 
maintain the program. And we have enough funding right now to maintain our program. 
Nobody’s cut us back yet.  
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APPENDIX 5 
TRANSCRIPTS FROM INTERVIEW WITH CBSA CHIEF GERRY DUNDAS 
Interview conducted February 5, 2009  
CBSA headquarters at the Windsor-Detroit Tunnel 
 
Q1: How to Border Services Officers contribute to the efficient flow of border 
traffic while ensuring that illegitimate goods and people do not cross the Canada-
United States border? 
A1: Well, it is a paradox, and it is for any agency-more so for ours than a lot of others. 
We’re part of the public service so we have a service to provide. If you’re a legitimate 
traveler and you travel here on a daily basis, we are just in your way. If you never 
smuggle, you never have any contraband or any problems-you don’t even buy goods in 
the States, we’re just an impediment. So our job is to find a way to identify you quickly, 
clear you quickly, and get out of your way. And the fine line between facilitation and 
border enforcement is a matter of proper employee selection-you have to have the right 
people for the job, proper training, proper training, proper mindset, proper updates, and 
proper tools to do the job. I’m sure you’re aware of our NEXUS program? We’ve tried to 
find innovative ways to facilitate the legitimate traveler, and there are all kinds of 
estimates out there. It usually runs around 97% of people who cross the border are just 
legitimate international travelers who need to be cleared. Particularly at a border crossing 
such as this one at the tunnel; We do thousands of commuters each day. I’ll give you an 
example: there are over 5,000 Registered Nurses who work in Detroit. They live in 
Canada, but they work in Detroit. They come as far as Chatham, Ontario to work in the 
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States. So if you were a nurse and you crossed at this border 5 days a week, and after a 12 
hour shift you had to pull up every single day and answer a whole host of questions, it 
would start to be a pretty redundant, ridiculous kind of process. We don’t want that. 
We’re trying to be innovative and find ways to not have you mad at us or bored with us 
or to be in your way all the time. And particularly here-unlike North Portal, 
Saskatchewan, where people are traveling from great distances to go across the border to 
someplace else, here you have people who only cross to commute to their jobs and home. 
And because it’s a commuter environment-more so than any other place in the country, 
these trusted programs such as NEXUS are an innovative way to say: “Jennifer has 
provided all her data, we’ve done a background check, we’ve done all the pertinent 
checks…We’ve identified for all intents and purposes that Jennifer is not a risk…we 
don’t like to use the term “not a risk.” Everyone is a risk. Again, that is part of what we 
do. Everybody needs to be a risk. But you are a very low risk. So we let you use this 
program, where you have a card, the proximity reader reads it. And by the time you pull 
up to the person at the booth, your picture is already on the screen, there is a line that says 
whatever it says…there is nothing that we want…and away it goes. So that part of it is to 
ensure that legitimate goods come in unimpeded or quickly and with as little fanfare as 
possible is the facilitation side. And again, not very easy to do without damaging your 
other components of “how do you catch the bad guys.” So you have to filter in some way, 
shape or form. The filtering of trusted program environments like NEXUS are done 
prescreen. We’ve run your name already. Why would we have to run it every time you 
come through because the card now, it automatically goes through the machine. So that’s 
trusted programs. The second half of the question, where how you identify the 
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illegitimate goods. And that’s where you get into more training and, there are some 
systems things that we use…obviously you know that the license plates are read 
automatically, and we have some data base queries that go on, but over the years, and I’ll 
just speak from experience, the vast majority of large organizations we get involved with 
contraband. Let’s just call them “bad guys.” They are usually caught by someone who 
makes really good eye contact, watches to see what your pulse is doing, your face flush, 
asks you questions that are pertinent to soliciting answers that will lead us to a conclusion 
of…you answer all the questions right, you can go. Or, I don’t like the way she answered 
that question, so I’m going to ask another question…I don’t like the way she answered 
that question, so I’m going to ask her kind of a tricky question. So there are a lot of 
techniques for that, but it requires a certain personality, it requires a certain amount of 
training. Not everyone is as good at it as some people are…some people are just…if 
you’re lying to them they can tell you’re lying in two seconds. Other people are much 
more trusting. We try to provide that type of training, so to catch the illicit goods it’s a 
combination of technology, and we’re relying on it quite a bit these days, only because 
the human element is a lot more difficult to train, and some people will just never really 
be good enforcement people because they are just too trusting. They’ve never had that 
ability. So I guess that’s a two part question, right. We want to get out of your way if 
you’re legitimate, but we can’t totally get out of your way. We can’t say “go, just go.” 
We have to find some filters, so the filter is, either we do it ahead of time in a trusted 
traveler program or we do it really quickly with license plate read, there’s no wants or 
warrants on it, and then we ask a couple of questions and make a determination. It’s 
finding the right balance, and the balance is very important. As I said earlier, we are 
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public servants. We don’t want to be overly officious. We don’t want to be impeding the 
natural flow of goods and commerce, in essence. We don’t want to have a negative 
impact on the business, be it tourism or be it the auto industry.  Our job is not to be a 
negative impact. Technically, our job is to protect those enterprises. So you have to find 
that balance. Even though you’re talking 97% and 3%, it’s still a balance. And for the 
most part, we do a pretty good job. It’s hard to quantify at times; statistically, it’s hard to 
have those concrete numbers.  
Q2: What is CBSA’s official policy/goal with respect to the interception of illicit 
goods and persons? 
A2: our mission statement is “a smart border with smart systems and smart people” so 
that we can provide that balance. If you’re not on that level, you lose that ability to have 
the respect of people. If we didn’t have that NEXUS lane, and you were a nurse who 
crossed 5 days a week after working 12 hours each day and we asked you the same 
questions over and over again, it becomes so ridiculous that we lose your respect. We 
want you to say “you know what, this is a vital program.” We’re not just here because 
we’re a bunch of buffoons trying to make your day long. We’re here to protect the 
economy, the security, and a lot of other industry issues and what have you. Some 
people, if they don’t understand that and don’t respect us, it becomes a really adversarial 
sort of relationship and we don’t want that. We want people to understand what we’re 
here to do.  
Q3: What types of training are Border Services Officers given to be able to 
successfully discern between licit and illicit goods and people that cross the border? 
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A3: our training is much more in-depth than it ever has been; partially because we have 
such a broad scope of legislation to enforce. Depending on who you talk to, it’s upwards 
of 90 pieces of federal legislation, so 90 Acts of Parliament we enforce here. And we also 
have the burdens of Services Canada issues and providing VIN RIV’s for people 
importing vehicles so they can go get license plates, and we collect provincial taxes for 
some things, so from a knowledge-based perspective, when you become a Canada Border 
Services Officer, you’re almost required to know too much. We can’t teach you 
everything, but we can teach you the basics of each thing and then  provide cheat sheets 
and abilities to get onto websites where it walks you through how to fill out the form 
properly, because, you know, we have hundreds of forms. Right? And you need to be 
reminded once in a while. So we can teach you, but you might not see that form again for 
two years. You need to be able to have a sample copy of a form that, technically you 
should know, but I could never expect all of my officers to know all of the forms. Now 
there are some who do know that, but they are really high performers. So you go to the 
Customs College for twelve weeks to Rigaud. And it’s very pass-fail. We have a higher 
failure rate than any police force in the country, which is problematic because we do a lot 
of work to get you to a certain point and you just can’t get over it. Sorry, you can’t be a 
Border Services Officer. I say problematic, but you get a higher-quality BSO when they 
graduate. Most of the people that come back, they are University-educated and good 
performers. But that’s the foundational kind of training. From the time you leave the 
Customs college in Quebec, you will constantly be trained. You will have in-service 
training, we have bulletins every day for our briefings downstairs where “Jessica just 
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drove through in a Honda Accord with a hidden compartment with a hydrolics switch, 
and I want everyone to take a look at this so you understand how to turn it on and get the 
hatch to open, right…hidden compartments..” so that training is constant. And that’s just 
the nature of the beast. Every time we find out some cool smuggling method, they change 
it to something else. So you’re constantly learning. CBSA has been a constant learning 
environment for the last 15 years. We do a yearly performance assessment of every 
employee. You’re given goals and objectives at the beginning of the year, and at the end 
of the year, everything’s documented, we can electronically pull statistics down for how 
well you did in enforcement, how well you did in documentation, and what have you. So 
pretty high standards. So we have a pretty good learning curve. We have constant 
learning. And on those yearly forms, there’s a section for your learning plan. Not only 
does management say “I want you to learn this; by next year I want you to take this 
course, this course and this course, and I’ll pay for it and schedule it for you.” On top of 
that, you can do your own learning plan to say “you know what? While I like to be a 
Border Services Officer, I’d like to become a manager; I’d like to go to the Intelligence 
division; I’d like to take this intelligence course. You put it on there and we’ll try and get 
it for you. From the public service perspective, we are a huge learning organization. At 
the end of the year, when our human resources people review the learning plans, they 
want it to be around 100%. We are a continual learning environment. And it is stressed 
from senior management right on down to the supervisor levels that the people who 
report to you need to have a learning plan. To discern between illicit and licit goods, we 
don’t care whether it’s licit or illicit. We just want to find out whether it’s contraband, 
which is illicit, or even if it’s licit goods, there may be import permits that you’re 
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violating, you may be trying to smuggle because the duty rate is very high on them, or 
you don’t even want to pay the sales tax on them. There are some commodities that are so 
expensive…a bad of diamonds, for instance. It’s not illicit…it’s not illegal to have a 
diamond. It’s illegal to not pay the excise tax on diamonds, which is a high percentage 
rate. This is a big game of hide and seek. You hide it; it’s our job to try to find it. That 
goes from people to commodities to contraband. And for us from a security perspective, 
obviously contraband is more important, but a bag of blood diamonds that are being used 
to fund terrorism is just as important.  
Q4: How does the CBSA contribute to Integrated Border Enforcement Teams? For 
example, if a large quantity of illicit drugs is found in a vehicle and Border Services 
Officers suspect that this seizure is part of a larger operation, what is the process of 
sharing this type of intelligence with the local Border Enforcement Team?   
A4: we have an intelligence division. In the late 1980s, we had the contraband detection 
initiative where the government sunk millions of dollars into mostly contraband…drug 
interdiction…then in the 1990s we had the big push on guns and tobacco. Cigarettes were 
being smuggled to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars…guns were being 
smuggled and so the government sunk a lot of money into it. Then of course you had 
9/11, where security becomes the high pitch so they sunk much more money into both the 
enforcement side, which is the uniform side, and the intell side. When I first started in 
intelligence, there was only 9 intelligence officers. (early 80s). Now there’s 780----60 in 
this region. And it’s not just our agency-all agencies after 9/11 beefed up their intell side. 
So let’s take a seizure of guns, for instance. We get a group of people smuggling guns 
and we arrest them, and then for us, a lot of people think: you got them, you just arrest 
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them, and they go to jail. Well, not even close, because this is where the intell starts. If a 
carload with twenty guns in it, which is not unusual for us-we’ve had higher seizures than 
that-were to get stopped here, we would call various agencies immediately. We’d call our 
own intell people immediately. Our own intell people are in joint forces with a lot of the 
agencies here. IBET, for instance-CBSA has people who work with the IBET people-
joint forces environments, where IBET is perhaps run by the RCMP right now, but they 
have members of Windsor PD, OPP and CBSA. And once that contact is made, they just 
fan out and try to find who else is involved, what’s the scope of it (is it just a small-time 
or is it organized crime? Is it related to terrorism? It just takes time to unravel that 
sweater. And some of these cases go on for months and years sometimes as a result of a 
seizure here. Post 9/11 we had some interesting people who…no contraband..just 
couldn’t stop lying to us, so you know there’s something more to it. Just in the good 
investigative techniques of address books and phone numbers and who knew who, it went 
from Jessica stopped at the border with these three phone numbers that came back to 
these three people that came back to these people who were tied into terrorism. If you 
ever got to see one of our intelligence link charts, it starts with a little car and one body at 
the border, and sometimes some of our link charts for organized crime are huge because 
they just keep fanning out. And it’s interesting, because we end up knowing about people 
who don’t even know that they’re part of the whole organization. They just do a function, 
but really they’re doing a function for something they probably wouldn’t agree to if they 
understood. And sometimes the middle people kind of get away because you just really 
want to get the top people. But I guess if I had to sum up how we contribute, we 
contribute in information, in resources..for us, we’re the front line. So to flip it 
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over…CSIS knows about Jessica, but they can’t catch her. They don’t have a reason to 
get a warrant for her residence or her business, but they know she’s going to be crossing 
from Detroit to Windsor on February the 5th. CBSA has the ability to do warantless 
searches. They know she’s up to something but they don’t know what. Jessica comes 
over, we examine Jessica and find whatever. But then we confirm or negate their 
suspicion based on providing intell-as long as we do it within the confines of legal 
authorization. There’s only so much we can do before we start to break our own 
legislation…for example, disclosure of information…we have very strict rules on what 
we can and cannot disclose. We have very strict rules on what we can and can’t even 
photocopy out of someone’s car. For instance, if Jessica came across the border and she 
had dope in her car, well the gloves are off. You’re the bad guy; we’ve caught you, and 
we have the ability to do so much. But if you came across and we didn’t really find 
anything but we’re suspicious, we’re restricted. This is a society where we follow the 
rules, and even though we’re suspicious there is only so much we can do. We can’t 
overstep our bounds. It’s always referred in jurisprudence as “fishing expeditions.” You 
can’t say “I just want to find out about her. I don’t really know if she’s up to anything, I 
don’t have any hunches, nobody’s  told me anything,  but I just feel like checking her 
out.” We can’t do that. No police agency in Canada can do that. Everything is done with 
reasonable and probable grounds. Even though we contribute from an intell basis, we’re 
restricted by what we can and can’t do. Even under some instances where you have been 
arrested, there are certain rules and restrictions that we must follow to make it legitimate 
and make it hold up in court and make it not a violation of your Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and not a violation of various other personal laws that we must abide by. Some 
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people think we have all this authority; we do have a lot of authority but the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms can’t be violated just because we’re allowed to do this. We have to 
play by all of those rules; we can lose that case in court, we can embarrass the department 
which is something no one ever wants to do; we can set bad jurisprudence and lose some 
of the power if we don’t abide by the rules. Anything; particularly covert style of 
operations like the IBET, make a difference. And the reason they call them Integrated 
Border Enforcement teams…if you and I are from two different agencies but we’re 
working the same thing at the same time, I don’t have to worry about telling you 
something because you found out about it the same time I did, kind of mentality. So when 
you have any type of agency or organization or group that’s made up of the …the sum of 
the organization is greater than the whole, it is so much more beneficial to have all these 
other agencies. And I’ll give you a good “for instance.” I guarantee you that two CBSA 
guys and two RCMP guys working together is better than 4 RCMP guys working 
together. To be honest, 2 RCMP guys and 2 CBSA guys is better than 4 CBSA guys 
working together. It’s just a matter of wider ranging authorities, because you got the 
benefits of the RCMP authorities and the CBSA authorities, which are sometimes similar 
but ours are much more wide-ranging from a search perspective. Pre-9/11 when we didn’t 
do a bunch of this stuff, we did have joint forces operations, and the IBETs were based 
on this concept. Even before 9/11, everybody knew Joint Forces were the way to go to 
attack any given problem. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, for instance. What is CBSA’s role 
in Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs? Well there isn’t any. We don’t have a mandate or any 
legislation, but we can sure stop them and identify them and monitor them as they cross 
the border so that’s a big help to whoever is following bikers’ international travel. So 
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even some of these smaller kinds of organizations like biker gangs, CBSA has a 
contribution to make there. To close on that one, pre-9/11 and post-9/11, there really isn’t 
a whole lot of difference. It’s just more formalized. We worked with the RCMP quite 
closely on border infrastructure issues long before, just because it was the right thing to 
do. They only had so many limited resources, we had limited resources, so we 
communicated and tried to find the best way to do that. The other thing is, without 
IBETs…some people say, “well forget about the intell and all these secret squirrel 
guys…you should have uniformed officers out there with guns standing along the 
border.” Well, the border I’m in charge of, just for my marine division, is 780 kilometers 
long. How many BSOs do I need with guns to line up? And even if I had them all, if you 
gave me 1000 extra people, at a huge cost to the taxpayer, I still wouldn’t be any more 
comfortable than I am with 5 IBET guys, because you don’t know where they’re ever 
going to be. If you’re a bad guy, you’ve got to be careful. Because if we were lined up 
along the border, they would know where we weren’t. They’d know where we were and 
they’d know where we weren’t. Whereas with IBET,…are they across there waiting for 
me? Do they have intell on me to chase me? Intell is the way to go to use your resources 
to the nth degree. It’s just too vast an area to say that a non-intelligence, non-covert type 
of enforcement is applicable, because it’s not. You can give me as many uniformed 
officers as you want, but I will not guarantee you that something is totally secure. IBETs 
will always be around somewhere; you just don’t know where. And sometimes not 
knowing where is a big deterrent to bad guys. IBET team members are usually in plain 
clothes, out skulking around. You’re not going to see one of my guys in uniform on one 
of these. It’s always going to be someone from our plain clothes intell or investigations 
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division, by the nature of their work. And some of the stuff that they do is cultivated from 
sources and informants along the way. So Jessica’s the IBET rep from Lasalle to 
Amherstburg. That’s your territory. How often are you out there? Maybe 8 hours a day, 
maybe 5 days a week. But if you cultivate joe blow at this marina and frank blow at that  
one and Sally Sue here and some old lady who lives in a high rise who can see for 10 
miles in all directions, give them your business card with your pager number or cell 
phone number and say “if you see anything strange, give me a call,” what a great use of 
resources. One girl is covering 40 kilometers of intricate waterways, but she’s cultivated 
sources in the public to help us out. And that’s what the IBETs do. They get out there and 
weave a web of contacts, informants and sources that, yeah, you know I’m not there 24 
hours a day, but the people who I know that don’t want bad guys in their neighbourhood 
know that they can call me and I’ll be there quickly. So that’s the covert side of things, 
right. Getting people in place; that kind of dragnet kind of mentality. Right after 9/11, we 
scrambled, and some of us, you know, we don’t’ need more money; we don’t need more 
resources. We just need more authorization and time to get out there and do those sort of 
things. And IBETs are kind of the result of that. There job is to be between those points 
of entry and to be in those covert areas and to cultivate and to be those eyes and ears out 
there.  
Q5: The Canadian and US governments stated after 9/11 that increasing the level of 
co-operation between Canadian and American border agencies would become a 
priority. Have the two agencies become more integrated since 9/11? If so, in what 
ways? If not, what are some of the limitations to integrating the US Customs and 
Border Protection and the Canada Border Services Agency? 
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A5: we’ve always had a good rapport with CBP. Unfortunately, I guess the short answer 
is, we’ve got great rapport since 9/11. It’s better than it ever was, but we’re still 
somewhat hampered by our own legal and statutory limitations whereby we can’t 
interface computers. They’ve got their tech system right on the Detroit side of the tunnel, 
but our systems aren’t allowed to talk…legislatively, two sovereign nations are not 
allowed to exchange that information at that level. So while the communication’s great, it 
could always be better. It could always be better. But the working relationship is great. 
From a headquarters perspective, Washington to Ottawa, again, those same bureaucratic 
kind of responsibilities that you have to play by. It would be nice, to catch bad guys, to 
just say “the gloves are off.” It’s terrorism; we’re going to do everything we want. But 
the Declaration of Independence and our Charter of Rights and Freedoms say this is the 
rules of engagement, and those are great guiding principles for both countries, and we’re 
not about to give them up. It’s important, because I have the authority to tell people what 
to do here, that I understand those and don’t ever breach them. I mean, there are some 
bad guys out there that by hook or by crook I would like to catch. But at what cost? At 
what personal cost to the integrity of law enforcement, and at what cost when it goes to 
court, which is the check and balance feature. “Did you violate his Charter of Rights 
when you arrested him? Yes? Case dismissed.” So both societies are based on…“make 
sure you do it, you do it right, and you do it with the right goals, objectives and 
authorities and legislation to back you up.” 
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